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Abstract
This thesis contains of four chapters. The rst chapter presents the introduction and
all other three chapters look at di¤erent aspects of monetary policy in an economy with
nancial frictions.
The second chapter studies the conditions under which a modest nancial shock can
trigger a deep recession with a prolonged period of slow recovery. We suggest that two
factors can generate such a prole. The rst is that the economy has accumulated a
moderately high level of private debt by the time the adverse shock occurs. The second
factor is when monetary policy is restricted by the zero lower bound. When present, these
factors can result in a sharp contraction in output followed by a slow recovery. Perhaps
surprisingly, we use a standard DSGE model with nancial frictions along the lines of
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) to demonstrate this result and so do not need to rely on
dysfunctional interbank markets.
The third chapter studies international transmission of nancial shocks between two
economies under exible exchange rate regime. We consider di¤erent degrees of nancial
integration and demonstrate that welfare is maximised for an intermediate value of de-
gree of it. Under perfect risk sharing there is large volatility of output during the period
of adjustment, while the deleveraging is performed faster. With greater restrictions on
international nancial ows, the deleveraging is substantially slowed down which leads to
longer periods of adjustment and greater costs. We demonstrate that in such world the
e¤ect of one countrys credit shock has very limited e¤ect on another country. When mon-
etary policymakers cooperate and choose interest rate optimally, the una¤ected country
can nearly eliminate all aftere¤ects of the shock to the other country. To some extent,
limited nancial integration prevents the spread of volatility across the border, however,
unconstrained monetary policy is the key to these results.
In the fourth chapter we use two-country model and assume that both countries are
locked into a permanently xed exchange rate regime within a currency union. We demon-
strate that the centralised monetary policy alone is unable to stabilise the economy. Na-
tional scal policies must be activated to counteract asymmetric shocks. We demonstrate,
however, that the e¤ectiveness of scal policy is limited. Even if it is chosen optimally,
scal policy does not eliminate cyclical patterns in economic adjustment, which is welfare-
reducing volatility of economic variables. This model reveals that shocks hitting one
economy, result in sharp contraction of consumption in both countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nearly a decade has passed since the beginning of the Great Recession in 2008, but for
a number of economies recovery is slow and remains weak. In fact, some even worry it
has led in a new era of permanently lower trend growth. The Great Recession stands
out for at least two reasons. First, in each country the average recession is not as deep
as the Great Recession. Second, in each country the average recession experiences its
lowest output growth rate at the beginning of the recession (period zero in the gure).
Thereafter, economies generally return to a more normal growth path within one or two
quarters. By way of contrast, following the arrival of the Great Recession growth reached
its minimum some two to four quarters later and growth remains at the lower end of the
typical post-war experience; recovery has been slow by recent historical standards.
The role of nancial frictionsin explaining these observed patterns has been identi-
ed as central by many researchers and policymakers and there is now a large and growing
body of research which seeks to provide quantitative macroeconomic models to explain
how seemingly well-functioning economies might unexpectedly end up with nancial
crises. For example, Boissay et al. (2015) demonstrate how an innocuouspositive pro-
ductivity shock can lead to rare but deep nancial crises. The role of nancial shocks in
generating realistically frequent recessions is discussed in Nolan and Thoenissen (2009),
Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Christiano et al. (2013) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016)
to mention only a few. Notably, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) propose a macroeconomic
model with nancial frictions which is quite closely aligned with the US data since the
early 1990s. The authors point out, however, that their model cannot replicate the large
reduction in hours worked and output observed during the Great Recession. Moreover,
so far researchers in this literature have generally focussed less on explaining the second
aspect of the Great Recession that we highlighted above: the slow recovery.1
1This is despite the two-decades of slow growth a¤ecting Japan since the early 1990s. An interesting
recent exception is a paper by Benigno and Fornaro (2015) emphasising non-linear features in a growth
model to explain stagnation traps.
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The Great Recession a¤ected many countries. The transmission of shocks was quick
and strong. We need a model to study how this was possible. Recently, Perri and
Quadrini (2011) use a two-country model with nancial market frictions to demonstrate
how nancial shocks may transmit from one country to another. It crucially relies on
nancial integration between countries. Domestic and foreign rms are able to borrow at
a global nancial market at the same interest rate. They demonstrate how a shock, which
originates in one country, creates a shortage of liquidity in both countries and results in
an international recession.
In this thesis I investigate how a small nancial shock can result in large reduction
in output and a prolonged recession. I look at single closed economy setting as well as
two-country model.
In the second chapter we demonstrate how a simple log-linear DSGE model with nan-
cial frictions a la Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and with nominal rigidities a la Rotemberg
(1983) is capable of generating the observed deep recessions, and slow recoveries that we
argue are present in the data. In this model, the recession is triggered by a nancial
shock which reduces the proportion of output which banks will be able to recover when
rms default. The implied reduction in bank credit requires substantial deleveraging in
the economy and this leads to a recession. This result is interesting as some have argued
that the onset of the crisis was essentially an adverse credit event (see e.g., Taylor, 2008),
whilst others attribute a large role to adverse selection and moral hazard problems in
the interbank/money markets (Boissay et al., 2015). We suspect both explanations likely
played a role, but our contribution in this chapter is simply to argue that standard models
of nancial frictions explain more than perhaps is generally realised. Two assumptions
are helpful in generating a deep recession, consistent with that observed during the recent
nancial crisis. The rst is the existence of overlending. An initially high level of debt
as indeed was observed prior to the Great Recession in many developed countries, see e.g.
Schularick and Taylor (2012). Following the shock the reduction in debt presages a fall in
the capital stock. In turn the lower capital stock requires less nance and these two e¤ects
reinforce one another and the sluggish adjustment of both stocks results in a much greater
reduction of capital, output and hours worked. We show that the higher the initial debt
to output ratio, the sharper the subsequent recession. For example, if the stock of lending
is 10 percent above its steady state level, a nancial shock nearly doubles the consequent
reduction in output, compared with the case when debt is initially at steady state. The
second assumption is the existence of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest
rates. We demonstrate that the ZLB, alone, can generate sharp and deep recessions. The
inability of the interest rate to help spreadthe cost of the required deleveraging over
many periods, results in an immediate and sharp reduction in the capital stock. Once
the capital stock returns to the optimal level, further adjustment is slow. This is why the
ZLB scenario facilitates capturing the second stylised fact: Once the initial large reduc-
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tion in output is corrected, the speed of further recovery is substantially slowed down as
compared to the case when monetary policy operates without constraints.
In the third chapter and the fourth chapter, I model interdependent economies to
describe channels of transmission of credit shocks between countries.
In the third chapter, we consider di¤erent degrees of nancial integration between
countries and investigate their e¤ect. The model is based on the one presented in the
second chapter, but rms can borrow from abroad. When allocating portfolios between
home and foreign corporate bonds, households face intermediation costs, which depend
on the degree of external indebtedness of the home economy. There is a risk premium if
the country is in net borrowing position. We also assume two independent monetary au-
thorities, and therefore, oating exchange rate regime, and the ability of each policymaker
to a¤ect its own interest rate. Our main objective is to investigate how the degree of -
nancial integration a¤ects international transmission of credit shocks. We also investigate
if the country size matters for the severity of recessions. Our results demonstrate that
welfare is maximised for an intermediate value of degree of nancial integration. If the
intermediation cost is absent, there is large volatility of output during the period of ad-
justment, while the deleveraging is performed faster. With greater costs on international
nancial ows, the deleveraging is substantially slowed down which leads to longer peri-
ods of adjustment and greater costs. We demonstrate that in two country model under
exible exchange rate and independent monetary authorities, the e¤ect of one countrys
credit shock has very limited e¤ect on another country. When monetary policymakers
cooperate and choose interest rates optimally, the una¤ected country can nearly elimi-
nate all aftere¤ects of the shock to the other country. To some extent, limited nancial
integration prevents the spread of volatility across the border, however, unconstrained
monetary policy is the key to these results.
In the fourth chapter, we investigate the importance of exchange rate regime for inter-
national transmission of credit shocks. Specically, we use the same two-country model
as in the previous chapter, but assume that both countries are locked into a permanently
xed exchange rate regime within a currency union. We therefore ignore any issues of
imperfect credibility of exchange rate pegs and do not discuss exchange rate crises. We,
therefore, also assume that the monetary policymaker has a mandate to stabilise both
countrieseconomies. We demonstrate that, unlike under exible exchange rate regime
studied in the previous chapter, the centralised monetary policy alone is unable to stabilise
the economy. National scal policies must be activated to counteract asymmetric shocks.
We demonstrate, however, that the e¤ectiveness of scal policy is limited. Even if it is cho-
sen optimally, scal policy does not eliminate cyclical patterns in economic adjustment,
which is welfare-reducing volatility of economic variables. This model demonstrates that
shocks hitting one economy, result in sharp contraction of consumption in another coun-
try. Countercyclical scal policy is able to avoid major recession, however. In contrast to
3
results in the previous chapter, the shocks propagation mechanism is much stronger under
xed exchange rate regime. As before, we assume variable degree of nancial integration
and study its importance for the propagation of credit shocks.
4
Chapter 2
Deep Recessions
2.1 Introduction
Almost a decade has passed since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008, but for a
number of economies recovery is slow and remains fragile. In fact, some even worry it
has ushered in a new era of permanently lower trend growth. The origins of some of
these concerns are reected in Figure 2.1, which plots all post-war recessions for the UK,
US and Japan.1 The Great Recession stands out for at least two reasons. First, in each
country the average recession is not as deep as the Great Recession. Second, in each
country the average recession experiences its lowest output growth rate at the onset of
the recession (period zero in the gure). Thereafter, economies generally return to a more
normal growth path within one or two quarters. By way of contrast, following the onset
of the Great Recession growth reached its minimum some two to four quarters later and
growth remains at the lower end of the typical post-war experience; recovery has been
slow by recent historical standards.
The role of nancial frictionsin explaining these observed patterns has been identi-
ed as central by many researchers and policymakers and there is now a large and growing
body of research which seeks to provide quantitative macroeconomic models to explain
how seemingly well-functioning economies might unexpectedly end up with nancial
crises. For example, Boissay et al. (2015) demonstrate how an innocuouspositive pro-
ductivity shock can lead to rare but deep nancial crises. The role of nancial shocks in
generating realistically frequent recessions is discussed in Nolan and Thoenissen (2009),
Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Christiano et al. (2013) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2016)
to mention only a few. Notably, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) propose a macroeconomic
model with nancial frictions which is quite closely aligned with the US data since the
1Episods in Figure 2.1 can be identied in the available data series in the FRED FRB St. Louis data-
base. The data series are NAEXKP01JPQ657S (Japan 1960Q1-2014Q4), NAEXKP01GBQ652S_PCH
(UK 1955Q1-2014Q4) and GDPC1_PCH (US 1947Q1-2015Q1). All series are seasonally adjusted.
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early 1990s. The authors point out, however, that their model cannot replicate the large
reduction in hours worked and output observed during the Great Recession. Moreover,
so far researchers in this literature have generally focussed less on explaining the second
aspect of the Great Recession that we highlighted above: the slow recovery.2
In this chapter we demonstrate how a simple log-linear DSGE model with nancial
frictions a la Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and with nominal rigidities a la Rotemberg
(1983) is capable of generating the observed deep recessions, and slow recoveries that we
argue are present in the data. In this model, the recession is triggered by a nancial
shock which reduces the proportion of output which banks will be able to recover when
rms default. The implied reduction in bank credit requires substantial deleveraging in
the economy and this leads to a recession. This result is interesting as some have argued
that the onset of the crisis was essentially an adverse credit event (see e.g., Taylor, 2008),
whilst others attribute a large role to adverse selection and moral hazard problems in
the interbank/money markets (Boissay et al., 2015). We suspect both explanations likely
played a role, but our contribution in this chapter is simply to argue that standard models
of nancial frictions explain more than perhaps is generally realised.
Two assumptions are helpful in generating a deep recession, consistent with that ob-
served during the recent nancial crisis. The rst is the existence of overlending. An
initially high level of debt as indeed was observed prior to the Great Recession in many
developed countries, see e.g. Schularick and Taylor (2012). Following the shock the re-
duction in debt presages a fall in the capital stock. In turn the lower capital stock requires
less nance and these two e¤ects reinforce one another and the sluggish adjustment of
both stocks results in a much greater reduction of capital, output and hours worked. We
show that the higher the initial debt to output ratio, the sharper the subsequent recession.
For example, if the stock of lending is 10 percent above its steady state level, a nancial
shock nearly doubles the consequent reduction in output, compared with the case when
debt is initially at steady state.
The second assumption is the existence of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal in-
terest rates. We demonstrate that the ZLB, alone, can generate sharp and deep recessions.
The inability of the interest rate to help spreadthe cost of the required deleveraging over
many periods, results in an immediate and sharp reduction in the capital stock. Once
the capital stock returns to the optimal level, further adjustment is slow. This is why the
ZLB scenario facilitates capturing the second stylised fact: Once the initial large reduc-
tion in output is corrected, the speed of further recovery is substantially slowed down as
compared to the case when monetary policy operates without constraints.
2This is despite the two-decades of slow growth a¤ecting Japan since the early 1990s. An interesting
recent exception is a paper by Benigno and Fornaro (2015) emphasising non-linear features in a growth
model to explain stagnation traps.
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Figure 2.1: Post-war recessions in the US, Japan and UK. The data series are available
in the FRED FRB St. Louis database. The data series are NAEXKP01JPQ657S (Japan
1960Q1-2014Q4), NAEXKP01GBQ652S-PCH (UK 1955Q1-2014Q4), GDPC1-PCH (US
1947Q1-2015Q1).
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model. We
discuss the empirical evidence and the corresponding calibration of the model in section
2.5. In section 2.6 we discuss the sequence of policy experiments, which show how to
generate stylized post-crisis dynamics like those with which we motivated this chapter.
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The Model
We present a simple model with rmsborrowing constraints a la Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) and with nominal rigidities a la Rotemberg (1983). The economy is populated by
households and rms. Firms use labor and capital to produce di¤erentiated goods. Firms
issue equity and debt and use intra-period loans to nance working capital. Firms face
credit restrictions because nancial intermediaries fear they may not repay those loans.
The detailed model of the economy is presented in this section.
2.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of homogeneous innitely-living households of measure one who
share identical preferences and technology. Households are indexed by j. The typical
household seeks to maximize the following utility function:
max
Cjt ;nt;bt+1;st+1
Et
1X
t=0
tU
 
Cjt ; n
j
t

where Et indicates expectations conditional on information available at time t; 0 <  < 1
is the discount factor; Ct and nt are a consumption aggregate and labor supply in period
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t, respectively. The period utility is:
U
 
Cjt ; n
j
t

=
Cj1 t
1     
nj1+ t
1 +  
where  is elasticity of relative risk aversion,  is the elasticity of labour supply and
 is a preferenceparameter. The households are assumed to hold equity, shares and
corporate bonds, which are for simplicity assumed to be real bonds. The households
budget constraint in nominal term can be written as:
Wtn
j
t + Ptbt + 
tst (Dt + pt) + Ptt = qtPtbt+1 + st+1pt + PtC
j
t + PtTt (2.1)
where Wt is the nominal wage rate, Pt is the price of goods, pt is the market price of
shares, Dt is the dividend, st is equity holdings. Ptbt is the market nominal value of
one-period real bonds bt which mature at period t held by the households, qt is t-period
price of bonds which mature at t+1, Ptt is nominal prot from the ownership of nal
good rms, Tt is a government transfer and the nominal return on bonds is
1 + it =
t+1
qt
:
Finally, 
t is a capital quality shock. The capital quality shock will serve as an exoge-
nous trigger of debt dynamics. The random variable 
t captures some form of economic
obsolescence, as opposed to physical depreciation.4 We allow for occasional disasters in
the form of sharp contractions in quality as we describe later. These disaster shocks serve
to initiate nancial crises. We assume that the households share the revenues of owning
rms in equal proportion. Following Woodford (2003) we consider a cashless economy.
Therefore the only explicit role played by money is to serve as a unit of account.
We assume that all households have the same level of initial wealth. As they face
the same labour demand and own equal share of all rms, they face identical budget
constraints. They all will have identical consumption paths, so we do not use individual
index.
The standard optimization of utility with respect to Ct; nt , bt+1 , and st+1; subject
to the budget constraint yields the following system of rst order conditions:
n t = wtC
 
t ; (2.2)
qt = Et
C t+1
C t
; (2.3)
pt
Pt
= Et
C t+1
C t

dt+1 +
pt+1
Pt+1


t+1; (2.4)
bt = qtbt+1 + st+1
pt
Pt
+ Ct + Tt   
tst

dt +
pt
Pt

  wtnt   t: (2.5)
4Following the nance literature, e.g. Merton (1973), the capital quality shock is a simple way to
introduce an exogenous source of variation in the value of capital. Our treatment of this shock follows
Gertler et al. (2012).
8
where we dened All derivations are given in Appendix A.1. These conditions are fa-
miliar, reecting optimal labour supply decisions, bond purchases, equity purchases and
intertemporal resource allocation. The budget constraint is written in an aggregated form.
Equation (2.3) is the standard Euler equation and determines the consumption smoothing
behavior of the households. (2.2) is the standard labour supply condition. It determines
the quantity of labor supplied as a function of real wage, given the marginal utility of
consumption. Finally equation (2.5) is the aggregate budget constraint.
2.2.2 Firms
There are two types of rms in this economy. There are exible price intermediate goods
producers and monopolistically competitive retailers. We discuss each in turn.
Intermediate goods producers
We assume that there is a continuum of rms of measure one with a standard production
technology
yt = F (kt; nt) = Ak

tn
1 
t (2.6)
and all rms are equal. A is a constant productivity shifter, nt is the labor input which
can be exibly changed at time t, kt is the capital stock determined at time t   1 and
predetermined at time t which is consistent with the typical timing convention.  is the
capital share. Capital in process for period t+1 is transformed into capital for production
after the realisation of a multiplicative shock to capital quality, 
t+1
kt+1 = ((1  ) kt + It) 
t+1 (2.7)
where It is investment and  is the depreciation rate. The capital quality shock will
serve as an exogenous trigger of debt dynamics. The random variable 
t+1 captures
some form of economic obsolescence, as opposed to physical depreciation.5 We allow
for occasional disasters in the form of sharp contractions in quality as we describe later.
These disaster shocks serve to initiate nancial crises. Firms use equity and debt to
nance their operations. They prefer debt, bt, to equity because of debts tax advantage,
 t: see, Jermann and Quadrini (2012). This is also the assumption made in Hennessy and
Whited (2005).
The budget constraint can be written as:
Pmt
Pt
F (kt; nt) +
bt+1
Rt
= bt +
Wt
Pt
nt + It +
	(Dt; Dt 1)
Pt
(2.8)
5Following the nance literature, e.g. Merton (1973), the capital quality shock is a simple way to
introduce an exogenous source of variation in the value of capital. Our treatment of this shock follows
Gertler et al. (2012).
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where Pmt is the nominal price of produced intermediate goods, Rt = 1 + rt(1    t) is
the after tax return on bonds, and 1 + rt = 1+itt+1 : 	(Dt; Dt 1) is the nominal payout to
shareholders.
We assume that rms raise funds via both intertemporal debt, bt, and an intra-period
loan, Lt , to nance working capital. They pay back the interest-free intra-period loan
at the end of the period. Firms start the period with intertemporal debt bt and they
choose labour, investment in capital, the dividend, Dt , and new intertemporal debt, bt+1,
before producing. Therefore the payments to workersWtnt, suppliers of investment goods
PtIt, shareholders 	(Dt; Dt 1) and bondholders Ptbt are made ahead of the realization of
revenues. The intra-period loan contracted by the rm will cover these costs as follows:
Lt = PtIt +Wtnt +	(Dt; Dt 1) + Ptbt   Pt bt+1
Rt
:
From here and the budget constraint Lt = PmtF (kt; nt) is repaid at the end of the period
and is free of interest.
The ability of rms to borrow is bounded because they may choose to default on their
debt. Default arises after the realization of revenues but before repaying the intra-period
loan. The total liabilities of the rm at that time are Lt+ Ptqtbt+1, where qt is t-period
price of bonds which mature at t+1, as it will need to pay back the loan and buy back
all the bonds. The total liquid resources of the rm are Lt = PmtF (kt; nt). These can
be divertedby the rm and so cannot be recovered by the lender after a default. Then,
the only asset available to the lender is capital Ptkt+1. Following Jermann and Quadrini
(2012), we assume that the liquidation value of capital is unknown at the moment of
contracting the loan. With probability et the full value Ptkt+1 will be recovered, but
with probability 1 et the liquidation value is zero. Therefore the enforcement constraint
will be as follows:
et (Ptkt+1   Ptqtbt+1)  PmtF (kt; nt): (2.9)
This constraint is derived based on the renegotiation process between the rm and the
lender in the case of default. The derivation is given in Appendix A.3. By increasing the
level of debt the enforcement constraint becomes tighter. On the other hand, increasing
the stock of capital relaxes the enforcement constraint. Most of the enforcement constraint
used in the literature shared these properties. The probability et is stochastic and
depends on uncertain markets conditions.6 We call this variable as "nancial shocks",
because it a¤ects the tightness of the enforcement constraint and, therefore, the borrowing
capacity of the rm. Notice that et is the same for all rms. Hence, there are two sources
of aggregate uncertainty in our model: productivity ezt and nancial et but we do not
6The variable et could be interpreted as the probability of nding a buyer. Because we assume that
the search for a buyer is required for the sale of the rms capital. The probability increases when the
market conditions improve.
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include productivity shocks for in our exposition. Since there are no idiosyncratic shocks,
we will focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all representative rms are the same.
We can slightly modify (2.9), to see clearly how the shock et a¤ects the economy.
Suppose the case in which  = 0 so that R = 1 + r. Using the budget constraint (2.8)
to substitute for Ptkt+1 Ptqtbt+1 and remembering that the intra-period loan is equal to
the revenues, Lt = PmtF (kt; nt), the enforcement constraint can be rewritten as
et
1  et (Pt (1  ) kt   Ptbt  Wtnt  	(Dt; Dt 1))  PmtF (kt; nt)
At the beginning of the period kt and bt are given. The rm have control only over the
input of labor, nt, and the equity payout, 	(Dt; Dt 1). If the rm wishes to keep the
production level unchanged, a negative nancial shock (lower et) requires a reduction
in equity payout 	(Dt; Dt 1) or employment. In other words, the rm is forced to raise
its equity and cut the new intertemporal debt. Thus, the exibility with which the rm
can change its nancial structure, i.e., the composition of debt and equity will determine
if the nancial shock a¤ects employment.
The rms nominal payout to shareholders is assumed to be subject to a quadratic ad-
justment cost which is a way to formalize the rigidities a¤ecting the substitution between
debt and equity:
	(Dt; Dt 1) = Dt + 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2
Dt
where the nominal equity payout Dt is given and   0 is a parameter.7
The parameter  is key for the role of nancial shocks. Since when  = 0 the economy
is almost frictionless, therefore debt adjustments caused by nancial shocks can be quickly
assisted through changes in rm equity. When  > 0, it is costly to substitute debt and
equity and rms readjustment becomes slowly. As a result, nancial shocks will have a
substantial e¤ect on macroeconomic situation of a country.
Each rm maximizes prot subject to budget constraint (2.8) and enforcement con-
straint (2.9), so the Lagrangian is:
L =
1X
t=0
m0;t

Dt
Pt
+ t

et (kt+1   qtbt+1)  Pmt
Pt
F (kt; nt)

+t

(1  ) kt + Pmt
Pt
F (kt; nt) +
bt+1
Rt
  bt   Wt
Pt
nt
  kt+1

t+1
 
 
Dt
Pt
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2
Dt
Pt
!!!
7One way of thinking about the adjustment cost is that it captures the preferences of managers for
dividend smoothing. Lintner (1956) showed that managers are concerned about smoothing dividends
over time, a fact later conrmed by subsequent studies. This could obtain from agency problems.
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where mt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, t and t are Lagrange multipliers.
The rst order conditions are (2.8), (2.9) and derivatives with respect to nt; kt+1;
bt+1; Dt; t; t:
0 = (t   t)XtFn(kt; nt)  twt (2.10)
0 = te
t   t

t+1
+Et
C t+1
C t
  
t+1   t+1

Xt+1Fk(kt+1; nt+1) + t+1 (1  )

(2.11)
0 =
t
Rt
  tet
1
1 + rt
  EtC
 
t+1
C t
t+1 (2.12)
0 = 1 + Et
C t+1
t+1C
 
t
t+12

Dt+1
Dt
  1

D2t+1
D2t
(2.13)
 t
 
1 + 2

Dt
Dt 1
  1

Dt
Dt 1
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2!
0 = et (kt+1   qtbt+1) XtF (kt; nt) (2.14)
0 = (1  ) kt +XtF (kt; nt) + bt+1
Rt
  bt   wtnt
  kt+1
 t+1
 
 
Dt
Pt
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2
Dt
Pt
!
(2.15)
where Xt =
Pmt
Pt
, wt =
Wt
Pt
and t =
Pt
Pt 1
is gross ination, Fn and Fk are derivatives of
F (kt; nt) respect to n and k. All derivations are given in Appendix A.2.
Equation (2.10), the optimal condition for labor indicates that the marginal produc-
tivity of labor is equal to the marginal cost ( twt
(t t)Xt ). As the enforcement constraint
becomes tighter, the e¤ective cost of labor rises and its demand falls. Therefore, nancial
shocks could transmit to the real sector of the economy through the demand of labor.
To get further insights, it will be convenient to consider the special case in which the
cost of equity payout is zero, that is,  = 0. In this case t = 1 (see condition (2.13)) and
condition (2.12) becomes te
t Rt
1+rt
+ RtEt
C t+1
C t
t+1 = 1. This denotes that there is a
negative relation between et and the multiplier t taking as given the aggregate prices
Rt, rt, and mt;t+1. In other words, lower probability of recovering rms capital make the
enforcement constraint tighter. Then from equation (2.10) we see that a higher t implies
a lower demand for labor.
This mechanism is strengthened when  > 0. In this case readjusting the nancial
structure becomes costly, and the change in et induces a larger volatility in t. Of
course, prices will be a¤ected by the change in the policies of all rms.
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Retailers
We introduce nominal rigidities a la Rotemberg (1983). Each nal good producer i buys
goods at price Pmt, and repackages them, producing the nal good, which may also be
costlessly transformed into capital. It sets its optimal price pit and produces quantity
yt (i). The rm faces a familiar demand for its good
yt (i) =

pit
Pt
 "
Yt:
Here the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods is given by " > 1. Firm
chooses price pit which solves the following optimization problem:
Et
1X
=t
mt;
 
pit
Pt
yit  
Pmt
Pt
yit  
!
2

pit
pit 1
  1
2
Yt
!
= Et
1X
=t
mt;
 
pit
Pt
1 "
Yt   Pmt
Pt

pit
Pt
 "
Yt   !
2

pit
pit 1
  1
2
Yt
!
where !
2

pit
pit 1
  1
2
Yt represents the cost of adjusting prices.
The aggregated rst order condition is:
! (t   1)t = (1  ") + "Xt + !EtC
 
t+1
C t
(t+1   1) Yt+1
Yt
t+1 (2.16)
The derivation is given in Appendix A.2.2.
Finally, the prot t in the household budget constraint can be found from the aggre-
gation of rmsbudget constraints:
Ptt = PtYt   PmtYt   !
2
(t   1)2 YtPt (2.17)
2.2.3 Government
The government collects taxes and pays it as transfers and government spending:
Tt =
bt+1
Rt
  bt+1
1 + rt
(2.18)
Gt = 
w
t wtnt + 
d
tdt + 
x
t Yt (2.19)
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2.2.4 Private Sector Equilibrium and Market Clearing
Private Sector Equilibrium is determined by the system (2.2)-(2.5), (2.8), (2.9), (2.10)-
(2.13), (2.16). We substitute out equations which determine share prices, and arrive to
the following system
0 = (t   t)XtFn(kt; nt)  twt (2.20)
0 =   t

t+1
+ te
t + Et
C t+1
C t
 
t+1   t+1

Xt+1
Yt+1
kt+1
+ t+1 (1  )

(2.21)
0 =
t
Rt
  tet
t+1
1 + it
  EtC
 
t+1
C t
t+1 (2.22)
0 = 1 + 2Et
C t+1
C t
t+1
t+1

dt+1
dt
t+1   1

dt+1
dt
t+1
2
(2.23)
 t
 
1 + 2

dt
dt 1
t   1

dt
dt 1
t + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2!
XtYt = e
t

kt+1   bt+1 t+1
1 + it

(2.24)
bt+1
Rt
= bt + wtnt +
kt+1

t+1
  (1  ) kt + dt
 
1 + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2!
(2.25)
 XtYt
! (t   1)t = (1  ") + "Xt + !EtC
 
t+1
C t
(t+1   1) Yt+1
Yt
t+1 (2.26)
t+1
1 + it
= Et
C t+1
C t
(2.27)
n t = wtC
 
t (2.28)
where Yt = Aktn
1 
t ; Rt = 1 + rt(1   t):
Finally, the resource constraint yields
Yt = Ct +
kt+1

t+1
  (1  ) kt + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt +
!
2
(t   1)2 Yt (2.29)
and system (2.20)-(2.29) is used to determine equilibrium variables for t; t; Xt; Ct; kt;
t; nt; dt; wt; bt given the policy instruments it and  t: The derivation of resource con-
straint is given in Appendix A.4.
2.3 Linearisation
For every variable zt with steady state z 6= 0 we denote z^t = log zt
z
. We linearise the
system around the steady state to yield:
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w^t =

1  

^t   ^t

+ X^t + k^t   n^t (2.30)
^t = 

X
Y
k

^t+1   ^t+1

+X
Y
k
(1  )

k^t+1 + (1  ) n^t+1   k^t+1 + X^t+1

  (1  )C^t+1 + (1  ) ^t+1

+ 

^t + ^t

+  (1  )C^t (2.31)
0 = 

C^t   C^t+1 + ^t+1

  1
R

^t   (1  )
R

{^t   ^t+1

+
r
R
^ t

(2.32)
+

1 + r

^t + ^t   {^t + ^t+1

^t = 2

^t+1 + d^t+1   d^t

  2

^t + d^t   d^t 1

(2.33)
k^t =

XY

k

k^t+1 + ^t

  b
1 + r

b^t+1   {^t + ^t+1 + ^t

  (1  ) n^t   X^t (2.34)
kk^t+1 = XY

X^t + k^t + (1  ) n^t

+
b
R

b^t+1   (1  )
R

{^t   ^t+1

+
r
R
^ t

(2.35)
 wn (w^t + n^t)  bb^t   dd^t + (1  ) kk^t
^t =
"X
!
X^t + Et^t+1 (2.36)
C^t = C^t+1   1


{^t   ^t+1

(2.37)
w^t =  n^t + C^t (2.38)
Y k^t = CC^t + kk^t+1   k (1  ) k^t   Y (1  ) n^t (2.39)
The linearisation of equations and steady states are given in Appendix A.6 and A.5.
2.4 Policy
Monetary policy is assumed to behave optimally, minimizing an ad hoc welfare loss, given
by the objective
L = E0
1
2
1X
t=0
t

^2t + {yY^ 2t + { (^{t   {^t 1)2

:
Thus we assume that the policymaker has objectives over ination and output, Y^t =
k^t+(1  ) n^t; as well as over interest rate smoothing. This policy objective has signicant
empirical support, one recent discussion can be found in Chen et al. (2014).89
Note that the interest rate may be constrained by the ZLB. We compute numerically
the implications of such a restriction using the approach developed in Laséen and Svensson
(2011) and extended to the case of discretion in Chen et al. (2014).
8See also estimation of policy objectives in e.g. Dennis (2006), Ilbas (2010) and Givens (2012).
9We can derive microfounded objectives for some other classes of policies using approach developed by
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). The comparison of those policies for di¤erent specications of objectives
allows demonstrates great robustness of results to specications of policy objectives.
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Figure 2.2: Historical data in the US. Data sources: NIPA and FoF tables.
2.5 Calibration
The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency. We x  = 0:9825. The capital
depreciation rate is set to  = 0:025: The capital ratio in production function is set to
 = 0:36, and the mean value of A is normalized to 1. The tax wedge which corresponds
to the advantage of debt over equity is determined to be  = 0:35, and the dividend
adjustment cost parameter set to  = 0:146 as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
We calibrate the steady state debt to output ratio to match the data. The quarterly
ratio of debt to output for the non-nancial business sector is 3:25 over the sample period
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1984:I-2010:II, see the top panel in Figure 2.2. In order to match that, we set the steady
state value of the nancial variable,  , to 0:1634.10
Parameters of the household utility function are determined as follows. The calibration
of the Frisch intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply,  , is assumed to be
equal to 1 and the risk aversion parameter is:  = 1. The relative weight on the disutility
of labour,  = 1:8834, is chosen so as to set steady state hours worked equal to 0:3.
We calibrate the measure of price stickiness, ! = 80, in a way that corresponds to a
probability of rms changing prices every 3 quarters (in a corresponding Calvo model).
The elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods " is equal to 11 in steady state
which gives a 10% mark up.
Parameters of the policy objective function are chosen to be {y = 0:5 and { = 0:6,
see Chen et al. (2014).11
It remains to calibrate the shock and the initial states to simulate the scenarios of
interest. The second panel in Figure 2.2 plots the historical data of corporate debt to
output ratio (quarterly). The average value of this ratio during 1984-2009 is 3.25. The
peak of 3.87 in 2008 was somewhat above the average value, and the consequent reduction
to 3.55 in 2011 constitutes a reduction of about 10% relative to its peak. We use these
numbers as a guide to our simulations.
Note that the model suggests the following steady state relationship
b
Y
=
 ("  1)
"

2  1
R
   (1  )
  
0@  ("  1)

1
R
  1

"

2  1
R
   (1  )
 + ("  1)
"
1A 1

so that a reduction in the debt to output ratio can be explained by a reduction in the
recovered share of output, , as all other parameters are structural. Rough calculations
indicate that a shock of about 10% is not unreasonable.
Based on this evidence, we consider an AR(1) credit shock ^t = ^t 1+ "t with persis-
tence  = 0:95, and we examine the dynamic implications of a negative 10% innovation
in "t.
10Data sources: NIPA and FoF tables. The calculations follow Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
11The results are very robust to wide range of parameters {y and { between zero and one.
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Figure 2.3: Ten years of positive productivity shock
2.6 Discussion
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) demonstrate the ability of an RBC-type model with nan-
cial frictions to explain the three episodes of recessions. As the authors note, it is evident
that the model fails to account for the depth of the Great Recession.
In this chapter we claim that deep recessions can still be generated by a very similar
model. To support this claim we run two numerical experiments. In the rst experiment
we demonstrate how an initial state with excess lending results in deeper recessions
following a nancial shock. In the second experiment we demonstrate how ZLB on interest
rates may results in a large reduction in output.
2.6.1 The e¤ect of over-lending
We start with the baseline scenario of a negative credit shock, impacting the economy
which is initially at steady state. Such a shock reduces the proportion of output which
banks will be able to recover in the case of default. Banks lend to rms at the beginning
of the period, so that rms are able to pay wages. As the enforcement constraint is always
binding, the di¤erence between bonds and capital is covered by a loan. As the nancial
shock reduces the probability of recovery, the amount of bank lending falls. Firms which
are not able to obtain funds up front have to deleverage or reduce production. Firms
reduce their labour demand, produce less output and also pay lower wages, see Figure
2.4. The equilibrium prices of intermediate goods and nal goods fall as a result of lower
income and lower demand. Firms reduce the amount of borrowing. Both constraints for
rms are tightened, as the values of the Lagrange multipliers indicate.
In response to lower ination and output the central bank reduces the nominal interest
rate su¢ ciently to guarantee a reduction in the real rate. Low real interest rates result in
falling consumption prole over time.
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Figure 2.4: The e¤ect of high corporate debt and an AR(1) negative credit shock with
persistence  = 0:95.
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Lower interest rates also make it easier for rms to pay out the existing stock of
corporate debt, so it helps to reduce the debt stock quickly. In addition, output falls by
less than wages, prots of rms fall and so dividends fall.
The reduction of output doubles if the nancial shock requires greater deleveraging.
We can illustrate this in the following scenario. Suppose the economy su¤ers from an one-
o¤ but permanent capital qualityshock where agents suddenly realise that the level of
accumulated debt is above the current level of the underlying capital stock. The resulting
deleveraging brings the level of debt down towards the steady state level of new, quality-
adjusted capital. In gure 2.4 we assume that the over-lending is 10 percent, i.e., as a result
of the permanent contraction in capital quality the initial debt to output ratio is exactly
10 percent higher than its steady state level in the economy with quality adjusted capital
stock. Such a degree of over-lending may be plausible, see Section 2.5. Moreover, this
excess can easily be achieved in this model, see Figure 2.3, which demonstrates that the
stock of outstanding corporate debt accumulates more than the required 10 percent above
the steady state level in the course of 10 years.12 This high initial level of debt requires
greater deleveraging than in the default scenario. Following the shock the reduction in
debt reduces the capital stock and the lower capital stock requires less nancing. These
two e¤ects reinforce each other and the sluggish adjustment of both stocks results in much
overshooting of debt below the steady state in the course of adjustment. As a result, there
is greater reduction in labour demand and wages, and much lower ination. The interest
rate falls by more, not only because of ination, but because it also helps to stabilize debt
and thus all policy-relevant variables  faster. The reduction in output and labour
doubles, which is consistent with the evidence presented in Figure 2.4.
However, in the process of this adjustment, the optimal interest rate violates the ZLB.
Therefore, next we discuss the implications of the ZLB on the dynamics of the economy.
2.6.2 The e¤ect of ZLB
The e¤ect of ZLB is illustrated in Figure 2.5. We compare two scenarios: the rst one is
the default case of unconstrained discretion, discussed in the section above, where the
interest rate can move below the ZLB, and the second scenario, where such movements
are prohibited. When the optimal interest rate is constrained by the ZLB, the recession is
deeper. Ination does not fall immediately but adjusts with a delay and converges back
to the steady state, and is higher than in the previous scenario without the ZLB. When
the nancial shock occurs both constraints are tightened and the interest is reduced but
12Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2015) discuss that the averagedevelopment before the deep recession
is a period of positive productivity shocks, their model suggest at least 10 years of AR(1) productivity
shocks with z = 0:9 and standard error of 0.013. We stick to Jermann and Quadrini (2012) calibration of
the model and we hit the economy with positive AR(1) productivity shocks with z = 0:95 and standard
error of 0.008.
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Figure 2.5: The e¤ect of ZLB and an AR(1) negative credit shock with persistence  =
0:95.
not as much as the policymaker would like. The enforcement constraint is tightened much
more than in the no ZLBscenario, see Figure 2.5. As the interest rate on debt remains
too high, greater deleveraging is required. Consumption drastically falls, and so does
output and demand. Both bond and capital stocks fall quickly and by large amounts.
Wages and labor fall instantaneously. The absence of monetary intervention results in a
deep recession.
As capital and labour fall, the production of intermediate goods fall too. The supply
of intermediate goods is greatly reduced, much lower than the demand for nal goods.
As a result, the initial-periods price of intermediate goods rises, and so does ination.
However, expected ination remains negative. Together with relatively high interest rate
this results in only a small reduction of the real interest rate and so consumption falls
only slow over time. As a result, we observe reduction in consumption and investment
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Figure 2.6: The e¤ect of ZLB, over-lending and an AR(1) negative credit shock with
persistence  = 0:95.
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reecting the reduction in output in the rst few periods following the shock.
Once the initial-periods capital and debt de-accumulation is done, the constraint is
weakened substantially. There is no further need to reduce bonds and capital quickly,
and no need to restrain investment as much. Investment remains negative, but somewhat
higher than in the rst several periods. Intermediate goods rms increase output, and
the price of intermediate goods falls to equalize demand and supply. Therefore, ination
falls as costs fall. Ination is negative and it is optimal to keep the interest rate below the
steady state level in order to stabilize the economy, but the interest rate does not need to
be below the ZLB. We show that it is optimal to slightly raise the interest rate above the
ZLB. The higher interest rate increases the real interest rate, but it still remains below
the steady state level. As such, consumption continues falling to match the desired path
for capital and supply. At some point the optimal deleveraging is achieved, the real rate
rises back to the steady state level and above so that expected future consumption is
higher than current consumption. Finally, consumption and demand start rising, prices
and ination rise and the economy converges back to the steady state. The adjustments
is however slow and the growth rate of the economy, measured by y^t   y^t 1, is noticeably
slower than in scenarios with no ZLB.
Note that this model requires convergence to the well-dened steady state. That means
that the economy grows faster when recovering from a negative shock than if it were not
hit by a shock at all. However, we compare the speed of recovery in di¤erent scenarios
after a negative nancial shock. We have shown that an initial stock of overlending results
in higher output growth rate and the ZLB results in lower growth rate along the most
of recovery path, excluding several initial periods. The e¤ect of the ZLB dominates, see
Figure 2.6. In the Figure the economy is hit by a nancial shock when there is 10%
overlending, and there is a restriction on interest rate movements below the ZLB. This
simple superposition of two scenarios generates a very substantial reduction in output, and
slow recovery. The slow recovery is the costof rapid deleveraging, due to the presence
of ZLB.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we demonstrate how a simple model with borrowing constrained rms
is able to replicate two empirical facts, observed during the recent nancial crisis. We
demonstrate that, in response to a moderate nancial shock, the economy may gener-
ate a very deep recession. Two assumptions are helpful in generating a deep recession,
consistent with that observed during the recent nancial crisis. The rst is the existence
of overlending. We show that the higher the initial debt to output ratio, the sharper
the subsequent recession. For example, if the stock of lending is 10 percent above its
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steady state level, a nancial shock nearly doubles the consequent reduction in output,
compared with the case when debt is initially at steady state. The second assumption
is the existence of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. We show that
if the interest rate is constrained by the zero lower bound the dynamics of the economy
involve a stagnationperiod, when the recovery is very slow.
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Chapter 3
Two country model with exible
exchange rate
3.1 Introduction
Financial crisis of 2007 has started as a subprime lending crisis, a¤ecting one sector in
one country. It quickly spread to many other countries. Financial interdependence of
economies must have played a key role in international transmission of shocks.
In this chapter and the next chapter, I model interdependent economies to describe
channels of transmission of credit shocks between countries.
The role of credit shocks for macroeconomic uctuations has been investigated pri-
marily in closed economy models, see Christiano et al. (2009), Gertler and Karadi (2011),
Goldberg (2010), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2010), Khan and Thomas (2010), Jermann and
Quadrini (2012), and Liu et al. (2013). We have studied closed economy in the second
chapter of this thesis.
Recently, Perri and Quadrini (2011) use a two-country model with nancial market
frictions to demonstrate how nancial shocks may transmit from one country to another.
It crucially relies on nancial integration between countries. Domestic and foreign rms
are able to borrow at a global nancial market at the same interest rate. They demonstrate
how a shock, which originates in one country, creates a shortage of liquidity in both
countries and results in an international recession.
In this chapter, we present a di¤erent model. We do not assume complete nancial
integration, but rather consider di¤erent degrees of nancial integration and investigate
their e¤ect. The model is based on the one presented in the second chapter, but rms
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can borrow from abroad. When allocating portfolios between home and foreign corpo-
rate bonds, households face intermediation costs, which depend on the degree of external
indebtedness of the home economy. There is a risk premium if the country is in net bor-
rowing position. We also assume two independent monetary authorities, and therefore,
oating exchange rate regime, and the ability of each policymaker to a¤ect its own interest
rate. Compared to Perri and Quadrini (2011) we have much less of nancial integration
between countries. Our main objective is to investigate how the degree of nancial in-
tegration a¤ects international transmission of credit shocks. We also investigate if the
country size matters for the severity of recessions.
Our results demonstrate that welfare is maximised for an intermediate value of degree
of nancial integration. If the intermediation cost is absent, there is large volatility of
output during the period of adjustment, while the deleveraging is performed faster. With
greater costs on international nancial ows, the deleveraging is substantially slowed down
which leads to longer periods of adjustment and greater costs. We demonstrate that in two
country model under exible exchange rate and independent monetary authorities, the
e¤ect of one countrys credit shock has very limited e¤ect on another country. When mon-
etary policymakers cooperate and choose interest rates optimally, the una¤ected country
can nearly eliminate all aftere¤ects of the shock to the other country. To some extent,
limited nancial integration prevents the spread of volatility across the border, however,
unconstrained monetary policy is the key to these results.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the model. Section
3.3 covers the linearised version of the system of equations. Section 3.4 describes the
calibration of the model. Section 3.5 describes the social welfare measure. The policy
set-up is given in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 discusses results, section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The Model
We present a simple two-country model with nancial frictions and with incorporated
nominal rigidities a la Rotemberg (1983). The world economy is populated by a continuum
of agents on the interval of [0; 1]. The population on the segment [0;n) belongs to country
H (Home), while the segment [n; 1] belongs to country F (Foreign). Each economy is
populated by households and rms. Firms use labor and capital to produce di¤erentiated
goods. Firms issue equity and debt and use intra-period loans to nance working capital.
Firms face credit restrictions due to uncertainty of recovering these loans. Preferences
reect home bias in consumption. The detailed model of the economy is presented in this
section.
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3.2.1 Law of One Price, The Terms of Trade and Relative Prices
We assume that the law of one price holds, implying pFt(z) = EtpFt(z), pHt(z) = Etp

Ht(z)
for all z 2 [0; 1] where Et = [H]= [F ] is the nominal exchange rate, that is the price of
foreign currency in terms of home currency, and pFt(z) is the price of foreign good z
denominated in foreign currency (Of course, the holding of one price does not imply that
PPP holds, unless we assume the absence of home bias). We dene the terms of trade is
the relative price of imported goods:1
St =
PFt
PHt
:
The real exchange rate the ratio of CPI inations, expressed in domestic currency 
is dened as
Qt = EtP

t
Pt
:
3.2.2 Domestic Households
The home economy (H), is populated by a continuum of homogeneous innitly-living
households who share identical preferences and technology and maximise the expected
lifetime utility E0
P1
t=0 
tU (Ct; nt), with aggregated period utility
U (Ct; nt) =
C1 t
1     
n1+ t
1 +  
(3.1)
where Ct is private home consumption, nt is home labor,  is the discount factor, E0 is
the actuarial expectation at time t = 0. Furthermore  > 0 measures the labor supply
elasticity,  > 0 measures the elasticity of consumption,  is a preference parameter. We
assume home bias in consumption. In more detail, a composite consumption index, Ct;
is dened as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the continuum of goods i 2 [0; 1] produced in
the foreign country and home2
Ct =

(1  ) 1 C
 1

Ht + 
1
C
 1

Ft
 
 1
Parameter  > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
consumption goods. Parameter  2 [0; 1] is the weight of imported goods in private
home consumption and is inversely related to the degree of home bias in preferences.
Another interpretation for  is as a natural index of openness or the import share. The
import share depends on (1  n) which is the relative size of foreign economy, and on $
1Let a "*" denote foreign variables.
2The same relationship can be written in per capita terms.
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which is the degree of trade openness. It yields  = (1   n)$. We assume home bias in
consumption:
1   = (1  (1  n)$) >  = n$
which implies
1  n$ > (1  n)$
Similarly, home bias in foreign preferences requires 1   >  which again implies
1  n$ > (1  n)$
CHt and CFt are domestic consumption sub-indexes of the continuum of di¤erentiated
goods produced respectively in country H and F given by the CES functions
CHt =
 
1
n
 1

Z n
0
cHt(z)
 1
 dz
! 
 1
; CFt =
 
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
cFt(z)
 1
 dz
! 
 1
where each consumption bundle CHt and CFt is composed of imperfectly substitutable
varieties of goods z 2 [0; 1] produced within a given country with elasticity of substitution
 > 1:
The aggregated nominal intertemporal budget constraint at time t for household i
belonging to country H is given by
Z 1
0
[PHt(z)C
i
Ht(z) + PFt(z)C
i
F t(z)]dz +
Ait+1
1 + it
+
Bit+1Et
(1 + it )

EtBt+1
Pt

 Ait +BitEt + (1  wt )W itnit +
  
1   dt

Dt + PSt

st   st+1PSt + T it + PHtt
PHt(z) and PFt(z) are price indices of domestic and foreign (imported from country F)
goods z, where the latter is expressed in domestic currency. At is the one-period domestic
corporate bond held by domestic households (real bonds, in terms of domestic prices), Bt
is the one-period foreign corporate bonds held by domestic households, W it is the nominal
wage and T it denotes lump-sum taxes/transfers. 
w
t denotes a country specic tax on
nominal income and Et is the nominal exchange rate, given as the price of one of unit
foreign currency in terms of home currency. PHtt is nominal prot from the ownership
of capital-producing rms and retailers (note that t = Ct +
R
t ). Here st is the domestic
share of equity which is wholly owned by domestic households, Dt denotes the equity
payout paid to the shareholders, PSt is the market price of domestic shares,  dt denotes
the tax on equity payout. We assume that the households share the revenues of owning
rms in equal proportion. Following Woodford (2003) we consider a cashless economy.
Therefore the only explicit role played by money is to serve as a unit of account.
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We introduce incomplete nancial markets as in Benigno (2009).3 Domestic house-
holds hold domestic equity shares st and noncontingent bonds issued by rms of home and
foreign countries. Households of country H can trade in two nominal one-period, risk-free
bonds. Bonds At are issued by home rms and are denominated in home currency, bonds
Bt are issued by foreign rms and are denominated in foreign currency. Households be-
longing to country H have to pay an intermediation cost, if they want to trade in the
foreign bond. These costs are determined by the function (). Function () depends on
the real holdings of the foreign assets in the entire economy, and therefore is taken as given
by the domestic households. If a household belongs to a country which is in a borrowing
position(Bt+1 < 0), it will be charged with a premium on the foreign interest rate and if
the household belongs to a country which is in a lending position(Bt+1 > 0), it receives
a rate of return lower than the foreign interest rate. Along with Benigno (2009) we need
the following restrictions on (): (0) = 1 and () is 1 only if Bt = 0. Furthermore ()
has to be a di¤erentiable, decreasing function in the neighborhood of zero. 0(0) =  :4
The intermediation prots zt are dened analogous to Benigno (2009)
zt =
Bit+1Et
(1 + it )
0@ 1


EtBt+1
Pt
   1
1A
and shared equally among foreign households. The domestic budget constraint is then
given as
PtCt + st+1PSt +
Ait+1
1 + it
+
Bit+1Et
(1 + it )
+zt
 Ait +BitEt + (1  wt )W itnit +
  
1   dt

Dt + PSt

st + T
i
t + PHtt
The optimal allocation within each variety of goods z yields per capita relationships
cHt(z) =
1
n

pHt(z)
PHt
 
CHt; cFt(z) =
1
1  n

pFt(z)
PFt
 
CFt
for all z 2 [0; 1], where
PHt =

1
n
Z n
0
pHt(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
, PFt =

1
1  n
Z 1
n
pFt(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
are the price indexes for domestic and imported goods, whereby the latter is expressed
in domestic currency. Note as  rises, the individual goods become closer substitutes and
therefore the individual rms have less market power.
Finally, the optimal condition of expenditures between domestic and imported (for-
eign) bundles of goods is given by5
CHt = (1  )

PHt
Pt
 
Ct and CFt = 

PFt
Pt
 
Ct
3See Benigno (2009) for a generalized asset trading framework, that follows Ghironi et al. (2006).
4We assume it is convex and can be approximated by (x) = 1  x+ x2:
5The same relationship can be written in per capita terms.
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where z denotes the goods type or variety and pHt(z); pFt(z) are prices of individual
home and foreign produced goods.
where Pt =

(1  )P 1 Ht + P 1 F t
 1
1  , Pt is the consumer price index (CPI) in coun-
try H and PHt; PFt are domestic and foreign goods price indices. Note that if the econ-
omy is closed,  = 0; the CPI equals domestic prices. Correspondingly we can write
total consumption expenditures by domestic households as PtCt = PHtCHt+PFtCFt. The
aggregated budget constraint can therefore be rewritten as
(1  wt )W itnit + Ait +BitEt +
  
1   dt

Dt + PSt

st + T
i
t + PHtt
 A
i
t+1
1 + it
+
Bit+1Et
(1 + it )

EtBt+1
Pt
 + st+1PSt + PtCt (3.2)
We assume that all households in the same country have the same level of initial
wealth. As they face the same labour demand and own equal share of all rms, they face
identical budget constraints. They all will have identical consumption paths, so we do
not use individual index within each country.
We maximize (3.1) with respect to (3.2) and arrive to the following system
C t
Pt
= t (3.3)
Wt
Pt
=
n t
C t (1  wt )
(3.4)
1
1 + it
= Et
C t+1
Ht+1C
 
t
(3.5)
1
1 + it
= Et
C t+1
Ht+1C
 
t
Et+1
Et


EtBt+1
Pt

(3.6)
PSt = Et
C t+1
Ht+1C
 
t
  
1   dt+1

Dt+1 + PSt+1

(3.7)
(1  wt )Wtnt + At +BtEt +
  
1   dt

Dt + PSt

st + Tt (3.8)
=
At+1
1 + it
+
Bt+1Et
(1 + it )

EtBt+1
Pt
 + st+1PSt + PtCt
All derivations are given in Appendix B.1. Equation (3.5) is the standard Euler equa-
tion and determines the consumption smoothing behavior of the households. Equation
(3.6) is the Euler equation derived from the optimal choice of the foreign bond. (3.4) is
the standard labour supply condition. It determines the quantity of labor supplied as a
function of real wage, given the marginal utility of consumption. Finally equation (3.8)
is the aggregate budget constraint.
30
The incomplete nancial market framework generates deviations from the uncovered
interest parity (UIP). Combining (3.5) and (3.6) yields the optimal portfolio choice of the
households of country H
(1 + it) = Et (1 + it )
Et+1
Et


EtBt+1
Pt

(3.9)


EtBt+1
Pt

can also be interpreted as a risk premium term on the interest rate. If the
economy is a net debtor, the domestic interest rate is above the foreign interest rate and
if the economy is a net creditor the domestic interest rate is below the foreign interest
rate. Therefore movements in the net foreign asset positions a¤ect the interest di¤erential
between the two countries.
3.2.3 Foreign Households
Similarly the foreign economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous innitly-living
households who share identical preferences and technology and maximise the expected
lifetime utility E0
P1
t=0 
tU (Ct ; n

t ), with aggregated period utility
U (Ct ; n

t ) =
C1 t
1     
n1+ t
1 +  
(3.10)
where Ct is private foreign consumption, n

t is foreign labor,  is the discount factor, E0
is the actuarial expectation at time t = 0. Furthermore  > 0 measures the labor supply
elasticity,  > 0 measures the elasticity of consumption,  is a preference parameter. We
assume home bias in consumption. In more detail, a composite consumption index, Ct ;
is dened as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the continuum of goods i 2 [0; 1] produced in
the foreign country and home6
Ct =

(1  ) 1 C
 1

Ft + 
 1
C
  1

Ht
 
 1
Parameter  > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign consumption goods. Parameter  2 [0; 1] is the weight of foreign imported goods
in private foreign consumption and is inversely related to the degree of foreign bias in
preferences. Another interpretation for  is as a natural index of foreign openness or the
foreign import share. The foreign import share depends on n which is the relative size of
6The same relationship can be written in per capita terms.
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home economy, and on $ which is the degree of trade openness. It yields  = n$. We
assume home bias in consumption:
1   > 
which implies
1  n$ > (1  n)$
Similarly, home bias in foreign preferences requires 1   >  which again implies
(1  (1  n)$) > n$
1  n$ > (1  n)$
CHt and C

Ft are foreign consumption sub-indexes of the continuum of di¤erentiated goods
produced respectively in country H and F given by the CES functions
CHt =
 
1
n
 1

Z n
0
cHt(z)
 1
 dz
! 
 1
; CFt =
 
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
cFt(z)
 1
 dz
! 
 1
Each consumption bundle CHt and C

Ft is composed of imperfectly substitutable varieties
of goods z 2 [0; 1] produced within a given country with elasticity of substitution  > 1:
The aggregated nominal intertemporal budget constraint at time t for household i in
foreign currency is given by
(1  wt )W t nt +
At
Et
+Bt +
  
1   dt

Dt + P

St

st + P

Ft

t
 A

t+1
Et (1 + it)


At+1
EtP t
 + Bt+1
(1 + it )
+ st+1P

St   T t
+
Z 1
0
[P Ht(z)C
i
Ht(z) + P

Ft(z)C
i
Ft(z)]dz
P Ht(z) and P

Ft(z) are price indices of domestic (exported to country F) and foreign pro-
duced goods z, where they are expressed in foreign currency. Bt is the one-period foreign
corporate bond held by foreign households (real bonds, in terms of domestic prices), At
is the one-period home corporate bonds held by foreign households, W it is the nominal
foreign wage and T it denotes lump-sum taxes/transfers. 
w
t denotes a country specic
tax on nominal income and Et is the nominal exchange rate, given as the price of one
of unit foreign currency in terms of home currency. Here P Ft

t is nominal prot from
the ownership of capital-producing rms and retailers (note that t = 
C
t +
R
t ). Here
st the foreign share of equity which is wholly owned by foreign households, D

t the eq-
uity payout paid to the shareholders, P St is the market price of foreign-owned shares,
d
t
denotes the tax on equity payout. We assume that the households share the revenues
of owning rms in equal proportion. Following Woodford (2003) we consider a cashless
economy. Therefore the only explicit role played by money is to serve as a unit of account.
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We introduce incomplete nancial markets as in Benigno (2009). Foreign households
hold foreign equity shares and noncontingent bonds issued by rms of home and foreign
countries. Households of country F can trade in two nominal one-period, risk-free bonds.
Bonds Bt are issued by foreign rms and are denominated in foreign currency, bonds
At are issued by domestic rms and are denominated in foreign currency. Households
belonging to country F have to pay an intermediation cost, if they want to trade in
the domestic bond. These costs are determined by the function (). Function ()
depends on the real holdings of the home assets in the entire economy, and therefore is
taken as given by the foreign households. If a household belongs to a country which is
in a borrowing position(At+1 < 0), it will be charged with a premium on the domestic
interest rate and if the household belongs to a country which is in a lending position
(At+1 > 0), it receives a rate of return lower than the domestic interest rate. Along
with Benigno (2009) we need the following restrictions on (): (0) = 1 and () is 1
only if At = 0. Furthermore 
() has to be a di¤erentiable, decreasing function in the
neighborhood of zero. 0(0) =  :7
The intermediation prots zt are dened analogous to Benigno (2009)
zt =
At+1
Et (1 + it)
0@ 1


At+1
EtP t
   1
1A
and shared equally among foreign households. The domestic budget constraint is then
given as
(1  wt )W t nt +
At
Et
+Bt +
  
1   dt

Dt + P

St

st + P

Ft

t
 A

t+1
Et (1 + it)
+
Bt+1
(1 + it )
+ st+1P

St   T t +zt + P t Ct
The optimal allocation within each variety of goods z yields per capita relationships
cHt(z) =
1
n

pHt(z)
P Ht
 
CHt , c

Ft(z) =
1
1  n

pFt(z)
P Ft
 
CFt
for all z 2 [0; 1], where
P Ht =

1
n
Z n
0
pHt(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
, P Ft =

1
1  n
Z 1
n
pFt(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
are the price indexes for home and foreign produced goods, where both are expressed
in foreign currency. Note as  rises, the individual goods become closer substitutes and
therefore the individual rms have less market power.
7We assume it is convex and can be approximated by (x) = 1  x+ x2:
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Finally, the optimal condition of expenditures between home and foreign produced
goods is given by8
CFt = (1  )

P Ft
P t
 
Ct and C

Ht = 


P Ht
P t
 
Ct
where z denotes the goods type or variety and pHt(z); p

Ft(z) are prices of individual home
and foreign produced goods.
where P t =
 
(1  )P 1 F t + P 1 Ht
 1
1  , P t is the consumer price index (CPI) in
country F and P Ht, P

Ft are domestic and foreign goods price indices. Note that if the
economy is closed,  = 0; the CPI equals foreign prices. Correspondingly we can write
total consumption expenditures by foreign households as P t C

t = P

HtC

Ht + P

FtC

Ft. The
aggregated budget constraint can therefore be rewritten as
(1  wt )W t nt +
At
Et
+Bt +
  
1   dt

Dt + P

St

st + P

Ft

t
 A

t+1
Et (1 + it)


At+1
EtP t
 + Bt+1
(1 + it )
+ st+1P

St   T t + P t Ct (3.11)
We assume that all households in the same country have the same level of initial
wealth. As they face the same labour demand and own equal share of all rms, they face
identical budget constraints. They all will have identical consumption paths, so we do
not use individual index within each country.
We maximize (3.10) with respect to (3.11) and arrive to the following system
C t
P t
= t (3.12)
W t
P t
=
n t
C t (1   wt )
(3.13)
1
(1 + it )
= Et
C t+1
C t Ft+1
(3.14)
1
(1 + it)
= Et
C t+1
C t
Et
Ft+1Et+1


At+1
EtP t

(3.15)
P St = Et
C t+1
Ft+1C
 
t
  
1   dt+1

Dt+1 + P

St+1

(3.16)
(1  wt )W t nt +
At
Et
+Bt +
  
1   dt

Dt + P

St

st + T

t
=
At+1
Et (1 + it)


At+1
EtP t
 + Bt+1
(1 + it )
+ st+1P

St + P

t C

t (3.17)
8The same relationship can be written in per capita terms.
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All derivations are given in Appendix B.1. Where the budget constraint is written in
an aggregated form. Equation (3.14) is the standard Euler equation and determines the
consumption smoothing behavior of the households. Equation (3.15) is the Euler equation
derived from the optimal choice of the foreign bond. (3.13) is the standard labour supply
condition. It determines the quantity of labor supplied as a function of real wage, given
the marginal utility of consumption. Finally equation (3.17) is the aggregate budget
constraint.
The incomplete nancial market framework generates deviations from the uncovered
interest parity (UIP). Combining (3.14) and (3.15) yields the optimal portfolio choice of
the households of country F
(1 + it ) = Et (1 + it)
Et
Et+1


At+1
EtP t

(3.18)


At+1
EtP t

can also be interpreted as a risk premium term on the interest rate. If the
economy is a net debtor, the foreign interest rate is above the domestic interest rate and if
the economy is a net creditor the foreign interest rate is below the domestic interest rate.
Therefore movements in the net domestic asset positions a¤ect the interest di¤erential
between the two countries.
Combining (3.6, 3.15) with the Euler equation of the foreign country (3.9, 3.18 ) yields
the international risk sharing condition
Et
C t+1
Ht+1C
 
t
= Et
C t+1
Ft+1C
 
t
Et
Et+1


At+1
EtP t

(3.19)
Et
C t+1
Ft+1C
 
t
= Et
C t+1
Ht+1C
 
t
Et+1
Et


EtBt+1
Pt

(3.20)
Note that if
At+1
EtP t
 EtBt+1
Pt
 0 then 

At+1
EtP t

= 

EtBt+1
Pt

= 1 and equations
(3.19) and (3.20) simplies to the standard international risk sharing relationship which
is obtained in a complete securities markets setting (see e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2005)).
3.2.4 Domestic Firms
Intermediate goods producers
We assume that there is a continuum of rms j 2 [0; 1] in country (H) with a gross
production function
Yt = F (e
zt ; kt; nt) = Ze
ztktn
1 
t
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and all rms are equal. Zezt is the stochastic productivity, common to all rms, kt is
the capital input and nt is the labor input. kt is assumed to be chosen at time t  1 and
predetermined at time t which is consistent with the typical timing convention. On the
contrary, the labor input nt can be exibly changed at time t.
Each period rms buy the investment good It
It = kt+1   (1  ) kt (3.21)
where  is the depreciation rate.
Therefore the payments to workersWtnt, suppliers of investment goods PHtQtIt, share-
holders 	(Dt; Dt 1) and bondholders ATt are made ahead of the realization of revenues.
The intra-period loan contracted by the rm will cover these costs as follows:
Lt = PHtQtIt +Wtnt +	(Dt; Dt 1) + ATt  
ATt+1
1 + it(1   t)
Firms use equity and debt to nance their operations. They prefer nominal debt,
ATt = At +A

t , to equity in general because of debts tax advantage ( t). This is also the
assumption made in Hennessy and Whited (2005). Given it the nominal interest rate, the
e¤ective gross interest rate for the rm is Rt = 1+ it(1   t), where  t represents the tax
benet.
We assume that rms raise funds by the intertemporal nominal debt ATt and the intra-
period domestic loan, Lt to nance working capital. Working capital is required to cover
the cash ow mismatch between the payments made at the beginning of the period and
the realization of revenues. They pay back the free-interest intra-period loan at the end
of the period.
Firms start the period with intertemporal debt ATt and they choose labour nt, in-
vestment in capital It, equity payout, Dt , and the new intertemporal debt ATt+1 before
producing. Therefore, the aggregated nominal budget constraint of rms can be written
as
PmtF (e
zt ; kt; nt) +
ATt+1
1 + it(1   t)  A
T
t +Wtnt + PHtQtIt +	(Dt; Dt 1) (3.22)
From the budget constraint Lt = PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt) is repaid at the end of the period
and is free of interest. Where Pmt is the nominal price of produced intermediate goods,
	(Dt; Dt 1) is the nominal payment to shareholders, PHtQt is the price of investment
goods, and and Wt is the nominal wage in home country.
The ability of rms to borrow is bounded because they may choose to default on their
debt. Default arises after the realization of revenues but before repaying the intra-period
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loan. The total liabilities of the rm at that time are Lt+
At+1
1+it
, as it will need to pay
back the loan and buy back all the bonds. The total liquid resources of the rm are
Lt = PmtF (e
zt ; kt; nt): These can be divertedby the rm, and so can not be recovered by
the lender after a default. Then, the only asset available to the lender is capital PHtQtkt+1.
Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we assume that the liquidation value of capital
is unknown at the moment of contracting the loan. With probability et the full value
PHtQtkt+1 will be recovered, but with probability 1   et the liquidation value is zero.
Therefore the enforcement constraint will be as follows:
et

PHtQtkt+1   A
T
t+1
1 + it

 PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt) (3.23)
This constraint is derived based on the renegotiation process between the rm and the
lender in the case of default. The derivation is given in Appendix A.3.
By increasing the level of debt the enforcement constraint becomes tighter. On the
other hand, increasing the stock of capital relaxes the enforcement constraint. Most of
the enforcement constraint used in the literature shared these properties. The probability
et is stochastic and depends on uncertain markets conditions.9 We call this variable
as "nancial shocks", because it a¤ects the tightness of the enforcement constraint and,
therefore, the borrowing capacity of the rm. Notice that et is the same for all rms.
Hence, there are two sources of aggregate uncertainty in our model: productivity ezt and
nancial et. Since there are no idiosyncratic shocks, we will focus on the symmetric
equilibrium where all representative rms are the same.
We can slightly modify (3.23), to see clearly how the shock et a¤ects the economy.
Suppose the case in which  = 0 so that R = 1+ i. Using the budget constraint (3.22) to
substitute for PHtQtkt+1   A
T
t+1
1+it
and remembering that the intra-period loan is equal to
the revenues, Lt = PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt), the enforcement constraint can be rewritten as
et
1  et
 
PHtQt (1  ) kt   ATt  Wtnt  	(Dt; Dt 1)
  PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt)
At the beginning of the period kt and ATt are given. The rm have control only over the
input of labor, nt, and the equity payout, 	(Dt; Dt 1). If the rm wishes to keep the
production level unchanged, a negative nancial shock (lower et) requires a reduction
in equity payout 	(Dt; Dt 1) or employment. In other words, the rm is forced to raise
its equity and cut the new intertemporal debt. Thus, the exibility with which the rm
can change its nancial structure, i.e., the composition of debt and equity will determine
if the nancial shock a¤ects employment.
9The variable et could be interpreted as the probability of nding a buyer. Because we assume that
the search for a buyer is required for the sale of the rms capital. The probability increases when the
market conditions improve.
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The rms nominal payout to shareholders assumed to be subject to a quadratic ad-
justment cost which is a way to formalize the rigidities a¤ecting the substitution between
debt and equity:
	(Dt; Dt 1) = Dt + 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2
Dt
where the nominal equity payout Dt is given and   0 is a parameter.10
The parameter  is key for the role of nancial shocks. Since when  = 0 the economy
is almost frictionless, therefore debt adjustments caused by nancial shocks can be quickly
assisted through changes in rm equity. When  > 0, it is costly to substitute debt and
equity and rms readjustment becomes slowly. As a result, nancial shocks will have a
substantial e¤ect on macroeconomic situation of a country.
The rst order conditions with respect to nt; kt+1; ATt+1; Dt; t; t can be written as
tWt = Fn(e
zt ; kt; nt) (t   t)Pmt (3.24)
0 = Et
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
  
t+1   t+1

Pmt+1Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; nt+1) + t+1PHt+1Qt+1 (1  )

   t   tetPHtQt (3.25)
0 =
t
1 + it(1   t)   te
t
1
1 + it
  Et UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
t+1 (3.26)
1 = t
 
1 + 2

Dt
Dt 1
  1

Dt
Dt 1
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2!
 Et C
 
t+1
Ht+1C
 
t
t+12

Dt+1
Dt
  1

D2t+1
D2t
(3.27)
0 = et

PHtQtkt+1   A
T
t+1
1 + it

  PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt) (3.28)
ATt = PmtF (e
zt ; kt; nt) +
ATt+1
1 + it(1   t)  Wtnt   PHtQtIt  	(Dt; Dt 1) (3.29)
All derivations are given in Appendix B.2. mt;t+1 = 
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
is a nominal stochastic
discount factor and the budget constraint is written in an aggregated form. The stochastic
discount factor mt;t+1, the wage Wt and interest rate it are determined in the general
equilibrium and are taken as given by an individual rm.
Equation (3.24), the optimal condition for labor indicates that the marginal produc-
tivity of labor is equal to the marginal cost ( tWt
(t t)Pmt ). As the enforcement constraint
becomes tighter, the e¤ective cost of labor rises and its demand falls. Therefore, nancial
shocks could transmit to the real sector of the economy through the demand of labor.
10One way of thinking about the adjustment cost is that it captures the preferences of managers for
dividend smoothing. Lintner (1956) showed that managers are concerned about smoothing dividends
over time, a fact later conrmed by subsequent studies. This could obtain from agency problems.
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To get further insights, it will be convenient to consider the special case in which the
cost of equity payout is zero, that is,  = 0. In this case t = 1 (see condition (3.27)) and
condition (3.26) becomes te
t Rt
1+it
+ RtEt
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
t+1 = 1. This denotes that there
is a negative relation between et and the multiplier t taking as given the aggregate
prices Rt, it, and 
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
. In other words, lower probability of recovering rms capital
make the enforcement constraint tighter. Then from equation (3.24) we see that a higher
t implies a lower demand for labor.
This mechanism is strengthened when  > 0. In this case readjusting the nancial
structure becomes costly, and the change in et induces a larger volatility in t. Of
course, prices will be a¤ected by the change in the policies of all rms.
Capital producers
Capital producers belong to households. They make new capital using input of nal
output and subject to adjustment costs. They sell new capital to rms at price PHtQt:
Their nominal prot
PHt
C
t = PHtQtIt   PHtIt
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
Specically, they buy It of the nal good, pay PHtIt

1 + %
2

It
It 1
  1
2
as they may
need to adjust contracts if the amount of the investment goods changes. They repackage
the good into investment good (costlessly) and sell it to rms at price PHtQt and receive
PHtQtIt:
The rst order condition yields
Qt = 1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2
+
It
It 1
%

It
It 1
  1

  EtUC;t+1
UC;t
%

It+1
It
  1

It+1
It
2
Retailers
Retailers repackage intermediate output. The marginal cost is Pmt. We introduce nominal
rigidities a la Rotemberg.
Cost minimisation yields
yit =

piHt
PHt
 "
Yt
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where index i is of retailer i and Yt is nal output. Retailers costlessly brand interme-
diate output. They have monopolistic power but have adjustment cost.
The rms prot is
piHt
R
t = p
i
Hty
i
t (1  xt )  Pmtyit  
!
2

piHt
piHt 1
  1
2
YtPHt
we introduce sales tax xt .
The rst order condition yields
! (Ht   1)Ht = (1  ") (1  xt ) + "Xt + !Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
(Ht+1   1) Yt+1
Yt
Ht+1 (3.30)
where Xt = PmtPHt . The derivation is given in Appendix B.2.
and the aggregated across rms prot
PHt
R
t = PHtYt (1  xt )  PmtYt  
!
2
(Ht   1)2 YtPHt
3.2.5 Foreign Firms
Intermediate Goods Producers
The optimisation problem for foreign rms is symmetric. We assume that there is a
continuum of rms j 2 [0; 1] in country (F) with a gross revenue function
Y t = F (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ) = Ze
zt kt n
1 
t
and all rms are equal. ez

t is the stochastic productivity, common to all rms, kt is the
capital and nt the labor in country F . k

t is assumed to be chosen at time t   1 and
predetermined at time t which is consistent with the typical timing convention. On the
contrary, the labor input nt can be exibly changed at time t.
Each period rms buy the investment good It
It = k

t+1   (1  ) kt
where It is investment and 
 is the depreciation rate in country F .
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Therefore the payments to workers W t n

t , suppliers of investment goods P

FtQ

t I

t ,
shareholders 	
 
Dt ; D

t 1

and bondholders BTt are made ahead of the realization of
revenues. The intra-period loan contracted by the rm will cover these costs as follows:
Lt = P

FtQ

t I

t +W

t n

t +	
  Dt ; Dt 1+BTt   BTt+11 + it (1   t )
Firms use equity and debt to nance their operations. They prefer nominal debt,
BTt = Bt+B

t , to equity in general because of debts tax advantage (

t ). This is also the
assumption made in Hennessy and Whited (2005). Given it the nominal interest rate, the
e¤ective gross interest rate for the rm is Rt = 1+ i

t (1   t ), where  t represents the tax
benet.
We assume that rms raise funds by the intertemporal nominal debt BTt and the intra-
period domestic loan, Lt to nance working capital. Working capital is required to cover
the cash ow mismatch between the payments made at the beginning of the period and
the realization of revenues. They pay back the free-interest intra-period loan at the end
of the period.
Firms start the period with intertemporal debt BTt and they choose labour n

t , in-
vestment in capital It , equity payout, D

t , and the new intertemporal debt B
T
t+1 before
producing. Therefore, the rms aggregated nominal budget constraint can be written as
P mtF (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ) +
BTt+1
1 + it (1   t )
 BTt +W t nt + P FtQt It +	
 
Dt ; D

t 1

(3.31)
From the budget constraint Lt = P

mtF (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ) is repaid at the end of the period
and is free of interest. Where P mt is the nominal price of produced intermediate goods,
	
 
Dt ; D

t 1

is the nominal payment to shareholders, P FtQ

t is the price of investment
goods, and W t is the nominal wage in foreign country.
The ability of rms to borrow is bounded because they may choose to default on
their debt. Default arises after the realization of revenues but before repaying the intra-
period loan. The total liabilities of the rm at that time are Lt+
BTt+1
1+it
, as it will need to
pay back the loan and buy back all the bonds. The total liquid resources of the rm are
Lt = P

mtF (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ): These can be divertedby the rm, and so can not be recovered by
the lender after a default. Then, the only asset available to the lender is capital P FtQ

tk

t+1.
Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we assume that the liquidation value of capital
is unknown at the moment of contracting the loan. With probability e

t the full value
P FtQ

tk

t+1 will be recovered, but with probability 1  e

t the liquidation value is zero.
Therefore the enforcement constraint will be as follows:
e

t

P FtQ

tk

t+1  
BTt+1
1 + it

 P mtF (ez

t ; kt ; n

t ) (3.32)
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This constraint is derived based on the renegotiation process between the rm and the
lender in the case of default. The derivation is given in Appendix A.3.
By increasing the level of debt the enforcement constraint becomes tighter. On the
other hand, increasing the stock of capital relaxes the enforcement constraint. Most of
the enforcement constraint used in the literature shared these properties. The probability
e

t is stochastic and depends on uncertain markets conditions.11 We call this variable
as "nancial shocks", because it a¤ects the tightness of the enforcement constraint and,
therefore, the borrowing capacity of the rm. Notice that e

t is the same for all rms.
Hence, there are two sources of aggregate uncertainty in our model: productivity ez

t and
nancial e

t . Since there are no idiosyncratic shocks, we will focus on the symmetric
equilibrium where all representative rms are the same.
We can slightly modify (3.32), to see clearly how the shock e

t a¤ects the economy.
Suppose the case in which   = 0 so that R = 1+ i. Using the budget constraint (3.31)
to substitute for P FtQ

tk

t+1   B
T
t+1
1+it
and remembering that the intra-period loan is equal
to the revenues, Lt = PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt), the enforcement constraint can be rewritten as
e

t
1  et
 
P FtQ

t (1  ) kt  BTt  W t nt  	
 
Dt ; D

t 1
  P mtF (ezt; kt ; nt )
At the beginning of the period kt and B
T
t are given. The rm have control only over the
input of labor, nt , and the equity payout, 	
  Dt ; Dt 1. If the rm wishes to keep the
production level unchanged, a negative nancial shock (lower e

t ) requires a reduction
in equity payout 	
 
Dt ; D

t 1

or employment. In other words, the rm is forced to raise
its equity and cut the new intertemporal debt. Thus, the exibility with which the rm
can change its nancial structure, i.e., the composition of debt and equity will determine
if the nancial shock a¤ects employment.
The rms nominal payout to shareholders assumed to be subject to a quadratic ad-
justment cost which is a way to formalize the rigidities a¤ecting the substitution between
debt and equity:
	
 
Dt ; D

t 1

= Dt + 


Dt
Dt 1
  1
2
Dt
where the nominal equity payout Dt is given and 
  0 is a parameter.12
11The variable e

t could be interpreted as the probability of nding a buyer. Because we assume
that the search for a buyer is required for the sale of the rms capital. The probability increases when
the market conditions improve.
12One way of thinking about the adjustment cost is that it captures the preferences of managers for
dividend smoothing. Lintner (1956) showed that managers are concerned about smoothing dividends
over time, a fact later conrmed by subsequent studies. This could obtain from agency problems.
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The parameter  is key for the role of nancial shocks. Since when  = 0 the
economy is almost frictionless, therefore debt adjustments caused by nancial shocks can
be quickly assisted through changes in rm equity. When  > 0, it is costly to substitute
debt and equity and rms readjustment becomes slowly. As a result, nancial shocks will
have a substantial e¤ect on macroeconomic situation of a country.
The rst order conditions with respect to nt ; k

t+1; B
T
t+1; D

t ; 

t ; 

t can be written as
tW

t = (

t   t )P mtFn(ez

t ; kt ; n

t ) (3.33)
0 = Et
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
  
t+1   t+1

P mt+1Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; n

t+1) + 

t+1P

Ft+1Q

t+1 (1  )

   t   tt et P FtQt (3.34)
0 =
t
1 + it (1   t )
  te

t
1
1 + it
  Et
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
t+1 (3.35)
1 = t
 
1 + 2

Dt
Dt 1
  1

Dt
Dt 1
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2!
 Et
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
t+12


Dt+1
Dt
  1

D2t+1
D2t
(3.36)
0 = e

t

P FtQ

tk

t+1  
BTt+1
1 + it

  P mtF (ez

t ; kt ; n

t ) (3.37)
BTt = P

mtF (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ) +
BTt+1
1 + it (1   t )
 W t nt
 P FtQt
 
kt+1   (1  ) kt
 	  Dt ; Dt 1 (3.38)
All derivations are given in Appendix B.2. mt;t+1 = 
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
is an stochastic discount
factor and the budget constraint is written in an aggregated form. The stochastic discount
factor mt;t+1, the wage W t and interest rate i

t are determined in the general equilibrium
and are taken as given by an individual rm.
Equation (3.33), the optimal condition for labor indicates that the marginal produc-
tivity of labor is equal to the marginal cost ( 

tW

t
(t t )P mt ). As the enforcement constraint
becomes tighter, the e¤ective cost of labor rises and its demand falls. Therefore, nancial
shocks could transmit to the real sector of the economy through the demand of labor.
To get further insights, it will be convenient to consider the special case in which the
cost of equity payout is zero, that is,  = 0. In this case t = 1 (see condition (3.36)) and
condition (3.35) becomes t
e

t
Rt
1+it
+ RtEt
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
t+1 = 1. This denotes that there
is a negative relation between e

t and the multiplier t taking as given the aggregate
prices Rt , i

t , and 
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
. In other words, lower probability of recovering rms capital
make the enforcement constraint tighter. Then from equation (3.33) we see that a higher
t implies a lower demand for labor.
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This mechanism is strengthened when  > 0. In this case readjusting the nancial
structure becomes costly, and the change in e

t induces a larger volatility in t . Of
course, prices will be a¤ected by the change in the policies of all rms.
Capital producers
Capital producers belong to households. They make new capital using input of nal
output and subject to adjustment costs. They sell new capital to rms at price P FtQ

t :
Their nominal prot
P Ft
C
t = P

FtQ

t I

t   P FtIt
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
Specically, they buy It of the nal good, pay P

FtI

t

1 + %
2

It
It 1
  1
2
as they may
need to adjust contracts if the amount of the investment goods changes. They repackage
the good into investment good (costlessly) and sell to rms at price P FtQ

t and receive
P FtQ

t I

t :
The rst order condition yields
Qt = 1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2
+
It
It 1
%

It
It 1
  1

  Et
Uc;t+1
Uc;t
%

It+1
It
  1

It+1
It
2
Retailers
Retailers repackage intermediate output. The marginal cost is P mt. We introduce nominal
rigidities a la Rotemberg.
Cost minimisation yields
yit =

piF t
P Ft
 "
Y t
where index i is of retailer i and Y t is nal output. Retailers costlessly brand inter-
mediate output. They have monopolistic power but have adjustment cost.
The rms prot is
piF t
R
t = p
i
F ty
i
t (1   xt )  P mtyit  
!
2

piF t
piF t 1
  1
2
Y t P

Ft
we introduce sales tax  xt .
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The rst order condition yields
! (Ft   1)Ft = (1  ") (1   xt ) + "Xt + !Et
Uc;t+1
Uc;t
 
Ft+1   1
 Y t+1
Y t
Ft+1 (3.39)
where Xt =
P mt
P Ft
. The derivation is given in Appendix B.2.
and the aggregated across rms prot
P Ft
R
t = P

FtY

t (1   xt )  P mtY t  
!
2
(Ft   1)2 Y t P Ft
3.2.6 Governments
The government in each country collects taxes and pays it as transfers and government
spending:
Tt =   A
T
t+1
1 + it(1   t) +
ATt+1
1 + it
(3.40)
PHtGt = 
w
t WtNt + 
d
tDt + 
x
tPHtYt (3.41)
T t =  
BTt+1
1 + it (1   t )
+
BTt+1
1 + it
(3.42)
P FtG

t = 
w
t W

t N

t + 
d
t D

t + 
x
t P

FtY

t (3.43)
We assume that the domestic government buys goods (G), taxes sale (with tax rate xt ).
PHtGt = 
x
tPHtYt
P FtG

t = 
x
t P

FtY

t
3.2.7 Market Clearing and Private Sector Equilibrium
In order to close the system, we write down two market clearing constraints:
Yt = (1  )tCt +  tSt Ct + 

dt
dt 1
Ht   1
2
dt +Gt +
!
2
(Ht   1)2 Yt
+It
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
+
0@ 1


EtBt+1
Pt
   1
1A Bt+1Et
(1 + it )PHt
(3.44)
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Y t = (1  )  tCt + 

t
St

Ct +

dt
dt 1
Ft   1
2
dt +G

t +
!
2
(Ft   1)2 Y t
+It
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
+
0@ 1


At+1
EtP t
   1
1A At+1
Et (1 + it)P Ft
where Yt = ZeztktN
1 
t ; Y

t = Ze
zt kt N
1 
t ;t =
 
(1  ) + S1 t
 1
1  ;
 t =
 
(1  ) + S 1t
 1
1  :
Together with households rst order conditions (3.3)-(3.8), (3.12)-(3.17) and rms rst
order conditions (3.24)-(3.29), (3.33)-(3.38), (3.30), (3.39), government budget constraints
(3.40)-(3.43) and one net foreign assets equation
0 = S1 t 

tCt    tSt Ct   Etat+1
Ht+1
(1 + it)
+ at + Etbt+1
Ft+1
(1 + it )
St   btSt
and the denition of nominal exchange rate
St =
PFt
PHt
:
They describe the evolution of the economy and determine twenty ve variables: Ct, nt,
wt, t, t, Xt, kt, Ht, dt, bt, at, Qt, C

t , n

t , w

t , 

t , 

t , X

t , k

t , 

Ft, d

t , b

t , a

t , Q

t and St:
Appendix B.3 demonstrates that the system is internally consistent. Policy instruments
are it; it ; 
w
t ; 
w
t ; 
d
t ; 
d
t ; 
x
t ; 
x
t ;  t; 

t and it remains to describe policy.
3.3 Linearised system
Let X^t = logXt   logX denote the log-deviation of variable Xt from its steady state
value X. In line with Benigno (2009) and Paoli (2009) we assume a symmetric steady
state, which implies that the net foreign asset position is zero in the steady state.13 The
log-linear approximations for the equilibrium conditions of our model are given as:
C^t = EtC^t+1   1


{^t   Et^Ht+1

+
1



EtS^t+1   S^t

(3.45)
and
^Ht = Et^Ht+1 +
("  1) (1  x)
!

x
(1  x) ^
x
t +
w
(1  w) ^
w
t
+

(1  )

^t   ^t

+ C^t   z^t   k^t + ( +  ) n^t + S^t

(3.46)
13Although non-zero steady state holdings of foreign assets seems to be the empirical case (see eg. Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2002)) the simplication doesn´t alter our results.
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The log-linearized Euler equation and the Phillips curve (PC) of the domestic country (see
non-linear (3.30) and (3.5)) state that current consumption is positively related to future
consumption, future ination and future terms of trade and negatively related to current
nominal interest rate and current terms of trade. Current ination is positively related to
future ination, sales tax, income tax, Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint,
consumption, labor and terms of trade and negatively related to Lagrange multiplier of
the budget constraint, productivity shock and capital.
We linearised the system of FOCs (3.25)-(3.29) and obtain the following equations
^t = 

^t + ^t

+  (1  ) C^t (3.47)
+

 (1  )XY
k
  (1  )

EtC^t+1 + (1  )Et^Ht+1
+

(1  )XY
k
+ (1  )

Et^t+1 +  (1  )XY
k
EtS^t+1
+ (1  )XY
k
( + 1)Etn^t+1    (1  )XY
k
k^t+1
Et^t+1 = ( + 1)

^t +
i
R
^ t

+

  ( + 1) (1  )
R

{^t
 

^t + ^t

  C^t + EtC^t+1 (3.48)
^t = 2

Etd^t+1   d^t + Et^Ht+1

  2

d^t   d^t 1 + ^Ht

(3.49)

k
Y
k^t+1    a
Y
a^t+1 + 
a
Y
1
a
S2


bt+1    a
Y
Et^Ht+1
=   a
Y
{^t   

k
Y
   a
Y

^t
+X


(1  )

^t   ^t

+ C^t +
w
(1  w) ^
w
t + (1 +  ) n^t + S^t

(3.50)
  k
Y
k^t+1 =

w
n
Y
 X

C^t +
w
(1  w) ^
w
t + (1 +  ) n^t + S^t

 X 
(1  )

^t   ^t

+
a
Y
a^t   

bt
Y
+
a
Y R
(1 + i) (1  )
R
{^t   a
Y R
i
R
^ t
  (1  ) k
Y
k^t +
d
Y
d^t  

a^t+1   1
a


bt+1 + Et^Ht+1

a
Y R
(3.51)
(3.47) and (3.49) show that Lagrange multiplier  positively related to credit shock,
Lagrange multiplier , consumption, future ination and negatively related to ination
and future consumption. The log-linearized aggregate demand equation is (see (3.44))
Y^t =
k
Y
k^t+1+



+ 1


bt+1
Y
 



+ 1

bt
Y
+
C
Y

C^t + S^t

 (1  ) k
Y
k^t+
G
Y
G^t (3.52)
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and states that domestic output is positively related to future domestic capital, domestic
consumption, terms of trade, domestic government spending and future foreign bonds but
negatively to improvements in the foreign bonds and domestic capital.
Due to the cost in trading foreign bonds the uncovered interest rate parity condition
is not valid anymore (see (3.9))
{^t = {^

t + Et^Ht+1   Et^Ft+1 + EtS^t+1   S^t   bt+1 (3.53)
There is a time varying risk-premium that depends on both the net future foreign asset
position of the country bt+1 and costs of changing the asset holdings . This risk premium
could be positive or negative depending on the Home country being a borrower or a lender
in the international assets market.
From the resource constraint we get the following extra equation
0 = 
C
Y

((1  ) (1  ) + ) S^t + C^t

  C

Y 
Y 
Y

 (1  ) S^t + C^t

+



+ 1


bt+1
Y
 



+ 1

bt
Y
(3.54)
where R = 1 + i(1  ):
For the other country the corresponding equations are
C^t = EtC^t+1  
1


{^t   Et^Ft+1

  1



EtS^t+1   S^t

(3.55)
^Ft = Et^Ft+1 +
("  1) (1   x)
!

 x
(1   x) ^
x
t +

(1  )

^t   ^

t

+( + ) n^t + C^

t +
 w
(1   w) ^
w
t   z^t   k^t   S^t

(3.56)
^

t = 


^t + ^

t

+ (1  )C^t
+

 (1  )XY

k
  (1  )

EtC^t+1 + (1  )Et^Ft+1
+

(1  )XY

k
+ (1  )

Et^

t+1
+ (1  )XY

k

( + 1)Etn^t+1   EtS^t+1   k^t+1

(3.57)
Et^

t+1 = (
 + 1)

^

t +
i 
(1 + (1   ) i) ^

t

+

   (
 + 1) (1   )
 (1 + (1   ) i)

{^t
 

^t + ^

t

  C^t + EtC^t+1 (3.58)
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^

t = 2


Etd^t+1   d^t + Et^Ft+1

  2

d^t   d^t 1 + ^Ft

(3.59)
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(3.60)
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Y^ t =
k
Y 
k^t+1  



+ 1


bt+1
Y 
+



+ 1

bt
Y 
+
C
Y 

C^t   S^t

  (1  ) k

Y 
k^t +
G
Y 
G^t (3.62)
{^t = {^t + Et^Ft+1   Et^Ht+1   EtS^t+1 + S^t   at+1 (3.63)
0 = 
C
Y

((1  ) (1  ) + ) S^t + C^t

  C

Y 
Y 
Y

 (1  ) S^t + C^t

+



+ 1


bt+1
Y
 



+ 1

bt
Y
(3.64)
where R = 1 + i(1    ): The linearisation of equations and steady states are given in
Appendix B.5 and B.4.
3.4 Calibration
The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency.14 We x  = 0:9825. The capital
depreciation rate is set to  = 0:025: The capital ratio in production function is set to
 = 0:36, and the mean value of A is normalized to 1. The tax wedge which corresponds
to the advantage of debt over equity is determined to be  = 0:35, and the dividend
adjustment cost parameter set to  = 0:146 as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
14Note that both countries are symmetric and we only include calibration of Home country.
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Figure 3.1: Historical data in the US. Data sources: NIPA and FoF tables.
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We calibrate the steady state debt to output ratio to match the data. The quarterly
ratio of debt to output for the non-nancial business sector is 3:25 over the sample period
1984:I-2010:II, see the top panel in Figure 3.1. In order to match that, we set the steady
state value of the nancial variable,  , to 0:1634.15
Parameters of the household utility function are determined as follows. The calibration
of the Frisch intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply,  , is assumed to be
equal to 1 and the risk aversion parameter is:  = 1. The relative weight on the disutility
of labour,  = 1:8834, is chosen so as to set steady state hours worked equal to 0:3.
We calibrate the measure of price stickiness, ! = 80, in a way that corresponds to
a probability of rms changing prices every 3 quarters in a corresponding Calvo model.
The elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods " is equal to 11 in steady state
which gives a 10% mark up.
Parameters of the policy objective function are chosen to be #y = 0:3, and #s = 0:1,
see Chen et al. (2014).16
It remains to calibrate the shock and the initial states to simulate the scenarios of
interest. The second panel in Figure 3.1 plots the historical data of corporate debt to
output ratio (quarterly). The average value of this ratio during 1984-2009 is 3.25. The
peak of 3.87 in 2008 was somewhat above the average value, and the consequent reduction
to 3.55 in 2011 constitutes a reduction of about 10% relative to its peak. We use these
numbers as a guide to our simulations.
Based on this evidence, we consider an AR(1) credit shock ^t = ^t 1+ "t with persis-
tence  = 0:95, and we examine the dynamic implications of a negative 10% innovation
in "t.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods  is
set to 2, which lies in the values assumed in the RBC literature (1  2) and the degree of
trade openness $ and $ are set to 0:3. The relative size of each country is calibrated
depending on the nature of the analysis. In the main case of interest, labelled base line
case, with large foreignand small homecountries the Home country has size n = 0:3,
as the relative size in terms of population or employment of Greece, Ireland, Italy and
Portugal is about one third of the total population of the EMU countries. However, we also
consider two identical countries with n = 0:5 when we discuss transmission mechanisms.
As in Benigno (2009), Ghironi et al. (2006), we assume that the costs of changing the
asset holdings with respect to the steady state are such that  =  = 0:01.17
15Data sources: NIPA and FoF tables. The calculations follow Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
16The results are very robust to wide range of parameters #y and #s between zero and one.
17Kollmann (2003) has used Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) estimates on the relationship between real
interest rate di¤erentials and net foreign asset position. He assumes a value of 0.0019 in a case in which
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3.5 Social Objectives
We assume the following world-wide social welfare function:
U =
1X
t=0
tVt (3.65)
with the ow objective
Vt = n^
2
Ht + n#yY^
2
t + (1  n) ^2Ft + (1  n)#yY^ 2t + #sS^2t (3.66)
We, therefore, assume that volatilities of ination, output and the terms of trade are
costly for the society. We assume this ad hoc objective but we also check robustness of
our results to a change of coe¢ cients.
Objective function in this form was used in Benigno and Benigno (2006) and Clarida
et al. (2002) and Corsetti et al. (2011).
3.6 Policy set-up
In this section we describe the policy set-up. Particularly, we demonstrate how a nancial
shock in a country could generate volatility in other countrys macroeconomic variables.
Given the loss function (equation (3.66)) we solve for the linearquadratic optimal policy
problem. The shock produces a dynamic path of deleveraging which depends endogenously
on policy. We study the e¤ects of cooperative monetary policy intervention. We assume
that policymakers act under commitment.
The sequence of events and actions within a period is as follows. At the beginning
of every period t, the state a^t; b^t ; b^t; k^t; k^

t ; d^t and d^

t are known and shock z^t; z^

t ; ^t; ^

t
realizes. Then the two policymakers choose the value of {^t and {^t cooperatively. There
is a particular move, when policymakers maximise the worlds objective and there are
two instruments (^{t , {^t ). After the policymakers have moved, in the next stage the
private sector simultaneously adjusts its choice variables ^Ht; ^Ft and C^t; C^

t . The optimal
^Ht; ^

Ft ,C^t; C^

t and policy {^t , {^

t result in the new level of a^t+1; b^

t+1; b^t+1; k^t+1; k^

t+1; d^t+1
and d^t+1 by the beginning of the next period t+ 1.
the net foreign asset position is normalized by exports. In our case, since the net foreign asset position
is normalized by quarterly GDP, with an export/GDP ratio of 15%, a value of 0.0019 implies a value for
 equal to 0.012, which is consistent the calibration that we use.
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3.7 Results
3.7.1 Transmission mechanism
In this section, we examine the transmission mechanism of asymmetric credit shocks. We
start with two identical countries (n = 0:5), characterized by the same steady state in-
termediation cost,  =  = 0:01. Next we discuss the country-size e¤ects. We perform
some robustness analysis along di¤erent assumptions on  = . Since our welfare ob-
jective function is not micro-founded, we also check the robustness of our results using
di¤erent values for output and terms of trade coe¢ cients (#y and #s). We discuss the
welfare consequences of our results as well.
Country size symmetry
In Figure (3.2), we observe the impulse responses of both equal size economies (n = 0:5)
to a negative 10% credit shock in Home country and a positive 10% credit shock in foreign
country. Such negative shock in Home country, reduces the proportion of Home output
which banks will be able to recover in case of default. Banks lend to domestic rms at the
beginning of the period, so that domestic rms are able to pay wages. As the enforcement
constraint is always binding, the di¤erence between bonds and capital is covered by a
loan. As the negative credit shock reduces the probability of recovery in Home country,
the amount of bank lending falls. Domestic rms which are not able to obtain funds up
front have to deleverage or reduce the value of production. Domestic rms reduce labour,
produce less output and also pay lower wages, see Figure (3.2). The equilibrium prices of
Home goods fall as a result of lower income and lower demand. Domestic rms reduce the
amount of borrowing. In response to lower ination and output the central bank reduces
the nominal interest rate. Initial reduction of consumption is too low to compensate the
large initial reduction in output. Domestic households sell assets to nance consumption.
Besides, Home goods are now cheaper and foreigners want to buy them. As a result of
inow of funds, Home currency appreciates (see also equation (3.45) and equation (3.53)).
Lower interest rate also makes it easier for banks to pay out the existing debt, so it helps
to reduce the debt quickly. Output falls by less than wages, prots of rms fall and
so dividends fall. Domestic rms budget constraint becomes tighter but its enforcement
constraint is looser at the initial moment then it gets tighter too gradually over time, see
equation (3.49) and equation (3.46). The adjustment goes with overshooting as capital
changes only slowly and it continues to fall while the e¤ect of persistent shock disappears.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses of symmetric size countries to an asymmetric credit shock
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Figure 3.3: Impulse responses of asymmetric size countries to an asymmetric credit shock
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Country size asymmetry
In Figure (3.3), we observe the impulse responses of two di¤erent size economies (n = 0:3)
to a negative 10% credit shock in Home country and a positive 10% credit shock in foreign
country. In what follows we compare our results with the same scenario assuming two
identical countries (see Figure (3.2)). Figure (3.3) shows that country-size do not have
any particular e¤ect on any macroeconomic variable except on consumption. Domestic
import share ( = (1 n)$) is higher for smaller n, and because Home ination, interest
rate and terms of trade are almost unchanged then Home consumption will be higher (see
equation (3.45)). And for the same reason, smaller  = n$, foreign consumption is
smaller. There are also small changes on foreign assets and terms of trade that we explain
them as follows: To nance higher level of consumption, domestic households need to
sell assets and foreign assets fall by more. Besides, higher import share, , indicates that
foreign goods are cheaper (see equation (3.46)). Then as a result of higher import and
outow of funds, Home currency will appreciate by less.
Home welfare loss is slightly greater than the foreign welfare loss (see Table 3.1).
The small H country maximises the world objective welfare, but there is a large relative
weight to the objectives of the large foreign country. Table 3.1 shows that, welfare relevant
variables at Home display higher volatility. Table 3.1 shows that in di¤erent size countries,
smaller country su¤ers a bigger loss. In contrast, bigger country and the world benet a
lower level of welfare loss.
Variance n = 0:5 n = 0:3
Y^t  102 0:62 1:17
Y^ t  102 0:62 0:43
^Ht  102 0:13 0:22
^Ft  102 0:13 0:10
S^t  102 0:17 0:16
Loss (W)102 0:34 0:34
Loss (H)102 0:34 0:58
Loss (F)102 0:34 0:24
Table 3.1: Volatilities of output, ination, terms of trade and unconditional welfare loss
due to a credit shock assuming two symmetric (second column) and asymmetric (third
column) size countries
3.7.2 Robustness analysis
How do the results change under di¤erent intermediation cost, ? We address this ques-
tion through di¤erent assumptions on :
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Figure 3.4: Robustness analysis for di¤erent value of  =  under asymmetric credit
shock.
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In Figure (3.4), we observe the impulse responses of both equal size economies (n =
0:5) to a negative 10% credit shock in Home country and a positive 10% credit shock in
foreign country using di¤erent s, and how optimal policy changes for alternative values
of  around the benchmark value of 0:01.1819 Namely we plot impulse responses under
optimal policy for  =  = 0:001, 0:01 and 0:1. A value of  below 0:01 leads to greater
volatility of home output which is costly, but also helps to deleverage faster. Output falls
by more in the Home country because the terms of trade (PFt=PHt) deviates by more.
Instead, for a higher  = 0:1, the real income is less volatile. As we see in Figure (3.4)
and Table (3.2), bigger  corresponds to smaller deviation of terms of trade, and output.
Deviation of ination is almost the same for all three alternative value of . Therefore,
welfare loss falls as  rises.
By assuming two di¤erent size countries, (n = 0:3), welfare loss is the highest when
 = 0:001 and it is the lowest when  is the benchmark level 0:01.
To summarise, welfare is maximised for an intermediate value of degree of nancial
integration. If the intermediation cost is absent, there is large volatility of output during
the period of adjustment, while the deleveraging is performed faster. With greater costs
on international nancial ows, the deleveraging is substantially slowed down which leads
to longer periods of adjustment and greater costs.
Variance (n = 0:5)  = 0:001  = 0:01  = 0:1
Y^t  102 0:6200 0:6200 0:6000
Y^ t  102 0:6200 0:6200 0:6000
^Ht  102 0:1332 0:1322 0:1334
^Ft  102 0:1332 0:1322 0:1334
S^t  102 0:1900 0:1700 0:1400
Loss (W)102 0:3400 0:3400 0:3300
Loss (H)102 0:3400 0:3400 0:3300
Loss (F)102 0:3400 0:3400 0:3300
Table 3.2: Volatilities of output, ination, terms of trade and unconditional welfare loss
for di¤erent value of intermediation cost due to a credit shock assuming two symmetric
size countries
Figure (3.5) shows how optimal policy changes for alternative values of #y and #s
around the benchmark value of #y = 0:3 and #s = 0:1. We assumed these coe¢ cients
were not microfounded, so it is useful to investigate if they play any important role in our
results. When deviation of output penalised by less (smaller #y, dash line): comparing
to the benchmark (dash-dot line), labor, capital and output fall by more because the
penalty on output deviation is lower. Consumption is higher and Home rms are more
18Note that Foreign responses are completely asymmetric to Domestic responses, so we skip adding
Foreign responses into this Figure.
19Note that we assume  = .
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Figure 3.5: Robustness analysis for di¤enet values of #y and #s under asymmetric credit
shock
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Variance (n = 0:3)  = 0:001  = 0:01  = 0:1
Y^t  102 1:1667 1:1667 1:0667
Y^ t  102 0:4286 0:4286 0:4143
^Ht  102 0:2177 0:2150 0:2147
^Ft  102 0:0973 0:0968 0:0974
S^t  102 0:1800 0:1600 0:1300
Loss (W)102 0:3500 0:3400 0:3300
Loss (H)102 0:5900 0:5800 0:5500
Loss (F)102 0:2400 0:2400 0:2300
Table 3.3: Volatilities of output, ination, terms of trade and unconditional welfare loss
for di¤erent value of intermediation cost due to a credit shock assuming two asymmetric
size (n=0.3) countries
interested in foreign bonds because of their higher rate of interest. Then foreign bonds
rises and as a result of outow of funds, Home currency depreciated. Then ination falls
by less (see equation (3.45) and equation (3.53)). When deviation of terms of trade is
penalised by more (higher #s, dot line): Since terms of trades movement is penalised by
more, it falls by less comparing to the benchmark case. It corresponds to the higher level
of foreign assets and outow of funds. Output deviation is the same as the benchmark
and consumption is higher. As a result, investment on capital must fall (see equation
(3.52)) and welfare loss has its biggest value. Now when we have both e¤ects together
(smaller #y and larger #s, solid line): Again output falls by more, so does capital and
labor. Because of both e¤ects, terms of trade rises to its highest level. Then foreign
bonds rises too. Consumption rises and so does the ination (see equation (3.45) and
equation (3.53)). Enforcement constraint is tighter, because of buying higher level of
foreign bonds. Budget constraint is tighter because of lower production and employment
level.
To summarise, welfare is minimised for the higher volatility of output but lower volatil-
ity of ination and terms of trade. If the penalty on output deviation is absent, there is
large volatility of output, while ination volatility and welfare fall. With greater penalty
on terms of trade volatility, its volatility and welfare fall as well.
3.7.3 Contagion
Finally in a two country model under exible exchange rate and independent monetary
authorities, we demonstrate the e¤ect of one countrys credit shock on another country.
Figure (3.6) shows that a negative shock in one country regardless of size, has no
particular e¤ect on macroeconomic variables of other country except a small change in
consumption, and foreign bonds. Foreign bonds in home country falls and foreign bonds
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Figure 3.6: Impulse responses of symmetric vs asymmetric size countries to a non-
symmetric credit shock
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Variance #y = 0:3, #y = 0:1, #y = 0:3, #y = 0:1,
( = 0:01) #s = 0:1 #s = 0:1 #s = 0:3 #s = 0:3
Y^t  102 0:62 1:16 0:72 1:24
Y^ t  102 0:62 1:16 0:72 1:24
^Ht  102 0:13 0:04 0:13 0:05
^Ft  102 0:13 0:04 0:13 0:05
S^t  102 0:17 0:098 0:097 0:07
Loss (W)102 0:34 0:40 0:35 0:42
Loss (H)102 0:34 0:40 0:35 0:42
Loss (F)102 0:34 0:40 0:35 0:42
Table 3.4: Volatilities of output, ination, terms of trade and unconditional welfare loss
for di¤erent penalties on output and terms of trade deviations due to a credit shock
assuming two symmetric size countries
in foreign country rises, then as a result of inow of funds domestic currency appreciates
(see equation (3.53)). Therefore foreign consumption falls (see equation (3.55)).
Foreign welfare loss is slightly greater than the Home welfare loss (see Table (3.1)).
The small foreign country maximises the world objective welfare, but there is a large
relative weight to the objectives of the large Home country.
To summarise, simulations demonstrate that in two country model under exible ex-
change rate and independent monetary authorities, the e¤ect of one countrys credit shock
has very limited e¤ect on another country. When monetary policymakers cooperate and
choose interest rate optimally, the una¤ected country can nearly eliminate all aftere¤ects
of the shock to the other country. To some extent, limited nancial integration prevents
the spread of volatility across the border, however, unconstrained monetary policy is the
key to these results, as we shall see in the next chapter of the thesis.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we try to address several important factors that explain cross-country
di¤erences in the e¤ects of the nancial crisis. We analyse transmission of shocks from
one country to another for two di¤erent cases: country size symmetry and asymmetry.
Our results demonstrate that welfare is maximised for an intermediate value of degree of
nancial integration. If the intermediation cost is absent, there is large volatility of output
during the period of adjustment, while the deleveraging is performed faster. With greater
costs on international nancial ows, the deleveraging is substantially slowed down which
leads to longer periods of adjustment and greater costs. We demonstrate that in two
country model under exible exchange rate and independent monetary authorities, the
e¤ect of one countrys credit shock has very limited e¤ect on another country. When mon-
etary policymakers cooperate and choose interest rate optimally, the una¤ected country
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can nearly eliminate all aftere¤ects of the shock to the other country. To some extent,
limited nancial integration prevents the spread of volatility across the border, however,
unconstrained monetary policy is the key to these results.
We also investigate if the country size matters for the severity of recessions. We show
that country-size do not have any particular e¤ect on any macroeconomic variable except
on consumption. Smaller country su¤ers a bigger loss. One reason is the higher rate of
import share for smaller country. Since the objective function is not microfounded, we
assume variable degree of penalty on output and terms of trade deviations. We nd that
welfare is minimised for the higher volatility of output but lower volatility of ination and
terms of trade. If the penalty on output deviation is absent, there is large volatility of
output, while ination volatility and welfare fall. With greater penalty on terms of trade
volatility, terms of trade volatility and welfare fall as well.
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Chapter 4
Monetary Union: Fixed Exchange
Rate Regime
4.1 Introduction
Financial crisis of 2007 has started as a subprime lending crisis, a¤ecting one sector in
one country. It quickly spread to many other countries. Arguably, the presence of xed
or semi-xed exchange rate targeters, such as Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea,
of countries locked into the European Monetary Union, played an important e¤ect in
amplication and spread of nancial shocks.
In this chapter, we investigate the importance of exchange rate regime for international
transmission of credit shocks. Specically, we use the same two-country model as in
the previous chapter, but assume that both countries are locked into a permanently xed
exchange rate regime within a currency union. We therefore ignore any issues of imperfect
credibility of exchange rate pegs and do not discuss exchange rate crises. We, therefore,
also assume that the monetary policymaker has a mandate to stabilise both countries
economies.
We demonstrate that, unlike under exible exchange rate regime studied in the pre-
vious chapter, the centralised monetary policy alone is unable to stabilise the economy.
National scal policies must be activated to counteract asymmetric shocks. We demon-
strate, however, that the e¤ectiveness of scal policy is nevertheless is limited. Even
if it is chosen optimally, scal policy does not eliminate cyclical patterns in economic
adjustment, which is welfare-reducing volatility of economic variables.
This model demonstrates that shocks hitting one economy, result in sharp contraction
of consumption in another country. Countercyclical scal policy is able to avoid major
recession, however. In contrast to results in the previous chapter, the shocks propagation
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mechanism is much stronger under xed exchange rate regime. As before, we assume
variable degree of nancial integration and study its importance for the propagation of
credit shocks.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the model. Sec-
tion 4.3 covers the linearised version of the system of equations. Section 4.4 describes
calibration of the model. Section 4.5 discusses policy objectives. Section 4.6 discusses the
results and section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The Model
We present a simple two-country model with nancial frictions and with incorporated
nominal rigidities a la Rotemberg (1983). The world economy is populated by a continuum
of agents on the interval of [0; 1]. The population on the segment [0;n) belongs to country
H (Home), while the segment [n; 1] belongs to country F (Foreign). Each economy is
populated by households and rms. Firms use labor and capital to produce di¤erentiated
goods. Firms issue equity and debt and use intra-period loans to nance working capital.
Firms face credit restrictions due to uncertainty of recovering these loans. Preferences
reect home bias in consumption. The detailed model of the economy is presented in this
section.
4.2.1 Law of One Price, The Terms of Trade and Relative Prices
We assume that the law of one price holds, implying pFt(z) = EtpFt(z), pHt(z) = Etp

Ht(z)
for all z 2 [0; 1] where Et = [H]= [F ] is the nominal exchange rate, that is the price of
foreign currency in terms of home currency, and pFt(z) is the price of foreign good z
denominated in foreign currency (Of course, the holding of one price does not imply that
PPP holds, unless we assume the absence of home bias).1 We dene the terms of trade is
the relative price of imported goods:
St =
PFt
PHt
:
The real exchange rate the ratio of CPI inations, expressed in domestic currency 
is dened as
Qt = EtP

t
Pt
:
1Let a "*" denote foreign variables.
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4.2.2 Domestic Households
The home economy (H), is populated by a continuum of homogeneous innitly-living
households who share identical preferences and technology and maximise the expected
lifetime utility E0
P1
t=0 
tU (Ct; nt), with aggregated period utility
U (Ct; nt) =
C1 t
1     
n1+ t
1 +  
(4.1)
where Ct is private home consumption, nt is home labor,  is the discount factor, E0 is
the actuarial expectation at time t = 0. Furthermore  > 0 measures the labor supply
elasticity,  > 0 measures the elasticity of consumption,  is a preference parameter. We
assume home bias in consumption. In more detail, a composite consumption index, Ct;
is dened as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the continuum of goods i 2 [0; 1] produced in
the foreign country and home2
Ct =

(1  ) 1 C
 1

Ht + 
1
C
 1

Ft
 
 1
Parameter  > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
consumption goods. Parameter  2 [0; 1] is the weight of imported goods in private
home consumption and is inversely related to the degree of home bias in preferences.
Another interpretation for  is as a natural index of openness or the import share. The
import share depends on (1  n) which is the relative size of foreign economy, and on $
which is the degree of trade openness. It yields  = (1   n)$. We assume home bias in
consumption:
1   = (1  (1  n)$) >  = n$
which implies
1  n$ > (1  n)$
Similarly, home bias in foreign preferences requires 1   >  which again implies
1  n$ > (1  n)$
CHt and CFt are domestic consumption sub-indexes of the continuum of di¤erentiated
goods produced respectively in country H and F given by the CES functions
CHt =
 
1
n
 1

Z n
0
cHt(z)
 1
 dz
! 
 1
; CFt =
 
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
cFt(z)
 1
 dz
! 
 1
where each consumption bundle CHt and CFt is composed of imperfectly substitutable
varieties of goods z 2 [0; 1] produced within a given country with elasticity of substitution
 > 1:
2The same relationship can be written in per capita terms.
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The aggregated nominal intertemporal budget constraint at time t for household i
belonging to country H is given by
Z 1
0
[PHt(z)C
i
Ht(z) + PFt(z)C
i
F t(z)]dz +
Ait+1
1 + it
+
Bit+1Et
(1 + it )

EtBt+1
Pt

 Ait +BitEt + (1  wt )W itnit +
  
1   dt

Dt + PSt

st   st+1PSt + T it + PHtt
PHt(z) and PFt(z) are price indices of domestic and foreign (imported from country F)
goods z, where the latter is expressed in domestic currency. At is the one-period domestic
corporate bond held by domestic households (real bonds, in terms of domestic prices), Bt
is the one-period foreign corporate bonds held by domestic households, W it is the nominal
wage and T it denotes lump-sum taxes/transfers. 
w
t denotes a country specic tax on
nominal income and Et is the nominal exchange rate, given as the price of one of unit
foreign currency in terms of home currency. PHtt is nominal prot from the ownership
of capital-producing rms and retailers (note that t = Ct +
R
t ). Here st is the domestic
share of equity which is wholly owned by domestic households, Dt denotes the equity
payout paid to the shareholders, PSt is the market price of domestic shares,  dt denotes
the tax on equity payout. We assume that the households share the revenues of owning
rms in equal proportion. Following Woodford (2003) we consider a cashless economy.
Therefore the only explicit role played by money is to serve as a unit of account.
We introduce incomplete nancial markets as in Benigno (2009).3 Domestic house-
holds hold domestic equity shares st and noncontingent bonds issued by rms of home and
foreign countries. Households of country H can trade in two nominal one-period, risk-free
bonds. Bonds At are issued by home rms and are denominated in home currency, bonds
Bt are issued by foreign rms and are denominated in foreign currency. Households be-
longing to country H have to pay an intermediation cost, if they want to trade in the
foreign bond. These costs are determined by the function (). Function () depends on
the real holdings of the foreign assets in the entire economy, and therefore is taken as given
by the domestic households. If a household belongs to a country which is in a borrowing
position(Bt+1 < 0), it will be charged with a premium on the foreign interest rate and if
the household belongs to a country which is in a lending position(Bt+1 > 0), it receives
a rate of return lower than the foreign interest rate. Along with Benigno (2009) we need
the following restrictions on (): (0) = 1 and () is 1 only if Bt = 0. Furthermore ()
has to be a di¤erentiable, decreasing function in the neighborhood of zero. 0(0) =  :4
The intermediation prots zt are dened analogous to Benigno (2009)
zt =
Bit+1Et
(1 + it )
0@ 1


EtBt+1
Pt
   1
1A
3See Benigno (2009) for a generalized asset trading framework, that follows Ghironi et al. (2006).
4We assume it is convex and can be approximated by (x) = 1  x+ x2:
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and shared equally among foreign households. The domestic budget constraint is then
given as
PtCt + st+1PSt +
Ait+1
1 + it
+
Bit+1Et
(1 + it )
+zt
 Ait +BitEt + (1  wt )W itnit +
  
1   dt

Dt + PSt

st + T
i
t + PHtt
The optimal allocation within each variety of goods z yields per capita relationships
cHt(z) =
1
n

pHt(z)
PHt
 
CHt; cFt(z) =
1
1  n

pFt(z)
PFt
 
CFt
for all z 2 [0; 1], where
PHt =

1
n
Z n
0
pHt(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
, PFt =

1
1  n
Z 1
n
pFt(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
are the price indexes for domestic and imported goods, whereby the latter is expressed
in domestic currency. Note as  rises, the individual goods become closer substitutes and
therefore the individual rms have less market power.
Finally, the optimal condition of expenditures between domestic and imported (for-
eign) bundles of goods is given by5
CHt = (1  )

PHt
Pt
 
Ct and CFt = 

PFt
Pt
 
Ct
where z denotes the goods type or variety and pHt(z); pFt(z) are prices of individual
home and foreign produced goods.
where Pt =

(1  )P 1 Ht + P 1 F t
 1
1  , Pt is the consumer price index (CPI) in coun-
try H and PHt; PFt are domestic and foreign goods price indices. Note that if the econ-
omy is closed,  = 0; the CPI equals domestic prices. Correspondingly we can write
total consumption expenditures by domestic households as PtCt = PHtCHt+PFtCFt. The
aggregated budget constraint can therefore be rewritten as
(1  wt )W itnit + Ait +BitEt +
  
1   dt

Dt + PSt

st + T
i
t + PHtt
 A
i
t+1
1 + it
+
Bit+1Et
(1 + it )

EtBt+1
Pt
 + st+1PSt + PtCt (4.2)
We assume that all households in the same country have the same level of initial
wealth. As they face the same labour demand and own equal share of all rms, they face
identical budget constraints. They all will have identical consumption paths, so we do
not use individual index within each country.
5The same relationship can be written in per capita terms.
68
We maximize equation (4.1) with respect to equation (4.2) and arrive to the following
system
UC;t
Pt
= t (4.3)
Wt
Pt
=   Un;t
UC;t (1  wt )
(4.4)
1
1 + it
= Et
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
(4.5)
1
1 + it
= Et
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
Et+1
Et


EtBt+1
Pt

(4.6)
PSt = Et
C t+1
Ht+1C
 
t
  
1   dt+1

Dt+1 + PSt+1

(4.7)
(1  wt )Wtnt + At +BtEt +
  
1   dt

Dt + PSt

st + Tt
=
At+1
1 + it
+
Bt+1Et
(1 + it )

EtBF;t+1
Pt
 + st+1PSt + PtCt (4.8)
All derivations are given in Appendix B.1. Equation (4.5) is the standard Euler equa-
tion and determines the consumption smoothing behavior of the households. Equation
(4.6) is the Euler equation derived from the optimal choice of the foreign bond. equation
(4.4) is the standard labour supply condition. It determines the quantity of labor supplied
as a function of real wage, given the marginal utility of consumption. Finally equation
(4.8) is the aggregate budget constraint.
The incomplete nancial market framework generates deviations from the uncovered
interest parity (UIP). Combining equation (4.5) and equation (4.6) yields the optimal
portfolio choice of the households of country H
(1 + it) = Et (1 + it )
Et+1
Et


EtBt+1
Pt

(4.9)


EtBt+1
Pt

can also be interpreted as a risk premium term on the interest rate. If the
economy is a net debtor, the domestic interest rate is above the foreign interest rate and
if the economy is a net creditor the domestic interest rate is below the foreign interest
rate. Therefore movements in the net foreign asset positions a¤ect the interest di¤erential
between the two countries.
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4.2.3 Foreign Households
Similarly the foreign economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous innitly-living
households who share identical preferences and technology and maximise the expected
lifetime utility E0
P1
t=0 
tU (Ct ; n

t ), with aggregated period utility
U (Ct ; n

t ) =
C1 t
1     
n1+ t
1 +  
(4.10)
where Ct is private foreign consumption, n

t is foreign labor,  is the discount factor, E0
is the actuarial expectation at time t = 0. Furthermore  > 0 measures the labor supply
elasticity,  > 0 measures the elasticity of consumption,  is a preference parameter. We
assume home bias in consumption. In more detail, a composite consumption index, Ct ;
is dened as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the continuum of goods i 2 [0; 1] produced in
the foreign country and home6
Ct =

(1  ) 1 C
 1

Ft + 
 1
C
  1

Ht
 
 1
Parameter  > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign consumption goods. Parameter  2 [0; 1] is the weight of foreign imported goods
in private foreign consumption and is inversely related to the degree of foreign bias in
preferences. Another interpretation for  is as a natural index of foreign openness or the
foreign import share. The foreign import share depends on n which is the relative size of
home economy, and on $ which is the degree of trade openness. It yields  = n$. We
assume home bias in consumption:
1   > 
which implies
1  n$ > (1  n)$
Similarly, home bias in foreign preferences requires 1   >  which again implies
(1  (1  n)$) > n$
1  n$ > (1  n)$
CHt and C

Ft are foreign consumption sub-indexes of the continuum of di¤erentiated goods
produced respectively in country H and F given by the CES functions
CHt =
 
1
n
 1

Z n
0
cHt(z)
 1
 dz
! 
 1
; CFt =
 
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
cFt(z)
 1
 dz
! 
 1
6The same relationship can be written in per capita terms.
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Each consumption bundle CHt and C

Ft is composed of imperfectly substitutable varieties
of goods z 2 [0; 1] produced within a given country with elasticity of substitution  > 1:
The aggregated nominal intertemporal budget constraint at time t for household i in
foreign currency is given by
(1  wt )W t nt +
At
Et
+Bt +
  
1   dt

Dt + P

St

st + P

Ft

t
 A

t+1
Et (1 + it)


At+1
EtP t
 + Bt+1
(1 + it )
+ st+1P

St   T t
+
Z 1
0
[P Ht(z)C
i
Ht(z) + P

Ft(z)C
i
Ft(z)]dz
P Ht(z) and P

Ft(z) are price indices of domestic (exported to country F) and foreign pro-
duced goods z, where they are expressed in foreign currency. Bt is the one-period foreign
corporate bond held by foreign households (real bonds, in terms of domestic prices), At
is the one-period home corporate bonds held by foreign households, W it is the nominal
foreign wage and T it denotes lump-sum taxes/transfers. 
w
t denotes a country specic
tax on nominal income and Et is the nominal exchange rate, given as the price of one
of unit foreign currency in terms of home currency. Here P Ft

t is nominal prot from
the ownership of capital-producing rms and retailers (note that t = 
C
t +
R
t ). Here
st the foreign share of equity which is wholly owned by foreign households, D

t the eq-
uity payout paid to the shareholders, P St is the market price of foreign-owned shares,
d
t
denotes the tax on equity payout. We assume that the households share the revenues
of owning rms in equal proportion. Following Woodford (2003) we consider a cashless
economy. Therefore the only explicit role played by money is to serve as a unit of account.
We introduce incomplete nancial markets as in Benigno (2009). Foreign households
hold foreign equity shares and noncontingent bonds issued by rms of home and foreign
countries. Households of country F can trade in two nominal one-period, risk-free bonds.
Bonds Bt are issued by foreign rms and are denominated in foreign currency, bonds
At are issued by domestic rms and are denominated in foreign currency. Households
belonging to country F have to pay an intermediation cost, if they want to trade in
the domestic bond. These costs are determined by the function (). Function ()
depends on the real holdings of the home assets in the entire economy, and therefore is
taken as given by the foreign households. If a household belongs to a country which is
in a borrowing position(At+1 < 0), it will be charged with a premium on the domestic
interest rate and if the household belongs to a country which is in a lending position
(At+1 > 0), it receives a rate of return lower than the domestic interest rate. Along
with Benigno (2009) we need the following restrictions on (): (0) = 1 and () is 1
only if At = 0. Furthermore 
() has to be a di¤erentiable, decreasing function in the
neighborhood of zero. 0(0) =  :7
7We assume it is convex and can be approximated by (x) = 1  x+ x2:
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The intermediation prots zt are dened analogous to Benigno (2009)
zt =
At+1
Et (1 + it)
0@ 1


At+1
EtP t
   1
1A
and shared equally among foreign households. The domestic budget constraint is then
given as
(1  wt )W t nt +
At
Et
+Bt +
  
1   dt

Dt + P

St

st + P

Ft

t
 A

t+1
Et (1 + it)
+
Bt+1
(1 + it )
+ st+1P

St   T t +zt + P t Ct
The optimal allocation within each variety of goods z yields per capita relationships
cHt(z) =
1
n

pHt(z)
P Ht
 
CHt , c

Ft(z) =
1
1  n

pFt(z)
P Ft
 
CFt
for all z 2 [0; 1], where
P Ht =

1
n
Z n
0
pHt(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
, P Ft =

1
1  n
Z 1
n
pFt(z)
1 dz
 1
1 
are the price indexes for home and foreign produced goods, where both are expressed
in foreign currency. Note as  rises, the individual goods become closer substitutes and
therefore the individual rms have less market power.
Finally, the optimal condition of expenditures between home and foreign produced
goods is given by8
CFt = (1  )

P Ft
P t
 
Ct and C

Ht = 


P Ht
P t
 
Ct
where z denotes the goods type or variety and pHt(z); p

Ft(z) are prices of individual home
and foreign produced goods.
where P t =
 
(1  )P 1 F t + P 1 Ht
 1
1  , P t is the consumer price index (CPI) in
country F and P Ht, P

Ft are domestic and foreign goods price indices. Note that if the
economy is closed,  = 0; the CPI equals foreign prices. Correspondingly we can write
total consumption expenditures by foreign households as P t C

t = P

HtC

Ht + P

FtC

Ft. The
aggregated budget constraint can therefore be rewritten as
(1  wt )W t nt +
At
Et
+Bt +
  
1   dt

Dt + P

St

st + P

Ft

t
 A

t+1
Et (1 + it)


At+1
EtP t
 + Bt+1
(1 + it )
+ st+1P

St   T t + P t Ct (4.11)
8The same relationship can be written in per capita terms.
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We assume that all households in the same country have the same level of initial
wealth. As they face the same labour demand and own equal share of all rms, they face
identical budget constraints. They all will have identical consumption paths, so we do
not use individual index within each country.
We maximize equation (4.10) with respect to equation (4.11) and arrive to the following
system
UC (C

t ; n

t )
P t
= t (4.12)
W t
P t
=   Un (C

t ; n

t )
UC (Ct ; nt ) (1   wt )
(4.13)
1
(1 + it )
= Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1

UC (Ct ; nt )Ft+1
(4.14)
1
(1 + it)
= Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1

Ft+1UC (C

t ; n

t )
Et
Et+1


At+1
EtP t

(4.15)
P St = Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1

Ft+1UC (C

t ; n

t )
  
1   dt+1

Dt+1 + P

St+1

(4.16)
(1  wt )W t nt +
At
Et
+Bt +
  
1   dt

Dt + P

St

st + T

t
=
At+1
Et (1 + it)


At+1
EtP t
 + Bt+1
(1 + it )
+ st+1P

St + P

t C

t (4.17)
All derivations are given in Appendix B.1. Equation (4.14) is the standard Euler equation
and determines the consumption smoothing behavior of the households. Equation (4.15)
is the Euler equation derived from the optimal choice of the foreign bond. equation (4.13)
is the standard labour supply condition. It determines the quantity of labor supplied as a
function of real wage, given the marginal utility of consumption. Finally equation (4.17)
is the aggregate budget constraint.
The incomplete nancial market framework generates deviations from the uncovered
interest parity (UIP). Combining equation (4.14) and equation (4.15) yields the optimal
portfolio choice of the households of country F
(1 + it ) = Et (1 + it)
Et
Et+1


At+1
EtP t

(4.18)


At+1
EtP t

can also be interpreted as a risk premium term on the interest rate. If the
economy is a net debtor, the foreign interest rate is above the domestic interest rate and if
the economy is a net creditor the foreign interest rate is below the domestic interest rate.
Therefore movements in the net domestic asset positions a¤ect the interest di¤erential
between the two countries.
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Combining equations (4.6, 4.15) with the Euler equation of the foreign country (4.9,
4.18 ) yields the international risk sharing condition
Et
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
= Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1

Ft+1UC (C

t ; n

t )
Et
Et+1


At+1
EtP t

(4.19)
Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1

Ft+1UC (C

t ; n

t )
= Et
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
Et+1
Et


EtBt+1
Pt

(4.20)
Note that if
At+1
EtP t
 EtBt+1
Pt
 0 then 

At+1
EtP t

= 

EtBt+1
Pt

= 1 and equations
(4.19) and (4.20) simplies to the standard international risk sharing relationship which
is obtained in a complete securities markets setting (see e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2005)).
4.2.4 Domestic Firms
Intermediate goods producers
We assume that there is a continuum of rms j 2 [0; 1] in country (H) with a gross
production function
Yt = F (e
zt ; kt; nt) = Ze
ztktn
1 
t
and all rms are equal. Zezt is the stochastic productivity, common to all rms, kt is
the capital input and nt is the labor input. kt is assumed to be chosen at time t  1 and
predetermined at time t which is consistent with the typical timing convention. On the
contrary, the labor input nt can be exibly changed at time t.
Each period rms buy the investment good It
It = kt+1   (1  ) kt
where  is the depreciation rate.
Therefore the payments to workersWtnt, suppliers of investment goods PHtQtIt, share-
holders 	(Dt; Dt 1) and bondholders ATt are made ahead of the realization of revenues.
The intra-period loan contracted by the rm will cover these costs as follows:
Lt = PHtQtIt +Wtnt +	(Dt; Dt 1) + ATt  
ATt+1
1 + it(1   t)
Firms use equity and debt to nance their operations. They prefer nominal debt,
ATt = At +A

t , to equity in general because of debts tax advantage ( t). This is also the
assumption made in Hennessy and Whited (2005). Given it the nominal interest rate, the
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e¤ective gross interest rate for the rm is Rt = 1+ it(1   t), where  t represents the tax
benet.
We assume that rms raise funds by the intertemporal nominal debt ATt and the intra-
period domestic loan, Lt to nance working capital. Working capital is required to cover
the cash ow mismatch between the payments made at the beginning of the period and
the realization of revenues. They pay back the free-interest intra-period loan at the end
of the period.
Firms start the period with intertemporal debt ATt and they choose labour nt, in-
vestment in capital It, equity payout, Dt , and the new intertemporal debt ATt+1 before
producing. Therefore, the aggregated nominal budget constraint of rms can be written
as
PmtF (e
zt ; kt; nt) +
ATt+1
1 + it(1   t)  A
T
t +Wtnt + PHtQtIt +	(Dt; Dt 1) (4.21)
From the budget constraint Lt = PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt) is repaid at the end of the period
and is free of interest. Where Pmt is the nominal price of produced intermediate goods,
	(Dt; Dt 1) is the nominal payment to shareholders, PHtQt is the price of investment
goods, and and Wt is the nominal wage in home country.
The ability of rms to borrow is bounded because they may choose to default on their
debt. Default arises after the realization of revenues but before repaying the intra-period
loan. The total liabilities of the rm at that time are Lt+
At+1
1+it
, as it will need to pay
back the loan and buy back all the bonds. The total liquid resources of the rm are
Lt = PmtF (e
zt ; kt; nt): These can be divertedby the rm, and so can not be recovered by
the lender after a default. Then, the only asset available to the lender is capital PHtQtkt+1.
Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we assume that the liquidation value of capital
is unknown at the moment of contracting the loan. With probability et the full value
PHtQtkt+1 will be recovered, but with probability 1   et the liquidation value is zero.
Therefore the enforcement constraint will be as follows:
et

PHtQtkt+1   A
T
t+1
1 + it

 PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt) (4.22)
This constraint is derived based on the renegotiation process between the rm and the
lender in the case of default. The derivation is given in Appendix A.3.
By increasing the level of debt the enforcement constraint becomes tighter. On the
other hand, increasing the stock of capital relaxes the enforcement constraint. Most of
the enforcement constraint used in the literature shared these properties. The probability
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et is stochastic and depends on uncertain markets conditions.9 We call this variable
as "nancial shocks", because it a¤ects the tightness of the enforcement constraint and,
therefore, the borrowing capacity of the rm. Notice that et is the same for all rms.
Hence, there are two sources of aggregate uncertainty in our model: productivity ezt and
nancial et. Since there are no idiosyncratic shocks, we will focus on the symmetric
equilibrium where all representative rms are the same.
We can slightly modify equation (4.22), to see clearly how the shock et a¤ects the
economy. Suppose the case in which  = 0 so that R = 1+ i. Using the budget constraint
equation (4.21) to substitute for PHtQtkt+1  A
T
t+1
1+it
and remembering that the intra-period
loan is equal to the revenues, Lt = PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt), the enforcement constraint can be
rewritten as
et
1  et
 
PHtQt (1  ) kt   ATt  Wtnt  	(Dt; Dt 1)
  PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt)
At the beginning of the period kt and ATt are given. The rm have control only over the
input of labor, nt, and the equity payout, 	(Dt; Dt 1). If the rm wishes to keep the
production level unchanged, a negative nancial shock (lower et) requires a reduction
in equity payout 	(Dt; Dt 1) or employment. In other words, the rm is forced to raise
its equity and cut the new intertemporal debt. Thus, the exibility with which the rm
can change its nancial structure, i.e., the composition of debt and equity will determine
if the nancial shock a¤ects employment.
The rms nominal payout to shareholders assumed to be subject to a quadratic ad-
justment cost which is a way to formalize the rigidities a¤ecting the substitution between
debt and equity:
	(Dt; Dt 1) = Dt + 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2
Dt
where the nominal equity payout Dt is given and   0 is a parameter.10
The parameter  is key for the role of nancial shocks. Since when  = 0 the economy
is almost frictionless, therefore debt adjustments caused by nancial shocks can be quickly
assisted through changes in rm equity. When  > 0, it is costly to substitute debt and
equity and rms readjustment becomes slowly. As a result, nancial shocks will have a
substantial e¤ect on macroeconomic situation of a country.
The rst order conditions with respect to nt; kt+1; ATt+1; Dt; t; t can be written as
9The variable et could be interpreted as the probability of nding a buyer. Because we assume that
the search for a buyer is required for the sale of the rms capital. The probability increases when the
market conditions improve.
10One way of thinking about the adjustment cost is that it captures the preferences of managers for
dividend smoothing. Lintner (1956) showed that managers are concerned about smoothing dividends
over time, a fact later conrmed by subsequent studies. This could obtain from agency problems.
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tWt = Fn(e
zt ; kt; nt) (t   t)Pmt (4.23)
0 = Et
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
  
t+1   t+1

Pmt+1Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; nt+1) + t+1PHt+1Qt+1 (1  )

   t   tetPHtQt (4.24)
0 =
t
1 + it(1   t)   te
t
1
1 + it
  Et UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
t+1 (4.25)
1 = t
 
1 + 2

Dt
Dt 1
  1

Dt
Dt 1
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2!
 Et UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
t+12

Dt+1
Dt
  1

D2t+1
D2t
(4.26)
0 = et

PHtQtkt+1   A
T
t+1
1 + it

  PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt) (4.27)
ATt = PmtF (e
zt ; kt; nt) +
ATt+1
1 + it(1   t)  Wtnt   PHtQtIt  	(Dt; Dt 1) (4.28)
All derivations are given in Appendix B.2. mt;t+1 = 
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
is an stochastic discount
factor and the budget constraint is written in an aggregated form. The stochastic discount
factor mt;t+1, the wage Wt and interest rate it are determined in the general equilibrium
and are taken as given by an individual rm.
Equation (4.23), the optimal condition for labor indicates that the marginal produc-
tivity of labor is equal to the marginal cost ( tWt
(t t)Pmt ). As the enforcement constraint
becomes tighter, the e¤ective cost of labor rises and its demand falls. Therefore, nancial
shocks could transmit to the real sector of the economy through the demand of labor.
To get further insights, it will be convenient to consider the special case in which the
cost of equity payout is zero, that is,  = 0. In this case t = 1 (see condition (4.26)) and
condition (4.25) becomes te
t Rt
1+it
+ RtEt
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
t+1 = 1. This denotes that there
is a negative relation between et and the multiplier t taking as given the aggregate
prices Rt, it, and 
UC;t+1
Ht+1UC;t
. In other words, lower probability of recovering rms capital
make the enforcement constraint tighter. Then from equation (4.23) we see that a higher
t implies a lower demand for labor.
This mechanism is strengthened when  > 0. In this case readjusting the nancial
structure becomes costly, and the change in et induces a larger volatility in t. Of
course, prices will be a¤ected by the change in the policies of all rms.
Capital producers
Capital producers belong to households. They make new capital using input of nal
output and subject to adjustment costs. They sell new capital to rms at price PHtQt:
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Their nominal prot
PHt
C
t = PHtQtIt   PHtIt
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
Specically, they buy It of the nal good, pay PHtIt

1 + %
2

It
It 1
  1
2
as they may
need to adjust contracts if the amount of the investment goods changes. They repackage
the good into investment good (costlessly) and sell it to rms at price PHtQt and receive
PHtQtIt:
The rst order condition yields
Qt = 1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2
+
It
It 1
%

It
It 1
  1

  EtUC;t+1
UC;t
%

It+1
It
  1

It+1
It
2
Retailers
Retailers repackage intermediate output. The marginal cost is Pmt. We introduce nominal
rigidities a la Rotemberg.
Cost minimisation yields
yit =

piHt
PHt
 "
Yt
where index i is of retailer i and Yt is nal output. Retailers costlessly brand interme-
diate output. They have monopolistic power but have adjustment cost.
The rms prot is
piHt
R
t = p
i
Hty
i
t (1  xt )  Pmtyit  
!
2

piHt
piHt 1
  1
2
YtPHt
we introduce sales tax xt .
The rst order condition yields
! (Ht   1)Ht = (1  ") (1  xt ) + "Xt + !Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
(Ht+1   1) Yt+1
Yt
Ht+1 (4.29)
where Xt = PmtPHt . The derivation is given in Appendix B.2.
and the aggregated across rms prot
PHt
R
t = PHtYt (1  xt )  PmtYt  
!
2
(Ht   1)2 YtPHt
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4.2.5 Foreign Firms
Intermediate Goods Producers
The optimisation problem for foreign rms is symmetric. We assume that there is a
continuum of rms j 2 [0; 1] in country (F) with a gross revenue function
Y t = F (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ) = Ze
zt kt n
1 
t
and all rms are equal. ez

t is the stochastic productivity, common to all rms, kt is the
capital and nt the labor in country F . k

t is assumed to be chosen at time t   1 and
predetermined at time t which is consistent with the typical timing convention. On the
contrary, the labor input nt can be exibly changed at time t.
Each period rms buy the investment good It
It = k

t+1   (1  ) kt
where It is investment and 
 is the depreciation rate in country F .
Therefore the payments to workers W t n

t , suppliers of investment goods P

FtQ

t I

t ,
shareholders 	
 
Dt ; D

t 1

and bondholders BTt are made ahead of the realization of
revenues. The intra-period loan contracted by the rm will cover these costs as follows:
Lt = P

FtQ

t I

t +W

t n

t +	
  Dt ; Dt 1+BTt   BTt+11 + it (1   t )
Firms use equity and debt to nance their operations. They prefer nominal debt,
BTt = Bt+B

t , to equity in general because of debts tax advantage (

t ). This is also the
assumption made in Hennessy and Whited (2005). Given it the nominal interest rate, the
e¤ective gross interest rate for the rm is Rt = 1+ i

t (1   t ), where  t represents the tax
benet.
We assume that rms raise funds by the intertemporal nominal debt BTt and the intra-
period domestic loan, Lt to nance working capital. Working capital is required to cover
the cash ow mismatch between the payments made at the beginning of the period and
the realization of revenues. They pay back the free-interest intra-period loan at the end
of the period.
Firms start the period with intertemporal debt BTt and they choose labour n

t , in-
vestment in capital It , equity payout, D

t , and the new intertemporal debt B
T
t+1 before
producing. Therefore, the rms aggregated nominal budget constraint can be written as
P mtF (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ) +
BTt+1
1 + it (1   t )
 BTt +W t nt + P FtQt It +	
 
Dt ; D

t 1

(4.30)
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From the budget constraint Lt = P

mtF (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ) is repaid at the end of the period
and is free of interest. Where P mt is the nominal price of produced intermediate goods,
	
 
Dt ; D

t 1

is the nominal payment to shareholders, P FtQ

t is the price of investment
goods, and W t is the nominal wage in foreign country.
The ability of rms to borrow is bounded because they may choose to default on
their debt. Default arises after the realization of revenues but before repaying the intra-
period loan. The total liabilities of the rm at that time are Lt+
BTt+1
1+it
, as it will need to
pay back the loan and buy back all the bonds. The total liquid resources of the rm are
Lt = P
$
mtF (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ): These can be divertedby the rm, and so can not be recovered by
the lender after a default. Then, the only asset available to the lender is capital P FtQ

tk

t+1.
Following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), we assume that the liquidation value of capital
is unknown at the moment of contracting the loan. With probability e

t the full value
P FtQ

tk

t+1 will be recovered, but with probability 1  e

t the liquidation value is zero.
Therefore the enforcement constraint will be as follows:
e

t

P FtQ

tk

t+1  
BTt+1
1 + it

 P mtF (ez

t ; kt ; n

t ) (4.31)
This constraint is derived based on the renegotiation process between the rm and the
lender in the case of default. The derivation is given in Appendix A.3.
By increasing the level of debt the enforcement constraint becomes tighter. On the
other hand, increasing the stock of capital relaxes the enforcement constraint. Most of
the enforcement constraint used in the literature shared these properties. The probability
e

t is stochastic and depends on uncertain markets conditions.11 We call this variable
as "nancial shocks", because it a¤ects the tightness of the enforcement constraint and,
therefore, the borrowing capacity of the rm. Notice that e

t is the same for all rms.
Hence, there are two sources of aggregate uncertainty in our model: productivity ez

t and
nancial e

t . Since there are no idiosyncratic shocks, we will focus on the symmetric
equilibrium where all representative rms are the same.
We can slightly modify equation (4.31), to see clearly how the shock e

t a¤ects
the economy. Suppose the case in which   = 0 so that R = 1 + i. Using the budget
constraint (4.30) to substitute for P FtQ

tk

t+1 B
T
t+1
1+it
and remembering that the intra-period
loan is equal to the revenues, Lt = PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt), the enforcement constraint can be
rewritten as
e

t
1  et
 
P FtQ

t (1  ) kt  BTt  W t nt  	
 
Dt ; D

t 1
  P mtF (ezt; kt ; nt )
11The variable e

t could be interpreted as the probability of nding a buyer. Because we assume
that the search for a buyer is required for the sale of the rms capital. The probability increases when
the market conditions improve.
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At the beginning of the period kt and B
T
t are given. The rm have control only over the
input of labor, nt , and the equity payout, 	
  Dt ; Dt 1. If the rm wishes to keep the
production level unchanged, a negative nancial shock (lower e

t ) requires a reduction
in equity payout 	
 
Dt ; D

t 1

or employment. In other words, the rm is forced to raise
its equity and cut the new intertemporal debt. Thus, the exibility with which the rm
can change its nancial structure, i.e., the composition of debt and equity will determine
if the nancial shock a¤ects employment.
The rms nominal payout to shareholders assumed to be subject to a quadratic ad-
justment cost which is a way to formalize the rigidities a¤ecting the substitution between
debt and equity:
	
 
Dt ; D

t 1

= Dt + 


Dt
Dt 1
  1
2
Dt
where the nominal equity payout Dt is given and 
  0 is a parameter.12
The parameter  is key for the role of nancial shocks. Since when  = 0 the
economy is almost frictionless, therefore debt adjustments caused by nancial shocks can
be quickly assisted through changes in rm equity. When  > 0, it is costly to substitute
debt and equity and rms readjustment becomes slowly. As a result, nancial shocks will
have a substantial e¤ect on macroeconomic situation of a country.
The rst order conditions with respect to nt ; k

t+1; B
T
t+1; D

t ; 

t ; 

t can be written as
tW

t = (

t   t )P mtFn(ez

t ; kt ; n

t ) (4.32)
0 = Et
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
  
t+1   t+1

P mt+1Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; n

t+1) + 

t+1P

Ft+1Q

t+1 (1  )

   t   tt et P FtQt (4.33)
0 =
t
1 + it (1   t )
  te

t
1
1 + it
  Et
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
t+1 (4.34)
1 = t
 
1 + 2

Dt
Dt 1
  1

Dt
Dt 1
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2!
 Et
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
t+12


Dt+1
Dt
  1

D2t+1
D2t
(4.35)
0 = e

t

P FtQ

tk

t+1  
BTt+1
1 + it

  P mtF (ez

t ; kt ; n

t ) (4.36)
BTt = P

mtF (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ) +
BTt+1
1 + it (1   t )
 W t nt
 P FtQt
 
kt+1   (1  ) kt
 	  Dt ; Dt 1 (4.37)
12One way of thinking about the adjustment cost is that it captures the preferences of managers for
dividend smoothing. Lintner (1956) showed that managers are concerned about smoothing dividends
over time, a fact later conrmed by subsequent studies. This could obtain from agency problems.
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All derivations are given in Appendix B.2. mt;t+1 = 
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
is a nominal stochastic
discount factor and the budget constraint is written in an aggregated form. The stochastic
discount factor mt;t+1, the wage W

t and interest rate i

t are determined in the general
equilibrium and are taken as given by an individual rm.
Equation (4.32), the optimal condition for labor indicates that the marginal produc-
tivity of labor is equal to the marginal cost ( 

tW

t
(t t )P mt ). As the enforcement constraint
becomes tighter, the e¤ective cost of labor rises and its demand falls. Therefore, nancial
shocks could transmit to the real sector of the economy through the demand of labor.
To get further insights, it will be convenient to consider the special case in which the
cost of equity payout is zero, that is,  = 0. In this case t = 1 (see condition (4.35)) and
condition (4.34) becomes t
e

t
Rt
1+it
+ RtEt
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
t+1 = 1. This denotes that there
is a negative relation between e

t and the multiplier t taking as given the aggregate
prices Rt , i

t , and 
Uc;t+1
Uc;tFt+1
. In other words, lower probability of recovering rms capital
make the enforcement constraint tighter. Then from equation (4.32) we see that a higher
t implies a lower demand for labor.
This mechanism is strengthened when  > 0. In this case readjusting the nancial
structure becomes costly, and the change in e

t induces a larger volatility in t . Of
course, prices will be a¤ected by the change in the policies of all rms.
Capital producers
Capital producers belong to households. They make new capital using input of nal
output and subject to adjustment costs. They sell new capital to rms at price P FtQ

t :
Their nominal prot
P Ft
C
t = P

FtQ

t I

t   P FtIt
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
Specically, they buy It of the nal good, pay P

FtI

t

1 + %
2

It
It 1
  1
2
as they may
need to adjust contracts if the amount of the investment goods changes. They repackage
the good into investment good (costlessly) and sell to rms at price P FtQ

t and receive
P FtQ

t I

t :
The rst order condition yields
Qt = 1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2
+
It
It 1
%

It
It 1
  1

  Et
Uc;t+1
Uc;t
%

It+1
It
  1

It+1
It
2
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Retailers
Retailers repackage intermediate output. The marginal cost is P mt. We introduce nominal
rigidities a la Rotemberg.
Cost minimisation yields
yit =

piF t
P Ft
 "
Y t
where index i is of retailer i and Y t is nal output. Retailers costlessly brand inter-
mediate output. They have monopolistic power but have adjustment cost.
The rms prot is
piF t
R
t = p
i
F ty
i
t (1   xt )  P mtyit  
!
2

piF t
piF t 1
  1
2
Y t P

Ft
we introduce sales tax  xt .
The rst order condition yields
! (Ft   1)Ft = (1  ") (1   xt ) + "Xt + !Et
Uc;t+1
Uc;t
 
Ft+1   1
 Y t+1
Y t
Ft+1 (4.38)
where Xt =
P mt
P Ft
. The derivation is given in Appendix B.2.
and the aggregated across rms prot
P Ft
R
t = P

FtY

t (1   xt )  P mtY t  
!
2
(Ft   1)2 Y t P Ft
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4.2.6 Governments
The government in each country collects taxes and pays it as transfers and government
spending:
Tt =   A
T
t+1
1 + it(1   t) +
ATt+1
1 + it
(4.39)
PHtGt = 
w
t WtNt + 
d
tDt + 
x
tPHtYt (4.40)
T t =  
BTt+1
1 + it (1   t )
+
BTt+1
1 + it
(4.41)
P FtG

t = 
w
t W

t N

t + 
d
t D

t + 
x
t P

FtY

t (4.42)
We assume that the domestic government buys goods (G), taxes sale (with tax rate xt ).
PHtGt = 
x
tPHtYt
P FtG

t = 
x
t P

FtY

t
4.2.7 Market Clearing and Private Sector Equilibrium
In order to close the system, we write down two market clearing constraints:
Yt = (1  )tCt +  tSt Ct + 

dt
dt 1
Ht   1
2
dt +Gt +
!
2
(Ht   1)2 Yt
+It
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
+
0@ 1


EtBt+1
Pt
   1
1A Bt+1Et
(1 + it )PHt
(4.43)
Y t = (1  )  tCt + 

t
St

Ct +

dt
dt 1
Ft   1
2
dt +G

t +
!
2
(Ft   1)2 Y t
+It
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
+
0@ 1


At+1
EtP t
   1
1A At+1
Et (1 + it)P Ft
where Yt = ZeztktN
1 
t ; Y

t = Ze
zt kt N
1 
t ;t =
 
(1  ) + S1 t
 1
1  ;
 t =
 
(1  ) + S 1t
 1
1  :
Together with households rst order conditions (3.3)-(3.8), (3.12)-(3.17) and rms rst
order conditions (4.23)-(4.28), (4.32)-(4.37), (4.29), (4.38), government budget constraints
(4.39)-(4.42) and one net foreign assets equation
0 = S1 t 

tCt    tSt Ct   Etat+1
Ht+1
(1 + it)
+ at + Etbt+1
Ft+1
(1 + it )
St   btSt
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and the denition of nominal exchange rate
St =
PFt
PHt
:
They describe the evolution of the economy and determine twenty ve variables: Ct, nt,
wt, t, t, Xt, kt, Ht, dt, bt, at, Qt, C

t , n

t , w

t , 

t , 

t , X

t , k

t , 

Ft, d

t , b

t , a

t , Q

t and St:
Appendix B.3 demonstrates that the system is internally consistent. Policy instruments
are it; it ; 
w
t ; 
w
t ; 
d
t ; 
d
t ; 
x
t ; 
x
t ;  t; 

t and it remains to describe policy.
4.2.8 Fixed Exchange Rate Regime and Policy Instruments
We assume that both countries form a currency union, so there is only one central bank
and permanently xed nominal exchange rate. The denition of nominal exchange rate
E^t
S^t   S^t 1 = ^Ft   ^Ht + E^t   E^t 1
collapses to
S^t   S^t 1 = ^Ft   ^Ht
while equations (3.53) and (3.63) yield:
{^t = {^t + bt+1 (4.44)
{^t = {^

t + 
at+1 (4.45)
These equations imply that in a monetary union with incomplete nancial markets house-
holds face di¤erent short-term interest rates. With no loss of generality we assume that
the Central Bank controls {^t.
Each of the two independent scal authorities in countries H and F controls sales tax
rate and spending, {^xt ; G^t} and {^
x
t ; G^

t}, respectively.
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4.3 Linearised System
Let X^t = logXt   logX denote the log-deviation of variable Xt from its steady state
value X. In line with Benigno (2009) and Paoli (2009) we assume a symmetric steady
state, which implies that the net foreign asset position is zero in the steady state.13 The
log-linear approximations for the equilibrium conditions of our model are given as:
C^t = EtC^t+1 +
1


Et^Ht+1   {^at +

2
bt+1

+
1

Et

^Ft+1   ^Ht+1

(4.46)
^t = 

^t + ^t

+ (1  )C^t + Et

 (1  )XY
k
  (1  )

C^t+1 (4.47)
  (1  ) Et

^Ft+1   ^Ht+1

+ 

X
Y
k
(1  ) + (1  )

Et^t+1
+ (1  )XY
k

( + 1)Etn^t+1 + 

Et^Ft+1   Et^Ht+1 + S^t

  k^t+1

( + 1)

^t +
i
R
^ t

+

  ( + 1) (1  )
R

{^at  

2
bt+1

(4.48)
= 

^t + ^t

+ 

C^t   EtC^t+1

  Et

^Ft+1   ^Ht+1

+ Et^t+1   Et^Ht+1
^t = 2

Etd^t+1   d^t + Et^Ht+1

  2

d^t   d^t 1 + ^Ht

(4.49)

k
Y

^t + k^t+1

   a
Y

^t + a^t+1  


1
a
bt+1 + Et^Ht+1   {^at +

2
bt+1

= X

( + 1) n^t + C^t +
w
(1  w) ^
w
t + S^t +

(1  ) ^t  

(1  ) ^t

(4.50)
^Ht = Et^Ht+1 +
("  1) (1  x)
!

x
(1  x) ^
x
t +
w
(1  w) ^
w
t
+

(1  )

^t   ^t

+ C^t   z^t   k^t + ( +  ) n^t + S^t

(4.51)
Y^t =
k
Y
k^t+1+



+ 1

bt+1
Y
 



+ 1

bt
Y
+
C
Y

C^t + S^t

 (1  ) k
Y
k^t+
G
Y
G^t (4.52)
k
Y
k^t+1 =

X   w n
Y

( + 1) n^t + C^t +
w
(1  w) ^
w
t + S^t

+

a^t+1   

1
a
bt+1 + Et^Ht+1   (1 + i) (1  )
R

{^at  

2
bt+1

+
i
R
^ t

a
Y R
+X

(1  )

^t   ^t

  a
Y

a^t   1
a


bt

+ (1  ) k
Y
k^t   d
Y
d^t (4.53)
Optimal decisions of the household are described by the Euler equation (4.46) and by a
standard New Keynesian Phillips curve (4.51).
13Although non-zero steady state holdings of foreign assets seems to be the empirical case (see eg. Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2002)) the simplication doesn´t alter our results.
86
For the other country the corresponding equations are
C^t = EtC^t+1 +
1


Et^Ft+1   {^at  

2
bt+1

  1

Et

^Ft+1   ^Ht+1

(4.54)
^

t = 


^t + ^

t

+ (1  )C^t (4.55)
+Et

 (1  )XY

k
  (1  )

C^t+1
+ (1  )Et

^Ft+1   ^Ht+1

+ Et

X
Y 
k
(1  ) + (1  )

^

t+1
+ (1  )XY

k

( + 1)Etn^t+1   

Et^Ft+1   Et^Ht+1 + S^t

  k^t+1

Et^

t+1 = (
 + 1)

^

t +
i 
R
^ t

+

   (
 + 1) (1   )
R

{^at +

2
bt+1

 

^t + ^

t

+ 

EtC^t+1   C^t

 Et

^Ft+1   ^Ht+1

+ Et^Ft+1 (4.56)
^

t = 2


Etd^t+1   d^t + Et^Ft+1

  2

d^t   d^t 1 + ^Ft

(4.57)

k
Y 

^

t + k^

t+1

   b

Y 

^

t + b^

t+1 +

1
b
  
2

bt+1 + Et^Ft+1   {^at

= X

( + 1) n^t + C^

t +
 w
(1   w) ^
w
t   S^t +

(1  )

^t   ^

t

(4.58)
^Ft = Et^Ft+1 +
("  1) (1   x)
!

 x
(1   x) ^
x
t +

(1  )

^t   ^

t

+( + ) n^t + C^

t +
 w
(1   w) ^
w
t   z^t   k^t   S^t

(4.59)
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
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
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


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
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Y 
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
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
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( + 1) n^t + C^

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 w
(1   w) ^
w
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(1  )

^t   ^

t

+
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RY 

b^t+1 +
bt+1
b
+ Et^Ft+1  
(1 + i) (1   )
R

{^at +

2
bt+1

+
i 
R
^ t

  b

Y 

bt
b
+ b^t

+ (1  ) k

Y 
k^t  
d
Y 
d^t
 w n

Y 

( + 1) n^t + C^

t +
 w
(1   w) ^
w
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(4.61)

 (1  ) C

Y 
Y 
Y
  ((1  ) (1  ) + ) C
Y

S^t
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C
Y
C^t   C

Y 
Y 
Y
C^t +



+ 1


bt+1
Y
 



+ 1

bt
Y
(4.62)
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S^t   S^t 1 = ^Ft   ^Ht (4.63)
GG^t = 
wwN

^w + w^t + N^t

+  dd

^ d + d^t

+ xY

^x + Y^t

(4.64)
Where {^at =
{^t + {^

t
2
. The linearisation of equations and steady states are given in
Appendix B.5 and B.4.
4.4 Calibration
The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency.14 We x  = 0:9825. The capital
depreciation rate is set to  = 0:025: The capital ratio in production function is set to
 = 0:36, and the mean value of A is normalized to 1. The tax wedge which corresponds
to the advantage of debt over equity is determined to be  = 0:35, and the dividend
adjustment cost parameter set to  = 0:146 as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
We calibrate the steady state debt to output ratio to match the data. The quarterly
ratio of debt to output for the non-nancial business sector is 3:25 over the sample period
1984:I-2010:II, see the top panel in Figure 4.1. In order to match that, we set the steady
state value of the nancial variable,  , to 0:1634.15
Parameters of the household utility function are determined as follows. The calibration
of the Frisch intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply,  , is assumed to be
equal to 1 and the risk aversion parameter is:  = 1. The relative weight on the disutility
of labour,  = 1:8834, is chosen so as to set steady state hours worked equal to 0:3.
We calibrate the measure of price stickiness, ! = 80, in a way that corresponds to
a probability of rms changing prices every 3 quarters in a corresponding Calvo model.
The elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods " is equal to 11 in steady state
which gives a 10% mark up.
Parameters of the policy objective function are chosen to be #y = 0:3, #g = 0:01 and
#s = 0:1, see Chen et al. (2014).16
It remains to calibrate the shock and the initial states to simulate the scenarios of
interest. The second panel in Figure 4.1 plots the historical data of corporate debt to
output ratio (quarterly). The average value of this ratio during 1984-2009 is 3.25. The
peak of 3.87 in 2008 was somewhat above the average value, and the consequent reduction
14Note that both countries are symmetric and we only include calibration of Home country.
15Data sources: NIPA and FoF tables. The calculations follow Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
16The results are very robust to wide range of parameters #y and #s between zero and one.
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Figure 4.1: Historical data in the US. Data sources: NIPA and FoF tables.
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to 3.55 in 2011 constitutes a reduction of about 10% relative to its peak. We use these
numbers as a guide to our simulations.
Based on this evidence, we consider an AR(1) credit shock ^t = ^t 1+ "t with persis-
tence  = 0:95, and we examine the dynamic implications of a negative 10% innovation
in "t.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods  is
set to 2, which lies in the values assumed in the RBC literature (1   2) and the degree
of trade openness $ and $ are set to 0:3. The share of government spending to GDP,
G
Y
and G

Y  , are set to 0:20 for each country, in line with the EMU data. The relative
size of each country is calibrated depending on the nature of the analysis. In the main
case of interest, labelled base line case, with large foreignand small homecountries the
home country has size n = 0:3, as the relative size in terms of population or employment
of Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal is about one third of the total population of the
EMU countries. However, we also consider two identical countries with n = 0:5 when we
discuss transmission mechanisms. As in Benigno (2009), Ghironi et al. (2006), we assume
that the costs of changing the asset holdings with respect to the steady state are such
that  =  = 0:01.17
4.5 Policy Objectives
Monetary policy is assumed to behave optimally, minimizing an ad hoc welfare loss, given
by the objective
U =
1X
t=0
tVt (4.65)
with the ow objective
Vt = n^
2
Ht + n#gG^
2
t + n#yY^
2
t + (1  n)^2Ft + (1  n)#gG^2t + (1  n)#yY^ 2t + #sS^2t (4.66)
The union-wide monetary policymaker minimises the union-wide ination, output, terms
of trade and there is also volatility of government expenditures. One reason to include
terms in G is that we have assumed that the private sector values consumption of public
goods, and this is also reected in policymakers objectives. Additionally, we will study
cooperative monetary and scal policy, and restricting volatility of scal instrument could
be an important stabilising factor. We assume this ad hoc objective but we also check
17Kollmann (2003) has used Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) estimates on the relationship between real
interest rate di¤erentials and net foreign asset position. He assumes a value of 0.0019 in a case in which
the net foreign asset position is normalized by exports. In our case, since the net foreign asset position
is normalized by quarterly GDP, with an export/GDP ratio of 15%, a value of 0.0019 implies a value for
 equal to 0.012, which is consistent the calibration that we use.
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robustness of our results to a change of government spendings coe¢ cients, #g; #

g speci-
cally.
Given the loss function (equation (4.66)) we solve for the linearquadratic optimal
policy problem. The shock produces a dynamic path of deleveraging which depends
endogenously on policy. Objective function in this form was used in Benigno and Benigno
(2006) and Clarida et al. (2002) and Corsetti et al. (2011).
We assume that the monetary authority choose the average interest rates (iat ) and
scal policy makers of both countries choose taxes (xt , 
x
t ) cooperatively to minimize
the welfare loss (4.65) subject to the system (4.46)(4.62).
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Transmission mechanism
In this section, we examine the transmission mechanism of symmetric and asymmetric
credit shocks. We start with two identical countries (e.g. n = 0:5). We compare our
results with closed economy model. Next we discuss the country-size e¤ects. We also
discuss the welfare consequences of our results. Since our welfare objective function is not
micro-founded, we check the robustness of our results using di¤erent values for government
spending coe¢ cient (#g = #

g).
Country-size symmetry and symmetric credit shock
In Figure (4.2), we observe the impulse responses of both equal size economies (n = 0:5)
to negative 10% credit shocks in home and foreign countries. Such negative shocks have
the same consequences for both home and foreign countries: it reduces the proportion
of output which banks will be able to recover in case of default. Banks lend to rms at
the beginning of the period, so that rms are able to pay wages. As the enforcement
constraint is always binding, the di¤erence between bonds and capital is covered by a
loan. As the negative credit shock reduces the probability of recovery, the amount of
bank lending falls. Firms which are not able to obtain funds up front have to deleverage
or reduce the value of production. Firms reduce labour, produce less output and also pay
lower wages, see Figure (4.2). As a result of a symmetric credit shock, terms of trade
and foreign bonds become zero (see equation (4.63) and equation (4.44)). To ght the
upcoming ination sales tax (xt , 
x
t ) rises and nominal interest rate falls. Consumption
falls. Both constraints are tighter as the Figure shows. Ination falls initially following a
shock (see also equation (4.51)). Low interest rates result in falling consumption prole
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Figure 4.2: Impulse responses of symmetric countries to a symmetric credit shock in xed
exchange rate regime
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over time (see also equation (4.52) and equation (4.46)). Firms reduce the amount of
borrowing. Lower interest rate also makes it easier for banks to pay out the existing debt,
so it helps to reduce the debt quickly. Output falls by less than wages, prots of rms
fall and so dividends fall. The adjustment goes with overshooting as capital changes only
slowly and it continues to fall while the e¤ect of persistent shock disappears. Results are
similar to closed economy model (see the Appendix (B.6)). However, there are several
important di¤erences between this model and the one in the second chapter. Here we
assume that there is optimising scal policy, constrained by balanced budget, while in the
second chapter only automatic stabilisers work as spending and taxes are kept at their
steady state levels. Second, we study policy under commitment, while the second chapter
studies policy under discretion. Both these factors change the timing of adjustment,
although the direction remains the same as in closed economy considered in the second
chapter.
Country-size symmetry and asymmetric credit shock
In Figure (4.3), we plot the impulse responses of both equal size economies (n = 0:5) to
negative 10% credit shock in home country and a positive 10% credit shock in foreign
country. We explain the impulse responses of home country to a negative shock, since
foreign responses is exactly asymmetric to home responses and we skip adding that. Such
negative shock reduces the proportion of output which banks will be able to recover in case
of default. Banks lend to rms at the beginning of the period, so that rms are able to
pay wages. As the enforcement constraint is always binding, the di¤erence between bonds
and capital is covered by a loan. As the negative credit shock reduces the probability of
recovery, the amount of bank lending falls. Firms which are not able to obtain funds up
front have to deleverage or reduce the value of production. Firms reduce labour, produce
less output and also pay lower wages, see Figure (4.3). Because of xed exchange rate,
average interest rate is zero but domestic interest rate falls gradually over time as foreign
bonds rises (see equation (4.44)). Domestic consumption falls initially but the reduction is
not as low as needed to explain the reduction in output. Domestic ination rises initially
while nominal interest rate is zero (see equation (4.44)). Then terms of trade falls (see
equation (4.63)). To ght ination, domestic sales tax (xt ) rises initially. Both constraints
are tighter as the Figure shows. Firms reduce the amount of borrowing. Lower interest
rate also makes it easier for banks to pay out the existing debt, so it helps to reduce the
debt quickly. Taxes play some of interest rate role. Under oating exchange rate regime
interest rate falls to increase ination and raise consumption, under xed exchange rate
taxes rise. As government budget is balanced, scal policy increases spending, increasing
domestic output. However, the nominal exchange rate cannot adjust and the terms of
trade is only changing because prices change, so the initial appreciation is not as big as
under oating exchange rate regime. As a result, there is no reduction in foreign asset
holdings. Output falls by less than wages, prots of rms fall and so dividends fall. The
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Figure 4.3: Impulse responses of symmetric countries to an asymmetric credit shock in
xed exchange rate regime
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adjustment goes with overshooting as capital changes only slowly and it continues to fall
while the e¤ect of persistent shock disappears.
Country-size asymmetry and asymmetric credit shock
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Figure 4.4: Impulse responses of asymmetric-size countries (n = 0:7) to asymmetric credit
shocks in a xed exchange rate regime
In Figure (4.4), we observe the impulse responses of two di¤erent size economies (n =
0:7) to negative 10% credit shock in home country and positive 10% credit shock in
foreign country in a xed exchange rate regime. We compare our results with asymmetric
credit shocks in two identical country model (see Figure (4.3)). The smaller country is
more a¤ected as a result of these shocks as we see in the Figure (4.4): Domestic import
share ( = (1   n)$) is smaller, then a negative credit shock reduces the proportion of
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Variances n = 0:7 n = 0:5
Y^t  102 0:69 1:46
Y^ t  102 3:63 1:46
^Ht  102 0:03 0:05
^Ft  102 0:12 0:05
G^t  102 5:94 13:2
G^t  102 35:0 13:2
S^t  102 0:27 0:29
Loss (W)102 0:70 0:65
Loss (H)102 0:33 0:65
Loss (F)102 1:59 0:65
Table 4.1: Volatilities of output, ination, government spending, terms of trade and
unconditional welfare loss for symmetric (third column) and asymmetric size (second
column) countries due to a credit shock
domestic output by less.18 Banks lend to rms at the beginning of the period, so that rms
are able to pay wages. As the enforcement constraint is always binding, the di¤erence
between bonds and capital is covered by a loan. As the negative credit shock reduces the
probability of recovery, the amount of bank lending also falls by less. Firms which are not
able to obtain funds up front have to deleverage or reduce the value of production. Firms
reduce labour, produce less output and also pay lower wages, see Figure (4.4). Besides,
lower import share, , indicates that foreign goods are cheaper (see equation (4.51)).
Then as a result of higher import and outow of funds, terms of trade falls by less. To
ght ination domestic tax rises by less, so domestic ination and domestic consumption
fall by more (see equation (4.51) and equation (4.46) and also Figure (4.3)). Low interest
rates result in falling consumption prole over time (see also equation (4.52) and equation
(4.46)). Low interest rate also makes it easier for banks to pay out the existing debt, so it
helps to reduce the debt quickly. Output falls by less than wages, prots of rms fall and
so dividends fall. The adjustment goes with overshooting as capital changes only slowly
and it continues to fall while the e¤ect of persistent shock disappears.
And for the same reason, foreign import share  = n$ is higher. Then a positive
credit shock increases the proportion of foreign output by more.19 Banks lend to foreign
rms at the beginning of the period, so that foreign rms are able to pay wages. As
the enforcement constraint is always binding, the di¤erence between bonds and capital
is covered by a loan. As the positive credit shock rises the probability of recovery, the
amount of bank lending also rises by more. Foreign rms which have enough funds up
front, raise their debt or raise the value of production. Foreign rms raise labour, produce
more output and also pay more wages, see Figure (4.4). To ght ination foreign tax falls
by more, so foreign ination and foreign consumption fall by more (see equation (4.59) and
equation (4.54) and also Figure (4.3)). Low interest rates result in falling consumption
prole over time (see also equation (4.60) and equation (4.54)). Foreign output rises by
18The proportion of domestic output which banks will be able to recover in case of default.
19The proportion of foreign output which banks will be able to recover in case of default.
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less than wages, prots of rms rise and so dividends rise. The adjustment goes with
overshooting as capital changes only slowly and it continues to rise while the e¤ect of
persistent shock disappears.
4.6.2 Robustness analysis
Variance #g = 0 #g = 0:01 #g = 1
Output, Y^t 0:008 0:015 0:027
Ination, ^Ht 0:0002 0:0004 0:0006
Terms of trade, S^t 0:0027 0:0029 0:0071
Consumption, C^t 0:212 0:041 0:043
Government spending, G^ 3:058 0:132 0:008
Domestic assets, a^ 0:578 0:43 0:389
Capital, k^ 0:019 0:024 0:029
Foreign assets, b^ 0:012 0:006 0:018
BC Lagrange multiplier, ^ 0:011 0:016 0:023
EC Lagrange multiplier, ^ 46:00 77:29 186:23
Employment, n^ 0:012 0:036 0:069
Dividend payout, d^ 13:949 6:532 4:937
Average interest rate, {^a  102 0:01 0:025 0:029
Loss 0:034 0:007 0:01
Table 4.2: Volatilities of given variables and unconditional welfare loss for di¤erent value
of penalty on deviation of government spending due to a credit shock assuming two
symmetric size countries
Variance  = 0:001  = 0:01  = 0:1
Y^t  102 1:48 1:46 1:48
Y^ t  102 1:48 1:46 1:48
^Ht  102 0:04862 0:04856 0:04956
^Ft  102 0:04862 0:04856 0:04956
G^t  102 13:94 13:2 13:68
G^t  102 13:94 13:2 13:68
S^t  102 0:2900 0:2900 0:300
Loss (W)102 0:6600 0:6500 0:6600
Loss (H)102 0:6600 0:6500 0:6600
Loss (F)102 0:6600 0:6500 0:6600
Table 4.3: Volatilities of output, ination, government spending, terms of trade and
unconditional welfare loss for di¤erent value of intermediation cost due to a credit shock
assuming two symmetric size countries
How do the results change under di¤erent penalty on government spending deviations,
#g or di¤erent intermediation cost, ? We address this question through di¤erent assump-
tions on the value of penalty on government spending deviations, #g and on intermediation
costs,  (see Figure (4.5)): The true social welfare loss is with #g = 0:01. When #g is 0,
then there is very high volatility of G which is penalised by the social objective. When
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Figure 4.5: Robustness analysis for symmetric-size countries, and asymmetric credit
shocks
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#g = 1, then G is not exible enough to stabilise the economy well. Therefore it is not
surprising that #g = 0:01 delivers the best result as measured by welfare objective. Table
(4.2) also demonstrates how volatility of di¤erent welfare components change with #g.
With greater penalty scal policy is more constrained to stabilise the economy, volatility
of most economic variables rises. If the penalty on G is further increased, then at some
threshold value the economic behavior does not change. We know that if G is not volatile
at all then the economy is unstable, so that a solution which stabilises the economy cannot
be found. However, any nite penalty on G allows G to stabilise the economy, although
at great costs. Table (4.3) and (4.5) show that the results are similar to the one under the
exible exchange rate. Greater nancial integration is more costly under credit shocks.
Variance #g = 0 #g = 0:01 #g = 1
Y^t  102 0:26 0:69 1:17
Y^ t  102 2:73 3:63 6:97
^Ht  102 0:01 0:03 0:04
^Ft  102 0:07 0:1 0:17
G^t  102 0:23 0:27 0:69
G^t  102 213:4 5:94 0:21
S^t  102 640:8 34:97 2:7
Loss (W)102 3:77 0:7 1:03
Loss (H)102 2:25 0:33 0:47
Loss (F)102 7:31 1:59 2:34
Table 4.4: Volatilities of output, ination, government spending, terms of trade and un-
conditional welfare loss for di¤erent value of penalty on deviation of government spending
due to a credit shock assuming two asymmetric size (n=0.7) countries
Variance  = 0:001  = 0:01  = 0:1
Y^t  102 0:6857 0:6857 0:6857
Y^ t  102 3:67 3:63 3:7
^Ht  102 0:0344 0:0343 0:0342
^Ft  102 0:116 0:117 0:12
G^t  102 6:143 5:94 6:13
G^t  102 38:37 34:97 35:73
S^t  102 0:2700 0:2700 0:2800
Loss (W)102 0:7200 0:7000 0:7200
Loss (H)102 0:3300 0:3300 0:3300
Loss (F)102 1:6300 1:5900 1:6200
Table 4.5: Volatilities of output, ination, government spending, terms of trade and
unconditional welfare loss for di¤erent value of intermediation cost due to a credit shock
assuming two asymmetric size countries, n=0.7
4.6.3 Contagion
In Figure (4.6), we plot the impulse responses of two identical economies (n = 0:5) to only
a negative 10% credit shock in home country in a xed exchange rate regime. Compared to
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Figure 4.6: Impulse responses of identical countries to a non-symmetric credit shock in
xed exchange rate regime
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the oating exchange rate regime there is substantial e¤ect for foreign country. Home and
foreign consumption fall at great extent, almost with perfect correlation. Output however
is much less correlated, with reduction in foreign output o¤set by increase in taxes and
in government expenditures in the medium-run. The reduction in interest rate helps to
stabilise ination and consumption. Terms of trade appreciates at home, but depreciates
in the other country in the rst couple of periods after the shock. As a result, consumption
of home residents switches to foreign-produced goods, keeping output at foreign country
high in rst initial periods. Higher output results in higher income abroad.
4.7 Conclusion
We demonstrate that, unlike under exible exchange rate regime studied in the previous
chapter, the centralised monetary policy alone is unable to stabilise the economy. Na-
tional scal policies must be activated to counteract asymmetric shocks. We demonstrate,
however, that the e¤ectiveness of scal policy is limited. Even if it is chosen optimally,
scal policy does not eliminate cyclical patterns in economic adjustment, which is welfare-
reducing volatility of economic variables.
This model demonstrates that shocks hitting one economy, result in sharp contraction
of consumption in another country. Countercyclical scal policy is able to avoid major
recession, however. In contrast to results in the previous chapter, the shocks propagation
mechanism is much stronger under xed exchange rate regime. As before, we assume
variable degree of nancial integration and study its importance for the propagation of
credit shocks. Since the objective function is not microfounded, we assume variable degree
of penalty on government spending deviations. With greater penalty scal policy is more
constrained to stabilise the economy, volatility of most economic variables rises. If the
penalty further increased, then at some threshold value the economic behavior does not
change. However, any nite penalty on government spending allows it to stabilise the
economy, although at great costs.
101
Bibliography
Benigno, G. and P. Benigno (2006). Designing Targeting Rules for International Monetary
Policy Cooperation. Journal of Monetary Economics 53 (4), 473506.
Benigno, G. and L. Fornaro (2015). Stagnation Traps . mimeo.
Benigno, P. (2009). Price stability with imperfect nancial integration. . J. Money Credit
Bank 41, 121149.
Boissay, F., F. Collard, and F. Smets (2015). Booms and Banking Crises . Journal of
Political Economy Forthcoming.
Chen, X., T. Kirsanova, and C. Leith (2014). An Empirical Assessment of Optimal
Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area . Stirling Economics Discussion Paper .
Christiano, L., R. Motto, and M. Rostagno (2009). Financial Factors in Economic Fluc-
tuations. . Unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University.
Christiano, L., R. Motto, and M. Rostagno (2013). Risk Shocks . NBER Working Paper
18682 .
Clarida, R., J. Galí, and M. Gertler (2002). A simple framework for international policy
analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 879904.
Corsetti, G., L. Dedola, and S. Leduc (2011). Optimal monetary policy in open economies.
In: Friedman, B.M., Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. 3.
Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 861-934. (Chapter 16).
Dennis, R. (2006). The Policy Preferences of the US Federal Reserve. Journal of Applied
Econometrics 21, 5577.
Galí, J. and T. Monacelli (2005). Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a
Small Open Economy. Review of Economic Studies 72 (3), 707734.
Gertler, M. and P. Karadi (2011). A Model of Unconventional Monetary Policy. Journal
of Monetary Economics 58 (1), 1734.
Gertler, M., N. Kiyotaki, and A. Queralto (2012). Financial Crises, Bank Risk Exposure
and Government Financial Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 59, S17S34.
102
Ghironi, F., J. Lee, and A. Rebucci (2006). The Valuation Channel of External Adjust-
ment. . Unpublished manuscript, Boston College.
Givens, G. E. (2012). Estimating Central Bank Preferences under Commitment and
Discretion. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 44 (6), 10331061.
Goldberg, J. (2010). A Model of Deleveraging. Working paper, MIT.
Guerrieri, V. and G. Lorenzoni (2010). Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings and the
Liquidity Trap. Unpublished manuscript, Chicago Booth School of Business.
Hennessy, C. and T. Whited (2005). Debt Dynamics. Journal of Finance 60 (3), 112965.
Ilbas, P. (2010). Estimation of monetary policy preferences in a forward-looking model:
a Bayesian approach. International Journal of Central Banking 6 (3), 169209.
Jermann, U. and V. Quadrini (2012). Macroeconomic E¤ects of Financial Shocks . Amer-
ican Economic Review 102, 238271.
Khan, A. and J. Thomas (2010). Credit Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations in an Econ-
omy with Production Heterogeneity. Unpublished manuscript, Ohio State University.
Kollmann, R. (2003). Monetary Policy Rules in an Interdependent World. CEPR Dis-
cussion Paper No. 4012.
Lane, P. R. and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti (2002). Long-Term Capital Movements. In NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 16 . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Laséen, S. and L. E. Svensson (2011). Anticipated alternative instrument-rate paths in
policy simulations. . International Journal of Central Banking 7(3), 135.
Lintner, J. (1956). Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained
Earnings, and Taxes. American Economic Review 46, 97113.
Liu, Z., P. Wang, and T. Zha (2013). Land-Price Dynamics and Macroeconomic Fluctu-
ations. Volume 81(3), pp. 114784.
Merton, R. C. (1973). An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model. Econometrica 41,
867887.
Mumtaz, H. and F. Zanetti (2016). The E¤ect of Labor and Financial Frictions on
Aggregate Fluctuations. Macroeconomic Dynamics 20, 313341.
Nolan, C. and C. Thoenissen (2009). Financial shocks and the US business cycle. . Journal
of Monetary Economics 56, 596604.
Oudiz, G. and J. Sachs (1985). International policy coordination in dynamic macroeco-
nomic models. In W. H. Buiter and R. C. Marston (Eds.), International Economic
Policy Coordination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
103
Paoli, B. D. (2009). Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy: the Role of the Asset
Market Structure. forthcoming in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Perri, F. and V. Quadrini (2011). International Recessions. NBER Working Paper 17201.
Rotemberg, J. J. (1983). Aggregate Consequences of Fixed Costs of Price Adjustment. .
American Economic Review 73, 43336.
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and M. Uribe (2004). Solving Dynamic General Equilibrium Models
Using a Second-Order Approximation to the Policy Function. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 28, 755775.
Schularick, M. and A. M. Taylor (2012). Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy,
Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870-2008. . American Economic Review 102,
102961.
Taylor, J. (2008). The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis
of What Went Wrong. . University of Stanford, mimeo.
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy.
Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.
104
Appendix A
Deep Recession
A.1 Households Optimisation Problem
The Lagrangian can be written as
 t = Et
1X
t=0
t
(
U (Ct; nt) + t
 
(1  wt )
Wt
Pt
nt + bt + st
  
1   dt

Dt + pt

Pt
+ t
 qtbt+1   st+1 pt
Pt
  Ct   Tt

And the rst-order conditions are taken with respect to Ct; nt , bt+1; st+1 and t.
UC (Ct; nt) = t
Un (Ct; nt) + t (1  wt )wt = 0
qt = Et
t+1
t
t
pt
Pt
= Ett+1
  
1   dt+1

Dt+1 + pt+1

Pt+1
(1  wt )
Wt
Pt
nt + bt + st
  
1   dt

Dt + pt

Pt
+ t = qtbt+1 + st+1
pt
Pt
+ Ct + Tt
FOCs in real term are
UC (Ct; nt) = t
n t = (1  wt )wtC t
1
1 + rt
= Et
C t+1
C t
pSt =
pt
Pt
= Et
C t+1
C t
  
1   dt+1

dt+1 + pSt+1

(1  wt )wtnt + bt + st
  
1   dt

dt + pSt

+ t = qtbt+1 + st+1pSt + Ct + Tt
where pSt =
pt
Pt
and dt = DtPt and we normalise the number of shares to be equal to one
(See Jermann and Quadrini (2012)).
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A.2 FirmsOptimisation Problems
A.2.1 Intermediate Goods Producers
The rms optimisation problem subject to 2.8 and 2.9 and the Lagrangian can be written
as follows:
L =
1X
t=0
m0;t

Dt
Pt
+ t

et (Qtkt+1   qtbt+1)  Pmt
Pt
F (ezt ; kt; nt)

+t
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And the rst-order conditions in the text are taken with respect to nt; kt+1; bt+1;
Dt; t; t :
@L
@nt
= (t   t)
Pmt
Pt
Fn(e
zt ; kt; nt)  tWt
Pt
= 0
@L
@kt+1
= te
tQt  Qt t

t+1
+Etmt+1

t+1

Pmt+1
Pt+1
Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; nt+1) +Qt+1 (1  )

+t+1

 Pmt+1
Pt+1
Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; nt+1)

@L
@bt+1
=
t
Rt
  tetqt   Etmt+1t+1 = 0
@L
@Dt
=
 
1  t
 
1 + 2

Dt
Dt 1
  1

Dt
Dt 1
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2!
+Etmt;t+1t+12

Dt+1
Dt
  1

D2t+1
D2t
1
t+1

@L
@t
= et (Qtkt+1   qtbt+1)  Pmt
Pt
F (ezt ; kt; nt)
@L
@t
= (1  ) kt + Pmt
Pt
F (ezt ; kt; nt) +
bt+1
Rt
  bt   Wt
Pt
nt
  kt+1

t+1
 
 
Dt
Pt
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2
Dt
Pt
!
106
where mt;s is the stochastic discount factor.
mt;s = 
s tUC;s
UC;t
Pt
Ps
mt;t+1 = 
UC;t+1
t+1UC;t
We substitute mt;t+1 and get the following real system
0 = Xt (t   t) (1  )Aeztktn t   twt
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+ t+1Qt+1 (1  )

 Qtt + tetQt
0 =  Et C
 
t+1
C t t+1
t+1 + t
1
Rt
  t
et
1 + rt
0 = 1 + 2Et
C t+1
C t
t+1
t+1

dt+1
dt
t+1   1

dt+1
dt
t+1
2
 t
 
1 + 2

dt
dt 1
t   1

dt
dt 1
t + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2!
0 = et (Qtkt+1   qtbt+1) XtF (ezt ; kt; nt)
0 = (1  ) kt +XtF (ezt ; kt; nt) + bt+1
Rt
  bt   wtnt
  kt+1

t+1
 
 
dt + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt
!
A.2.2 Retailers
The rms optimisation problem is standard
Et
1X
=t
mt;
 
piy
i
 (1  x )  Pmyi  
!
2

pi
pi 1
  1
2
YP
!
= Et
1X
=t
mt;
 
pi
P
yi (1  x ) 
Pm
P
yi  
!
2

pi
pi 1
  1
2
Y
!
P
= Et
1X
=t
mt;
 
pi
P
1 "
Y (1  x ) 
Pm
P

pi
P
 "
Y   !
2

pi
pi 1
  1
2
Y
!
P
where !
2

pi
pi 1
  1
2
YP represents the cost of adjusting prices. The rst order condition
is:
@
@pi
: Etmt;
 
(1  ")

pi
P
 "
Y
1
P
(1  x )  !

pi
pi 1
  1

Y
1
pi 1
+"
Pm
P

pi
P
 " 1
Y
1
P
!
+ Etmt;+1!

pi+1
pi
  1

Y+1
pi+1
(pi )
2
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from where after pi = P :
@
@pi
: Etmt; ((1  ")Y (1  x )  ! (   1)Y
+"
Pm
P
Y

+ Etmt;+1! (+1   1)Y+12+1
0 = (1  ")Y (1  x )  ! (   1)Y + "XY + !Et
C +1
C 
(+1   1)Y+1+1
A.3 Derivation of the enforcement constraint
Firms may decide to default after the realization of revenues but before returning the
intra-period loan. The total liabilities are Lt+ Ptqtbt+1, that is, the intra-period loan
plus the new intertemporal debt. At this moment the rm also obtains liquidity Lt =
F (ezt ; kt; nt) from selling its products. In the case of default the lender uses the right to
liquidate the rms capital. We assume that at the moment of contracting the loan the
liquidation value of physical capital is unknown. With probability et the lender will be
able to obtain the whole value PtQtkt+1 but with probability 1 et he obtains nothing.1
Both lender and rm are not able to see the liquidation value before the actual default.
Hence, to obtain the result from renegotiation, we have to examine these two cases one
at a time. In doing so, suppose that the rm has all the bargaining power and the lender
gets only the threat value. We have two possible cases:
First, when the liquidation value is PtQtkt+1: Since the lender can claim the whole
capital, the rm has to pay the amount that leaves the lender indi¤erent between liqui-
dation and keeping the rm in operation. This needs the rm to pay PtQtkt+1   Ptqtbt+1
and guarantee to pay Ptbt+1 at the beginning of the next period, when the intertemporal
debt is due.2 So, the ex-post value of default is as follows
lt + Etmt;t+1
1X
t=s+1
t s 1
Dt
Pt
  PtQtkt+1 + Ptqtbt+1
Second, when the liquidation value is zero: In this case, liquidation obviously is not the
best choice for the lender. But the best choice is to wait until the next period when Ptbt+1
is due. In the current period the lender receives nothing and the rm keeps the liquidity
lt = F (e
zt ; kt; nt). Therefore, the ex-post value of default is:
lt + Etmt;t+1
1X
t=s+1
t s 1
Dt
Pt
1In the rst chapter we do not include "capital producers", so we can ignore Qt.
2The required value PtQtkt+1   Ptqtbt+1 could be more than the liquidity lt. In this case we assume
that shareholders raise the extra cash without any additional costs.
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We expect the following liquidation value when the debt contracted:
lt + Etmt;t+1
1X
t=s+1
t s 1
Dt
Pt
  et (PtQtkt+1   Ptqtbt+1)
So the following constraint enforces that the value of not defaulting must not be smaller
than the expected value of defaulting:
Etmt;t+1
1X
t=s+1
t s 1
Dt
Pt
> lt + Etmt;t+1
1X
t=s+1
t s 1
Dt
Pt
  et (PtQtkt+1   Ptqtbt+1)
which can be written as in equation 2.9.
A.4 Market Clearing and Private Sector Equilibrium
We can take the sum of the households budget constraint (2.1),
Wtn
j
t + btPt + st (Dt + pt) + Ptt = Ptqtbt+1 + st+1pt + PtC
j
t + PtTt
rms budget constraint (2.8),
PmtF (e
zt ; kt; nt) + Pt
bt+1
Rt
= Ptbt +Wtnt + PtIt +	(Dt; Dt 1)
and governments budget constraint (2.18)-(2.19),
PtTt = Pt
bt+1
Rt
  Pt bt+1
1 + rt
PtGt = 
w
t WtNt + 
d
tDt + 
x
tPtYt
and obtain the resource constraint
Yt = Ct + kt+1   (1  ) kt + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt +
!
2
(t   1)2 Yt
The complete system which determines the private sector equilibrium can be written as:
0 = (t   t) (1  )XtYt   twtnt
0 =  Et C
 
t+1
C t t+1
t+1 +
t
Rt
  t
et
1 + rt
t

t+1
  tet = Et
C t+1
C t t+1
 
t+1   t+1

Xt+1
Yt+1
kt+1
+ t+1 (1  )

0 = 1 + 2Et
C t+1
C t
t+1
t+1

dt+1
dt
t+1   1

dt+1
dt
t+1
2
 t
 
1 + 2

dt
dt 1
t   1

dt
dt 1
t + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2!
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XtYt = e
t (kt+1   qtbt+1)
0 = (1  ) kt +XtF (ezt ; kt; nt) + bt+1
Rt
  bt   wtnt
  kt+1

t+1
 
 
dt + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt
!
! (t   1)Ytt = ((1  ") (1  xt ) + "Xt)Yt + !Et
C t+1
C t
(t+1   1)Yt+1
1
1 + rt
= Et
C t+1
C t
n t = (1  wt )wtC t
where Yt = ZeztktN
1 
t ; Rt = 1 + it(1   t):
There are 10 equations and 10 unknowns: t; t; Xt; Ct; kt; dt; nt; wt;t bt for given
policy instruments it;  t.
A.5 Steady State
The steady state level of the system is as follows:
r =
1

  1
 = 1
 =

1
R
  1

1

X =
("  1) (1  x)
"
Y
k
=
1     (1  )
X (1  )
Y
n
=
 
A

k
Y
! 11 
w =
Y
n
X (1  ) (1  )
b
Y
=

k
Y
  X


1

d
Y
= X +

1
R
  1

b
Y
  w n
Y
   k
Y
C
Y
= 1   k
Y
I
Y
= 
k
Y
1 + r = 1 + i
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A.6 Reduced form linearised system
For every variable Zt with steady state Z 6= 0 we denote Z^t = log ZtZ . We linearise the
system around the above steady state to yield:
0 = Xt (t   t) (1  )Aeztktn t   twt
0 = X

1 + X^t

(1 + ^t)  (1 + ^t)

(1  )A (1 + z^t) k

1 + k^t

n (1 + n^t) 
 (1 + ^t)w(1 + w^t)
0 = (1  ) Y
n
X

(1 + ^t + X^t + z^t + k^t   n^t)  (1 + ^t + X^t + z^t + k^t   n^t)

 w(1 + ^t + w^t)
0 = X (  ) (1  ) Y
n
  w
0 = (1  ) Y
n
X

^t + X^t + z^t + k^t   n^t   (^t + X^t + z^t + k^t   n^t)

 w(^t + w^t)
0 = Et
C t+1
C t t+1
 
t+1   t+1

Xt+1
Yt+1
kt+1
+ t+1 (1  )

  t + tet
0 =



1 + C^t   C^t+1   ^t+1
0@



1 + ^t+1

    1 + ^t+1X 1 + X^t+1

Y (1+Y^t+1)
k(1+k^t+1)
+  (1  )

1 + ^t+1
 1A
 

1 + ^t

+  (1 + ^t) 

1 + ^t

0 = 

(  )XY
k
+ (1  )

  1 + 
0 = 


Y
k
X

^t+1   ^t+1 + (1  )

X^t+1 + Y^t+1   k^t+1 + C^t   C^t+1   ^t+1

+(1  )

^t+1 + C^t   C^t+1   ^t+1

  ^t + 

^t + ^t

We assume that in steady state  = 1:
0 =  Et C
 
t+1
C t t+1
t+1 + t
1
Rt
  t
et
1 + rt
0 =  


1 + C^t   C^t+1 + ^t+1   ^t+1

+

1 + ^t   R^t
 
R
  

1 + ^t + ^t

1 + r (1 + r^t)
0 =   + 1
R
   
1 + r
0 =  

C^t   C^t+1 + ^t+1   ^t+1

+

^t   R^t
 1
R
  
1 + r

^t + ^t  
r
1 + r
r^t

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0 = 1 + 2Et
C t+1
C t
t+1
t+1

dt+1
dt
t+1   1

dt+1
dt
t+1
2
 t
 
1 + 2

dt
dt 1
t   1

dt
dt 1
t + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2!
0 = 1 +
2


1 + C^t   C^t+1   ^t+1 + ^t+1




1 + ^t+1 + d^t+1   d^t

  1



1 + ^t+1 + d^t+1   d^t
2
 

1 + ^t
0@ 1 + 2

^t + d^t   d^t 1

1 + ^t + d^t   d^t 1

+

^t + d^t   d^t 1
2
1A
1 = 
0 = 2

^t+1 + d^t+1   d^t

  ^t   2

^t + d^t   d^t 1

0 = et

kt+1   bt+1
1 + rt

 XtYt
0 = 

1 + ^t

k

1 + k^t+1

  b
1 + r

1 + b^t+1   rr^t
1 + r

 XY

1 + X^t + Y^t

0 = 

k   b
1 + r

 XY
0 = 

k

k^t+1 + ^t

  b
1 + r

b^t+1   rr^t
1 + r
+ ^t

 XY

X^t + Y^t

0 = XtYt +
bt+1
Rt
  wtnt   bt   dt
 
1 + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2!
  It
0 = XY

1 + X^t + Y^t

+
b

1 + b^t+1

R

1 + R^t
   wn (1 + w^t) (1 + n^t)  b1 + b^t
 d

1 + d^t
0@1 +  1 + d^t
1 + d^t 1


1 + ^t

  1
!21A
 I

1 + I^t

0 = XY +
b
R
  wn  b  d  1 +  (  1)2  I
0 = XY

X^t + Y^t

+
b
R

b^t+1   R^t

  wn (w^t + n^t)  bb^t   dd^t   II^t
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0 = (1  ") (1  xt ) + "Xt + !Et
C t+1
C t
(t+1   1) Yt+1
Yt
  ! (t   1)t
0 = (1  ") (1  x (1 + ^xt )) + "X

1 + X^t

  !



1 + ^t

  1



1 + ^t

+!Et

1 + C^t   C^t+1



1 + ^t+1

  1
 Y 1 + Y^t+1
Y

1 + Y^t

0 = (1  ") (1  x) + "X
!^t = ("  1) x^xt + "XX^t + !Et^t+1
1
1 + rt
= Et
C t+1
C t
1
1 + r

1  r
1 + r
r^t

= Et

1 + C^t   C^t+1

1
1 + r
= 
 rr^t = C^t   EtC^t+1
n t = (1  wt )wtC t
C w (1  w)

1  
w^wt
1  w

1 + w^t   C^t

= n (1 +  n^t)
w =
n C
(1  w)
w^t   C^t   
w^wt
1  w =  n^t
Rt = 1 + rt (1   t)
R

1 + R^t

= 1 + r (1 + r^t) (1   (1 + ^ t))
R

1 + R^t

= 1 + r (1  )

1 + r^t   
1   ^ t

R^t =
 r (1  )
R
+
r (1  )
R

1 + r^t   
1   ^ t

R^t =
r (1  )
R
r^t   r
R
^ t
1 + rt =
1 + it
Ett+1
1 + r + rr^t =
1 + i+ i^{t
+^Ht+1
1 + r = 1 + i
i
1 + i
r^t =
i
1 + i
{^t   ^t+1
r^t = {^t   1
r
Et^t+1
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Yt = Ct + It
 
1 +
%
2

I
I 1
  1
2!
+ 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt +
!
2
(t   1)2 Yt
0 = C

1 + C^t

+ I

1 + I^t
0B@1 + %
2
0@ I

1 + I^t

I

1 + I^t 1
   1
1A2
1CA
+
0@ d

1 + d^t

d

1 + d^t 1
1 + ^t  1
1A2 d1 + d^t  Y 1 + Y^t
+
!
2



1 + ^t

  1
2
Y

1 + Y^t

Y = C + I
Y Y^t = CC^t + II^t
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Appendix B
Two Open Economies
B.1 Households Optimisation Problem
B.1.1 Domestic Households
The Lagrangian can be written as
 t = Et
1X
t=0
t

U (Ct; nt) + t
 
(1  w)Wtnt + At +BtEt +
  
1   dDt + PSt st
+Tt   At+1
1 + it
  Bt+1Et
(1 + it )

EtBt+1
Pt
   st+1PSt   PtCt
1A9=;
And the rst-order conditions are taken with respect to Ct; nt , At+1 , Bt+1; st+1 and t.
UC;t
Pt
= t
Wt
Pt
=   Un;t
UC;t (1  w)
1
1 + it
= Et
PtUC;t+1
Pt+1UC;t
1
1 + it
= Et
PtUC;t+1
Pt+1UC;t
Et+1
Et


EtBt+1
Pt

PSt = Et
PtUC;t+1
Pt+1UC;t
  
1   dDt+1 + PSt+1
(1  w)Wtnt + At +BtEt +
  
1   dDt + PSt st + Tt
=
At+1
1 + it
+
Bt+1Et
(1 + it )

EtBF;t+1
Pt
 + st+1PSt + PtCt
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FOCs in real term are
UC;t
Pt
= t
n t t = wtC
 
t (1  w)
1
(1 + it)
= Et
 
(1  ) + S1 t
 1
1  UC;t+1 
(1  ) + S1 t+1
 1
1  UC;tHt+1
1
1 + it
= Et
C t+1
C t
St+1
St
1
Ft+1
 
1   + S1 t
1   + S1 t+1
! 1
1 

 
(1  ) + S1 t
  1
1  Stbt+1

t+1

pSt = Et
 
(1  ) + S1 t
 1
1  C t+1 
(1  ) + S1 t+1
 1
1  C t Ht+1
  
1   d dt+1Ht+1 + pSt+1Ht+1
(1  w)wtnt + at + btSt +
 
1   d dt + Tt
PHt
=
at
(1 + it)
Ht+1 +
bt+1St

Ft+1
(1 + it )
 
(1  ) + S1 t
  1
1  Stbt+1t+1

+
 
(1  ) + S1 t
 1
1  Ct
where pSt = PStPHt and dt =
Dt
PHt
: See also Appendix (G) and (F) for more notations. We
normalise the number of shares to be equal to one (See Jermann and Quadrini (2012)).
B.1.2 Foreign Households
The Lagrangian can be written as
 t = Et
1X
t=0
t

U (Ct ; n

t ) + 

t

(1  w)W t nt +
At
Et
+Bt +
  
1   dDt + P St st
  A

t+1
Et (1 + it)


At+1
EtP t
   Bt+1
(1 + it )
  st+1P St   P t Ct + T t
1A9=;
And the rst-order conditions in the text are taken with respect to Ct ; n

t , B

t+1; A

t+1,
st+1 and 

t .
UC (C

t ; n

t )
P t
= t
W t
P t
=   Un (C

t ; n

t )
UC (Ct ; nt ) (1  w)
1
(1 + it )
= Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1

P t
UC (Ct ; nt )P t+1
1
(1 + it)
= Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1

UC (Ct ; nt )
P t Et
P t+1Et+1


At+1
EtP t

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P St = Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1

P t
UC (Ct ; nt )P t+1
  
1   dDt+1 + P St+1
(1  w)W t nt +
At
Et
+Bt +
  
1   dDt + P St st + T t
=
At+1
Et (1 + it)


At+1
EtP t
 + Bt+1
(1 + it )
+ st+1P

St + P

t C

t
and the FOCs in real term are
UC (C

t ; n

t )
P t
= t
wt =  
 tUn (C

t ; n

t )
UC (Ct ; nt ) (1  w)
1
(1 + it )
= Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1
  
(1  ) + S 1t
 1
1 
Ft+1UC (C

t ; n

t )
 
(1  ) + S 1t+1
 1
1 
1
(1 + it)
= Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1

UC (Ct ; nt )
 
(1  ) + S 1t
 1
1  St 
(1  ) + S 1t+1
 1
1  St+1
1
Ht+1

 
(1  )S1 t + 
  1
1  t+1a

t+1

pSt = Et
UC
 
Ct+1; n

t+1
  
(1  ) + S 1t
 1
1 
UC (Ct ; nt )
 
(1  ) + S 1t+1
 1
1  Ft+1
  
1   d dt+1Ft+1 + pSt+1Ft+1
(1  w)wtnt +
at
St
+ bt +
  
1   d dt + pSt st
+
T t
P Ft
   (1  ) + S 1t  11  Ct
= Et
at+1Ht+1
(1 + it)

 
(1  )S1 t + 
  1
1  t+1at+1

St
+ Et
bt+1

Ft+1
(1 + it )
+ st+1p

St
where pSt =
P St
P Ft
and dt =
Dt
P Ft
. See also Appendix (G) and (F) for more notations. We
normalise the number of shares to be equal to one (See Jermann and Quadrini (2012)).
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B.2 FirmsOptimisation Problems
B.2.1 Domestic Firms
Intermediate Goods Producers
The rms optimisation problem subject to equations (3.22) and (3.23) and the Lagrangian
can be written as follows:
Lf0 = E0
1X
t=0
m0;t

Dt + t

et

PHtQtkt+1   A
T
t+1
1 + it

  PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt)

+t

PmtF (e
zt ; kt; nt) +
ATt+1
1 + it(1   t)   A
T
t  Wtnt
 PHtQt (kt+1   (1  ) kt) 	(Dt; Dt 1)))
And the rst-order conditions in the text are taken with respect to nt; kt+1; ATt+1; Dt;
t; t.
tWt = (t   t)PmtFn(ezt ; kt; nt)
0 = Etmt;t+1
  
t+1   t+1

Pmt+1Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; nt+1) + t+1PHt+1Qt+1 (1  )

   t   tetPHtQt
0 =
t
1 + it(1   t)   te
t
1
1 + it
  Etmt;t+1t+1
1 = t
 
1 + 2

Dt
Dt 1
  1

Dt
Dt 1
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2!
 Etmt;t+1t+12

Dt+1
Dt
  1

D2t+1
D2t
0 = et

PHtQtkt+1   A
T
t+1
1 + it

  PmtF (ezt ; kt; nt)
ATt = PmtF (e
zt ; kt; nt) +
ATt+1
1 + it(1   t)  Wtnt   PHtQtIt  	(Dt; Dt 1)
where ms;t is the stochastic discount factor:
mt;s = 
s tUC;s
UC;t
Pt
Ps
mt;t+1 = 
UC;t+1
t+1UC;t
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We substitute mt;t+1 and get the following real system
twt = (t   t)XtFn(ezt ; kt; nt)
0 = Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
t
t+1
  
t+1   t+1

Xt+1Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; nt+1) + t+1Qt+1 (1  )

   t   tetQt
0 =
t
1 + it(1   t)   te
t
1
1 + it
  Et UC;t+1
UC;tHt+1
t
t+1
t+1
1 = t
 
1 + 2

dt
dt 1
Ht   1

dt
dt 1
Ht + 

dt
dt 1
Ht   1
2!
 Et UC;t+1
UC;tHt+1
t
t+1
t+12

dt+1
dt
Ht+1   1

d2t+1
d2t
2Ht+1
0 = et

Qtkt+1   a
T
t+1
(1 + it)
EtHt+1

 XtF (ezt ; kt; nt)
aTt = XtF (e
zt ; kt; nt) +
aTt+1
(1 + it(1   t))EtHt+1   wtnt  QtIt   dt
 

dt
dt 1
Ht   1
2
dt
See also Appendix (G) and (F) for more notations.
Capital producers
The objective of a capital producer is to choose It to maximise nominal prot
max
I
Et
1X
=t
mt;
 
PmQI   Pm
 
1 +
%
2

I
I 1
  1
2!
I
!
And the rst-order condition in the text is taken with respect to It:
If no costs % = 0 then
Q = 1
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Retailers
The rms optimisation problem is standard
Et
1X
=t
mt;
 
piHy
i
 (1  x )  Pmyi  
!
2

piH
piH 1
  1
2
YPH
!
= Et
1X
=t
mt;
 
piH
PH
yi (1  x ) 
Pm
PH
yi  
!
2

piH
piH 1
  1
2
Y
!
PH
= Et
1X
=t
mt;
0@  piHPH 1 " Y (1  x )  PmPH  piHPH  " Y
 !
2

piH
piH 1
  1
2
Y
1APH
where !
2

piH
piH 1
  1
2
YPH represents the cost of adjusting prices. The rst order con-
dition is:
@
@pjH
: Etmt;
 
(1  ")

piH
PH
 "
Y (1  x )  !

piH
piH 1
  1

Y
PH
piH 1
+"
Pm
PH

piH
PH
 " 1
Y
!
+ Etmt;+1!

piH+1
piH
  1

Y+1
piH+1
(piH )
2PH+1
from where after piH = PH :
@
@pjH
: Etmt; ((1  ")Y (1  x )  ! (   1)Y
+"
Pm
PH
Y

+ Etmt;+1! (+1   1)Y+12+1
@
@pjH
: Etmt; ((1  ")Y (1  x )  ! (   1)Y
+"
Pm
PH
Y

+ Et
C +1
C 

+1
! (+1   1)Y+1+1
! (   1)Y = (1  ")Y (1  x ) + "XY + !Et
C +1
C 

+1
(+1   1)Y+1+1
B.2.2 Foreign Firms
Intermediate goods producers
The Lagrangian can be written as
Lf0 = E0
1X
t=0
m0;t

Dt + 

t

e

t

P FtQ

tk

t+1  
BTt+1
1 + it

  P mtF (ez

t ; kt ; N

t )

+t

P mtF (e
zt ; kt ; N

t ) +
BTt+1
1 + it (1   t )
 BTt  W t nt
 P FtQt
 
kt+1   (1  ) kt
 	  Dt ; Dt 1
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And the rst-order conditions in the text are taken with respect to nt ; k

t+1; B
T
t+1; D

t ; 

t ;
t .
tW

t = (

t   t )P mtFn(ez

t ; kt ; n

t )
0 = Etmt;t+1
  
t+1   t+1

P mt+1Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; n

t+1) + 

t+1P

Ft+1Q

t+1 (1  )

   t   tt et P FtQt
0 =
t
1 + it (1   t )
  te

t
1
1 + it
  Etmt;t+1t+1
1 = t
 
1 + 2

Dt
Dt 1
  1

Dt
Dt 1
+ 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2!
 Etmt;t+1t+12

Dt+1
Dt
  1

D2t+1
D2t
0 = e

t

P FtQ

tk

t+1  
BTt+1
1 + it

  P mtF (ez

t ; kt ; n

t )
BTt = P

mtF (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ) +
BTt+1
1 + it (1   t )
 W t nt
 P FtQt
 
kt+1   (1  ) kt
 	  Dt ; Dt 1
and the FOCs in real term are
tw

t = (

t   t )Xt Fn(ez

t ; kt ; n

t )
0 = Et
C t+1
C t
 t
 t+1
  
t+1   t+1

Xt+1Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; n

t+1) + 

t+1Q

t+1 (1  )

   t   tt et Qt
0 =
t
1 + it (1   t )
  te

t
1
1 + it
  Et C
 
t+1
Ft+1C
 
t
 t
 t+1
t+1
1 = t
 
1 + 2

dt
dt 1
Ft   1

dt
dt 1
Ft + 


dt
dt 1
Ft   1
2!
 2EtC
 
t+1
C t
 t
 t+1
Ft+1

t+1

dt+1
dt
Ft+1   1

dt+1
dt
2
0 = e

t

Qtk

t+1  
bTt+1
(1 + it )
EtFt+1

 Xt F (ez

t ; kt ; n

t )
bTt = X

t F (e
zt ; kt ; n

t ) +
bTt+1EtFt+1
(1 + it (1   t ))
  wtnt
 Qt
 
kt+1   (1  ) kt
  dt    dtdt 1Ft   1
2
dt
where mt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor:
mt;t+1 = 
C t+1
t+1C
 
t
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Capital producers
The objective of a capital producer is to choose I to maximise nominal prot
max
I
Et
1X
=t
mt;
 
QI

  
 
1 +
%
2

I
I 1
  1
2!
I
!
P F;
If no costs % = 0 then
Q = 1
Retailers
The rms optimisation problem is standard
Et
1X
=t
mt;
 
piF
P F
yi (1   x ) 
P m
P F
yi  
!
2

piF
piF 1
  1
2
Y 
!
P F
= Et
1X
=t
mt;
0@  piFP F 1 " Y  (1   x )  P mP F  piFP F  " Y 
 !
2

piF
piF 1
  1
2
Y 
1AP F
where !
2

piF
piF 1
  1
2
Y  represents the cost of adjusting prices. The rst order conditions
are:
@
@pjF
: Etmt;
 
(1  ")

piF
P F
 "
Y  (1   x )  !

piF
piF 1
  1

Y 
P F
piF 1
+"
P m
P F

piF
P F
 " 1
Y 
!
+ Etmt;+1!

piF+1
piF
  1

Y +1
piF+1P

F+1
(piF )
2
from where after piF = P

F :
! (t   1)Y t t = (1  ")Y t (1   xt ) + "Xt Y t + Et
C t+1
C t
 t
 t+1
!
 
t+1   1

Y t+1

t+1
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B.3 Market Clearing and Private Sector Equilibrium
For each country we can take the sum of the household budget constraint and the gov-
ernment budget constraint and obtain two nancial accounts
FAa : Yt =
Pt
PHt
Ct + 

dt
dt 1
Ht   1
2
dt +Gt + It
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
+
!
2
(t   1)2 Yt +
0@ 1


EtBt+1
Pt
   1
1A Bt+1Et
(1 + it )PHt
+
1
PHt

At  BtEt +
Bt+1Et
(1 + it )
  A

t+1
(1 + it)

FAb : Y t =
0@ 1


At+1
EtP t
   1
1A At+1
Et (1 + it)P Ft
+
1
P Ft

At+1
Et (1 + it)
  Bt+1
(1 + it )
+Bt   A

t
Et

+Gt +
!
2
(t   1)2 Y t
+It
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
+
P t
P Ft
Ct + 

dt
dt 1
Ft   1
2
dt
which can be used in the nal system instead of household budget constraint.
The two market clearing conditions for countries H and F are
PHtYt = CHtPHt + C

HtP

HtEt + 

Dt
Dt 1
  1
2
Dt + PHtIt
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
+PHtGt + PHt
!
2
(t   1)2 Yt +
0@ 1


EtBt+1
Pt
   1
1A Bt+1Et
(1 + it )
P FtY

t = C

FtP

Ft + CFt
PFt
Et
+
0@ 1


At+1
EtP t
   1
1A At+1
Et (1 + it)
+ P Ft
!
2
(t   1)2 Y t
+P FtG

t + P

FtI

t
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
+ P t C

t + 


Dt
Dt 1
  1
2
Dt
these are balance of goods. We substitute consumption into the market clearing con-
ditions and obtain
GAa : Yt = (1  )
 
(1  ) + S1 t
 
1  Ct + 
  (1  )S1 t +  1  Ct
+

dt
dt 1
Ht   1
2
dt +Gt + It
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
+
!
2
(t   1)2 Yt
+
0@ 1


EtBt+1
Pt
   1
1A Bt+1Et
(1 + it )PHt
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GAb : Y t = (1  )
 
(1  ) + S 1t
 
1  Ct + 
 
(1  )S 1t + 
 
1  Ct
+
0@ 1


At+1
EtP t
   1
1A At+1
Et (1 + it)P Ft
+Gt +
!
2
(t   1)2 Y t
+It
 
1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2!
+ 

dt
dt 1
Ft   1
2
dt
Of course, the sum of two nancial constraints is equal to the sum of two market clearing
conditions, so one equation is redundant. To close the system, we use equations GAa and
GAb; and instead of using either FAa or FAb we use FAa-GAa.
The complete system which determines the private sector equilibrium of home country
can be written as:
0 = (t   t) (1  )XtYt   twtnt
0 =
t
Rt
  tet
1
1 + it
  EtC
 
t+1
C t
t+1
 
t   tet

Qt
= Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
t+1
  
t+1   t+1

Xt+1Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; nt+1) + t+1Qt+1 (1  )

1 + 2Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
t+1

dt+1
dt
t+1   1

dt+1
dt
t+1
2
= t
 
1 + 2

dt
dt 1
t   1

dt
dt 1
t + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2!
XtYt = e
t

Qtkt+1  
 
at+1 + a

t+1
 Ett+1
(1 + it)

Qt = 1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2
+
It
It 1
%

It
It 1
  1

  EtUC;t+1
UC;t
%

It+1
It
  1

It+1
It
2
0 = XtYt +
 
at+1 + a

t+1
 Ett+1
Rt
  (at + at )  wtntt  QtIt   dt   

dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt
! (t   1)Ytt = ((1  ") (1  xt ) + "Xt)Yt + !Et
C t+1
C t
t
t+1
(t+1   1)Yt+1t+1
1
1 + it
= Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
t
t+1t+1
1
1 + it
= Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
St+1
St
t
t+1t+1


St
t
bt+1

t+1

n t = wt (1  wt )
C t
t
where Yt = ZeztktN
1 
t ; Rt = 1 + it(1   t);t =
 
(1  ) + S1 t
 1
1  :
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Finally the resource constraint yields
Yt = Ctt + It +Gt + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt +
!
2
(t   1)2 Yt
+Et
0@ 1


St
t
bt+1t+1
   1
1A bt+1St t+1
1 + it
+

at   at+1
Ett+1
1 + it
  Stbt + Stbt+1Et

t+1
1 + it

similarly the Private Sector Equilibrium for the foreign country is:
tw

t = (

t   t )Xt
St
t
Fn(e
zt ; kt ; n

t )
t
Rt
= Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
t+1 + 

t
e

t
1
1 + it
 
t   tt e

t

Qt
= Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
t+1
  
t+1   t+1

Xt+1Fk(e
zt+1 ; kt+1; n

t+1) + 

t+1Q

t+1 (1  )

1 + 2Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
t+1

dt+1
dt
t+1   1

dt+1
dt
t+1
2
= t
 
1 + 2

dt
dt 1
t   1

dt
dt 1
t + 


dt
dt 1
t   1
2!
Xt Y

t = 
e

t

Qtk

t+1  
 
bt+1 + b

t+1
 Ett+1
1 + it

0 = Xt Y

t +
 
bt+1 + b

t+1
 Ett+1
Rt
  (bt + bt ) wtnt t Qt It   dt   

dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt
Qt = 1 +
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2
+
It
It 1
%

It
It 1
  1

  EtUC;t+1
UC;t
%

It+1
It
  1

It+1
It
2
! (t   1)Y t t = (1  ")Y t (1   xt ) + "Xt Y t + Et
C t+1
C t
 t
 t+1
!
 
t+1   1

Y t+1

t+1
Ett+1
1 + it
= Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
 t
 t+1
Ett+1
1 + it
= Et
UC;t+1
UC;t
 tSt
 t+1St+1


t+1
t
at+1

n t = w

t (1   wt )
C t
 t
Y t =  tC

t + I

t +G

t + 


dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt +
!
2
(t   1)2 Y t
+Et
0@ 1


t+1
t
at+1
   1
1A at+1
St
t+1
1 + it
 

at   at+1
Ett+1
1 + it

1
St
+ bt   bt+1Et

t+1
1 + it
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Yt   Yt =
 
(1  ) + S1 t
 1
1  Ct + It +Gt + 

dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt + It
%
2

It
It 1
  1
2
+
!
2
(t   1)2 Yt   A

t+1
PHt (1 + it)
+
At
PHt
  BtEt
PHt
+
Bt+1Et
PHt (1 + it )

EtBF;t+1
Pt

  (1  )  (1  ) + S1 t  1  Ct     (1  )S1 t +  1  Ct   It  Gt
  EtBt+1
PHt (1 + it )
0@ 1


EtBt+1
Pt
   1
1A   dt
dt 1
t   1
2
dt   It%
2

It
It 1
  1
2
 !
2
(t   1)2 Yt
we get
0 = S1 t 

tCt    tSt Ct   at+1
Ett+1
1 + it
+ at + bt+1
Ett+1
1 + it
St   btSt
where Y t = Ze
zt kt N
1 
t , R

t = 1 + i

t (1   t ),  tSt =
 
(1  )S1 t + 
 1
1  (See also
Appendix G for more notations).
There are 25 equations and 25 unknowns: Ct, nt, wt, t, t, Xt, kt, t, dt, bt, at, Qt,
Ct , n

t , w

t , 

t , 

t , X

t , k

t , 

t , d

t , b

t , a

t , Q

t , and St for given policy instruments it; i

t ;
wt ; 
w
t ; 
d
t ; 
d
t ; 
x
t ; 
x
t ;  t; 

t .
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B.4 Steady State
The steady state level of the system is as follows:
S = 1
 = 1
 =
1
1 + i
1 = 
 
(1  ) + S1   11  Sbt+1! b = 0
Q = 1
X =
("  1) (1  x)
"
 =
1
(1 + i(1  ))    1
Y
k
=
1     (1  )
 (1  )X
Y
N
=
 
A

k
Y
! 11 

a
Y
=

k
Y
  X


w = (1  )X (1  ) Y
N
d
Y
= X +
a
Y

1
(1 + i(1  ))   1

  N
Y
w    k
Y
C
Y
 = 1   k
Y
  G
Y
Y =
 
n(+ )
w (1  w)
d
 
N
Y
  C
Y

! 1
 +
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 = 1
 =
1
1 + i
1 = 
 
(1  )S1  +   11  a! a = 0
Q = 1
wt =  
Un (C

t ; n

t )
Uc (Ct ; nt ) (1   wt )
X =
("  1) (1   x)
"
 =
1
(1 + i(1   ))   
1

Y 
k
=
1      (1  )
 (1  ) X
Y 
N
=
 
A

k
Y 
! 11 
b
Y 
=

k
Y 
  X



1

w  = (1  )X (1  ) Y

n
d
Y 
= X +
b
Y 

1
(1 + i(1   ))   1

  w  n

Y 
   k

Y 
 
C
Y 
= 1   k

Y 
  G

Y 
Y  =
 
(1  n)(+ ) w
 (1   w)
d
 
N
Y 
  C
Y 

! 1
 +
 
(1  ) + S1  11  =  
(1  )S1  +  11  =  S 
1   + S 1 11  =  
S 
 
(1  )S1  +   1  + = "CY  
C
Y

 Y   1  +
Y
1 
 +
#

 
(1  ) + S1  1  +
B.5 Reduced form Linearised System
For every variable zt with steady state z 6= 0 we denote z^t = log ztz . We linearise the
system around the steady state to yield:
w (1 + w^t) =
n C (1 +  n^t)

1 + C^t + ^t

(1  w)

1  w
(1 w) ^
w
t

w^t =  n^t + C^t + ^t +
w
(1  w) ^
w
t
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1(1 + i) (1 + {^t)
= Et
1
1 + ^t+1


1  C^t+1 + ^t


1  C^t + ^t+1

C^t = C^t+1 +
1


^t+1   {^t

+
1


^t+1   ^t

1
(1 + i) (1 + {^t )
= Et

1 + S^t+1


1 + S^t
 1
1 + ^Ft+1


1  C^t+1 + ^t


1  C^t + ^t+1


 
1   + S1   11  Sbt+1
1 =

1 + S^t+1   S^t + {^t   ^Ft+1   C^t+1 + ^t + C^t   ^t+1


 
1   + S1   11  Sbt+1
C^t = C^t+1   1


{^t   ^Ft+1

  1

(1  )
(1   + S1 )

S^t+1   S^t

+


S

bt+1
Note that we assume:
 (x) =  (0) + 0 (0) x = 1  x
% = 0
 (x) =  (0) + 0 (0) x = 1  x
% = 0

1 + ^t

w (1 + w^t) =

1 + ^t

   (1 + ^t)

X

1 + X^t

(1  )
Y

1 + Y^t

n (1 + n^t)
^t + w^t =
1
(1  ) ^t  

(1  ) ^t + X^t + Y^t   n^t

1 + ^t

   (1 + ^t) 

1 + ^t

= Et

1  C^t+1 + ^t


1  C^t + ^t+1

0@ 1 + ^t+1    1 + ^t+1X 1 + X^t+1  Y (1+Y^t+1)k(1+k^t+1)
+

1 + ^t+1

(1  )
1A
0 = (1  )

 C^t+1 + C^t + ^t   ^t+1

  ^t + 

^t + ^t

+X
Y
k

^t+1   ^t+1

+  (1  )XY
k

X^t+1 + Y^t+1   k^t+1

+  (1  ) ^t+1
1 + ^t

 (1 + ^ t) + (1 + i) (1 + {^t) (1   (1 + ^ t))    (1 + ^t) 

1 + ^t
 1
(1 + i) (1 + {^t)
= Et

1  C^t+1 + ^t



1  C^t + ^t+1 + ^Ht+1
 1 + ^t+1
( + 1)

^t +
i
(1 + (1  ) i) ^ t

+

  ( + 1) (1  )
 (1 + (1  ) i)

{^t   

^t + ^t

=

 C^t+1 + ^t + ^t+1 + C^t   ^t+1   ^Ht+1

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0 = 1 + 2Et

1  C^t+1 + ^t


1  C^t + ^t+1
 1 + ^t+1
0@

1 + d^t+1


1 + d^t
 1 + ^Ht+1  1
1A

1 + 2d^t+1


1 + 2d^t
 1 + ^Ht+1
 

1 + ^t
0BB@ 1 + 2

(1+d^t)
(1+d^t 1)

1 + ^Ht

  1

(1+d^t)
(1+d^t 1)

1 + ^Ht

+

(1+d^t)
(1+d^t 1)

1 + ^Ht

  1
2
1CCA
^t = 2

d^t+1   d^t + ^Ht+1

  2

d^t   d^t 1 + ^Ht



1 + ^t
0@1 + Q^t k 1 + k^t+1   a (1 + a^t+1) + at+1

1 + ^Ht+1

(1 + i) (1 + {^t)
1A
= X

1 + X^t

Y

1 + Y^t


k
Y

^t + k^t+1

   a
Y

^t + a^t+1 +
1
a
at+1 + ^Ht+1   {^t

= X

X^t + Y^t

Q^t = %

I^t   I^t 1

  %

I^t+1   I^t

!

1 + ^Ht

  1

1 + ^Ht

= (1  ") (1  x (1 + ^xt )) + "X

1 + X^t

+!Et

1  C^t+1 + ^t


1  C^t + ^t+1
 1 + ^Ht+1  1

1 + Y^t+1


1 + Y^t
 1 + ^Ht+1
^Ht =
("  1) (1  x)
!

x
(1  x) ^
x
t + X^t

+ ^Ht+1
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Y

1 + Y^t

= C

1 + C^t
  
1   + S1  11  1 + S1 
(1   + S1 ) S^t

+

k

1 + k^t+1

  (1  ) k

1 + k^t

+G

1 + G^t

+
0@

1 + d^t


1 + d^t 1
 1 + ^Ht  1
1A2 d1 + d^t+ !
2
(t   1)2 Y

1 + Y^t

+
0@ 1


(1   + S1 )  11  Sbt+1
   1
1A bt+1 S
(1 + i)
+
0@ at   at+1 (1+^Ht+1)(1+i)(1+{^t)   S 1 + S^t bt
+S

1 + S^t

bt+1
(1+^Ft+1)
(1+i)(1+{^t )
1A
Y^t =
C
Y


C^t +
S1 
(1   + S1 ) S^t

+
k
Y
k^t+1   (1  ) k
Y
k^t +
G
Y
G^t
+
at
Y
  a

t+1
Y
  S bt
Y
+ S
bt+1
Y
0 = X

1 + X^t

Y

1 + Y^t

+
 
a (1 + a^t+1) + a

t+1
 1 + ^Ht+1
 (1 + ^ t) + (1 + i) (1 + {^t) (1   (1 + ^ t))
  (a (1 + a^t) + at )  w (1 + w^t)n (1 + n^t)
 

1 + Q^t

k

1 + k^t+1

  (1  ) k

1 + k^t

 d

1 + d^t

  
0@

1 + d^t


1 + d^t 1
 1 + ^Ht  1
1A2 d1 + d^t
0 = X

X^t + Y^t

+

a^t+1 +
1
a
at+1 + ^Ht+1  
(1 + i) (1  )
R
{^t +
i
R
^ t

a
Y R
  a
Y

a^t +
1
a
at

  k
Y
k^t+1 + (1  ) k
Y
k^t   d
Y
d^t   w n
Y
(w^t + n^t)
w (1 + w^t ) =
 n C (1 +  n^t )

1 + C^t +  ^t

(1   w)

1  w
(1 w) ^
w
t

w^t =  n^

t + C^

t +  ^t +
 w
(1   w) ^
w
t
1
(1 + i) (1 + {^t )
= Et

1  C^t+1 +  ^t


1  C^t +  ^t+1
 1
1 + ^Ft+1

C^t = C^

t+1 +
1


 ^t+1    ^t + ^Ft+1   {^t

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1(1 + i) (1 + {^t)
= Et

1  C^t+1 +  ^t + S^t


1  C^t +  ^t+1 + S^t+1
 1
1 + ^Ht+1


 
(1  )S1  +   11  at+1
C^t = C^

t+1  
1


{^t   ^Ht+1

+
1

(1  )

S^t+1   S^t

+


at+1

1 + ^

t

w (1 + w^t ) =

1 + ^

t

   (1 + ^t )

X

1 + X^t

(1  )
Y 

1 + Y^ t

n (1 + n^t )
^

t + w^

t =
1
(1  ) ^

t  

(1  ) ^

t + X^

t + Y^

t   n^t

1 + ^

t

   (1 + ^t ) 

1 + ^

t

1 + Q^t

= Et

1  C^t+1 +  ^t


1  C^t +  ^t+1

0@

1 + ^

t+1

    1 + ^t+1X 1 + X^t+1

Y (1+Y^ t+1)
k(1+k^t+1)
+

1 + ^

t+1

1 + Q^t+1

(1  )
1A
0 = (1  )

 C^t+1 + C^t +  ^t    ^t+1

  ^t + 

^t + ^

t

+X
Y 
k

^

t+1   ^t+1

+  (1  )XY

k

X^t+1 + Y^

t+1   k^t+1

+ (1  ) ^t+1 
1 + ^

t

  (1 + ^ t ) + (1 + i) (1 + {^

t ) (1    (1 + ^ t ))
  (1 + ^t ) 

1 + ^

t
 1
(1 + i) (1 + {^t )
= Et

1  C^t+1 +  ^t


1  C^t +  ^t+1 + ^Ft+1
 1 + ^t+1
( + 1)

^

t +
i 
(1 + (1   ) i) ^

t

+

   (
 + 1) (1   )
 (1 + (1   ) i)

{^t
 

^t + ^

t

=

 C^t+1 +  ^t    ^t+1   ^Ft+1 + C^t + ^

t+1

0 = 1 + Et

1  C^t+1 +  ^t


1  C^t +  ^t+1
 1 + ^t+1 2
0@

1 + d^t+1


1 + d^t
 1 + ^Ft+1  1
1A

1 + 2d^t+1


1 + 2d^t
 1 + ^Ft+1
 

1 + ^

t
0BB@ 1 + 2


(1+d^t )
(1+d^t 1)

1 + ^Ft

  1

(1+d^t )
(1+d^t 1)

1 + ^Ft

+

(1+d^t )
(1+d^t 1)

1 + ^Ft

  1
2
1CCA
^

t = 2


d^t+1   d^t + ^Ft+1

  2

d^t   d^t 1 + ^Ft

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

1 + ^

t
0@1 + Q^t k 1 + k^t+1  bt+1 + b 1 + b^t+1

1 + ^Ft+1

(1 + i) (1 + {^t )
1A
= X

1 + X^t

Y 

1 + Y^ t


k
Y 

^

t + k^

t+1

   b

Y 

1
b
bt+1 + b^

t+1 + ^

Ft+1   {^t + ^

t

= X

X^t + Y^

t

Q^t = %

I^t   I^t 1

  %

I^t+1   I^t

!

1 + ^Ft

  1

1 + ^Ft

= (1  ") (1   x (1 + ^ xt )) + "X

1 + X^t

+!Et

1  C^t+1 +  ^t


1  C^t +  ^t+1
 1 + ^Ft+1  1

1 + Y^ t+1


1 + Y^ t
 1 + ^Ft+1
^Ft =
("  1) (1   x)
!

 x
(1   x) ^
x
t + X^

t

+ ^Ft+1
Y 

1 + Y^ t

=
 
(1  )S1  +  11 

1 + (1 
)S1 
((1 )S1 +) S^t

S

1 + S^t
 C 1 + C^t 
+

k

1 + k^t+1

  (1  ) k

1 + k^t

+G

1 + G^t

+
0@

1 + d^t


1 + d^t 1
 1 + ^Ft  1
1A2 d 1 + d^t
+
!
2
(t   1)2 Y 

1 + Y^ t

+
0@ 1


((1  )S1  + )  11  at+1
   1
1A at+1
S
1
(1 + i)
  1
S

1 + S^t
 at   at+1 1(1 + i)   Sbt + Sbt+1 11 + i

Y^ t =
C
Y 
 

C^t  

((1  )S1  + ) S^t

+
k
Y 
k^t+1   (1  )
k
Y 
k^t +
G
Y 
G^t
  1
S
at
Y 
+ 
1
S
at+1
Y 
+
bt
Y 
   bt+1
Y 
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0 = X

1 + X^t

Y 

1 + Y^ t

+

bt+1 + b


1 + b^t+1

1 + ^Ft+1
  (1 + ^ t ) + (1 + i) (1 + {^

t ) (1    (1 + ^ t ))
 

bt + b


1 + b^t

  w (1 + w^t )n (1 + n^t )
 

1 + Q^t

k

1 + k^t+1

  (1  ) k

1 + k^t

 d

1 + d^t

  
0@

1 + d^t


1 + d^t 1
 1 + ^Ft  1
1A2 d 1 + d^t
0 = X

X^t + Y^

t

+
b
RY 

b^t+1 +
bt+1
b + ^

Ft+1
  (1+i)(1 )
R {^

t +
i
R ^

t

  b

Y 

bt
b
+ b^t

  k

Y 
k^t+1 + (1  )
k
Y 
k^t  
d
Y 
d^t   w
n
Y 
(w^t + n^

t )
0 = S1 
 
(1  ) + S1  1  1 + (1  ) S^t
1 +
S1 
((1  ) + S1 ) S^t

C

1 + C^t

 
 
(1  )S1  +  1  1 +  (1  )S1 
((1  )S1  + ) S^t

C

1 + C^t

 at+1 + at + bt+1S   btS
0 = S1 
 
(1  ) + S1  1  C
Y

(1  ) (1  ) + S1 
((1  ) + S1 ) S^t + C^t

   (1  )S1  +  1  C
Y 
Y 
Y

 (1  )S1 
((1  )S1  + ) S^t + C^

t

 a

t+1
Y 
Y 
Y
+
at
Y 
Y 
Y
+ 
bt+1
Y
S   bt
Y
S
Y^t = z^t + k^t + (1  ) n^t
Y^ t = z^

t + k^

t + (1  ) n^t
at+1 =  


bt+1
Proof (for the last equation):
From the following equations
C^t = C^t+1 +
1


^Ht+1   {^t

+
1


^t+1   ^t

C^t = C^t+1   1


{^t   ^Ft+1

  1

(1  )
(1   + S1 )

S^t+1   S^t

+


S

bt+1
C^t = C^

t+1 +
1


 ^t+1    ^t + ^Ft+1   {^t

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C^t = C^

t+1  
1


{^t   ^Ht+1

+
1

(1  )S1 
((1  )S1  + )

S^t+1   S^t

+

S 
at+1
we get
{^t = {^

t   ^Ft+1 + ^Ht+1 +

S^t+1   S^t

  bt+1
{^t = {^

t   ^Ft+1 + ^Ht+1 + S^t+1   S^t + at+1
so that
at+1 + bt+1 = 0
B.6 Closed vs open economy model
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Figure B.1: Impulse responses of a closed economy to a credit shock under commitment
and discretion (with no scal policy)
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Appendix C
Welfare Loss Computation
Consider the following linear constraint
Zs+1 =MZs +B"s+1
Zs is predetermined variable
from where, assuming that "s are not correlated with Zs; it follows
Z 0s+1 = Z
0
sM
0 + "0s+1B
0
Zs+1Z
0
s+1 = (MZs +B"s+1)
 
Z 0sM
0 + "0s+1B
0
1X
s=0
!sZs+1Z
0
s+1 =
1X
s=0
!s (MZs +B"s+1)
 
Z 0sM
0 + "0s+1B
0
1X
s=0
!sZs+1Z
0
s+1 =
1X
s=0
!s
 
MZsZ
0
sM
0 +B"s+1Z 0sM
0 +MZs"0s+1B
0 +B"s+1"0s+1B
0
1X
s=0
!sZs+1Z
0
s+1
=
1X
s=0
!s
0@MZsZ 0sM 0 +B "s+1Z 0s| {z }
0, uncorrelated
M 0 +M
 
Zs"
0
s+1

B0 +B"s+1"0s+1B
0
1A
1X
s=0
!sZs+1Z
0
s+1 =
1X
s=0
!s
 
MZsZ
0
sM
0 +B"s+1"0s+1B
0
1X
s=0
!sZs+1Z
0
s+1 =M
 1X
s=0
!sZsZ
0
s
!
M 0 +B
 1X
s=0
!s"s+1"
0
s+1
!
B0
1
!
 1X
s=0
!s+1Zs+1Z
0
s+1 + Z
0
0Z0
!
=M
 1X
s=0
!sZsZ
0
s
!
M 0+B
 1X
s=0
!s"s+1"
0
s+1
!
B0+
1
!
Z0Z
0
0
1
!
 1X
s=0
!sZsZ
0
s
!
=M
 1X
s=0
!sZsZ
0
s
!
M 0 +B
 1X
s=0
!s"s+1"
0
s+1
!
B0 +
1
!
Z0Z
0
0
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1X
s=0
!sZsZ
0
s = !M
 1X
s=0
!sZsZ
0
s
!
M 0 + !B
 1X
s=0
!s"s+1"
0
s+1
!
B0 + Z0Z 00
E0
1X
s=0
!sZsZ
0
s = !M
 
E0
1X
s=0
!sZsZ
0
s
!
M 0 + !B
 
E0
1X
s=0
!s"s+1"
0
s+1
!
B0 + Z0Z 00
Denote V =
P1
s=0 !
sZsZ
0
s: For covariance stationary "s with covariance matrix 
E0V = !ME0VM 0 + !B
 
E0
1X
s=0
!s"s+1"
0
s+1
!
B0 + Z0Z 00
= !ME0VM 0 + !B
 1X
s=0
!sE0
 
"s+1"
0
s+1
!
B0 + Z0Z 00
= !ME0VM 0 + !
1  !BB
0 + Z0Z 00
X = !MXM 0 +
!
1  !BB
0 + Z0Z 00
vec (X) = !vec (MXM 0) +
!
1  !vec (BB
0) + vec (Z0Z 00)
vec (X) = ! (M 
M) vec (X) + !
1  ! (B 
B) vec ()
+ (Z0 
 Z0)
vec (X)  ! (M 
M) vec (X) = !
1  ! (B 
B) vec () + (Z0 
 Z0)
(I   ! (M 
M)) vec (X) = !
1  ! (B 
B) vec () + (Z0 
 Z0)
vec (X) = (I   ! (M 
M)) 1 vec

!
1  !BB
0 + Z0Z 00

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Appendix D
ZLB under Discression: application
of the Laséen-Svensson (2011)
approach
Consider the standard LQ RE model. The policy objective is quadratic
Lt =
1
2
1X
s=t
s tg0sQgs =
1
2
1X
s=t
s t (y0sQys + 2y0sPus + u0sRus) : (D.1)
subject to the system of linear constraints
xt+1
Xt+1

=

A11 A12
A21 A22
 
xt
Xt

+

B1
B2

[ut] +

C1
C2

[t+1] ; (D.2)
where ys = [x0s; X
0
s]
0 : We assume A22 is invertible. We consider standard discretionary
policy.
D.1 No binding constraints
This section presents the standard discretionary solution.
Suppose that the reaction of the private sector is given by a linear rule
Xt =  Nxt: (D.3)
Representation (D.3) can be rewritten in an equivalent form in terms of predetermined
variables and controls (as did Oudiz and Sachs, 1985). We one-period lead (D.3) and
substitute for xt+1 from the rst equation (D.2):
Xt+1 =  Nxt+1 =  N(A11xt + A12Xt +B1ut):
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Combining this with the second equation in (D.2) we obtain:
Xt =  (A22 +NA12) 1[(A21 +NA11)yt + (B2 +NB1)ut]
=  Jxt  Kut; (D.4)
where
J = (A22 +NA12)
 1(A21 +NA11); (D.5)
K = (A22 +NA12)
 1(B2 +NB1): (D.6)
The policymaker is maximising its objective function with respect to ut, taking time-
consistent reaction Xt as given and recognising dependence of Xt on policy us:We dene
Lagrangian with period term
Hs =
1
2
s t(y0sQys + 2y0sPus + u0sRus) + 0s+1(A11xs + A12Xs +B1us   ys+1)
+0s (Xs + Jxs +Kus) ;
with s and s are Lagrange multipliers.
First order conditions can be written as
0 = (P 01  K 0Q012)xs + (P 02  K 0Q22)Xs + (R K 0P2)us + (B01  K 0A012) s+1;
0 = (Q11   J 0Q012)xs + (Q12   J 0Q22)Xs + (P1   J 0P2)us   s + (A011   J 0A012) s+1;
s =  Q012xs  Q22Xs   P2us   A012s+1
and equations (D.4) and the rst equation of (D.2). Here s = 
s ts; s = 
s ts and
matrices Q, P and R are partitioned conformally with ys = [x0s; X 0s]0 and us.
Substitute out Xs and s; and relabelling the matrices we arrive to the following linear
system
0 = P 0xs +Rus +B0s+1;
0 = Qxs + P us   s + A0s+1;
0 = Axs +Bus   xs+1
which can be written in a matrix form
I 0
0 22
 
xt+1
~ut+1

=

	11 	12
	21 	22
 
xt
~ut

; (D.7)
where ~ut = [u0t; 
0
t]
0and
22 =

0 B0
0 A0

; 	21 =
  P 0
 Q

; 	22 =
  R 0
 P  I

;
	11 = A
; 	12 =

B 0

:
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A solution to system (D.7) will necessarily have a linear form of
~ut =

ut
t

=
  F
S

yt (D.8)
It is straightforward to show that system matrices in (D.8) satisfy the following well-
known Riccati equations describing solution to a discretionary problem
S = Q + A0SA   (P 0 + B0SA) (R + B0SB) 1 (P 0 + B0SA) (D.9)
F = (R + B0SB) 1 (P 0 + B0SA) (D.10)
Practically, the solution can be found with generalised Schur decomposition of (D.7).
D.2 Binding constraint on instrument
Following Laséen and Svensson (2011) we augment the original system by the vector
of predetermined state variables zt  (zt;t; zt+1;t : : : zt+T;t)0 in order to account for the
sequence of anticipated policy shocks. Vector zt denotes a projection in period t of future
realizations of shocks, zt+;t;  = 0; 1; :::; T: zt;t follows a moving average process
zt;t = t;t +
TX
s=1
t;t s;
where t;t s; s = 0; 1; ::T; are zero-mean i:i:d: shocks. For T = 0; zt;t = t;t: For T > 0;
the stochastic shocks following a moving average process:
zt+;t+1 = zt+;t + t+;t+1;  = 1; :::; T
zt+T+1;t+1 = t+T+1;t+1:
The above stochastic shocks process can be rewritten in the following matrix form
zt+1 = Azz
t + t+1;
where t+1   t+1;t+1; t+2;t+1 : : : t+T+1;t+10 is a (T + 1) vector of i:i:d:shocks and Az is
(n1 + 1) (n1 + 1) matrix
Az =

0T1 IT
0 01T

We denote the vector of predetermined state variables xct = [z
0
t; x
0
t]
0 ; where superscript
c stands for constrained, and vector zt consists of anticipated shocks.
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Matrices in equation (D.2) can be written as
Ac11 =

Az 0
0 A11

; Bc1 =

0
B1

and matrices Q, P and R can be redened to account for additional state variables (we
keep the same notation).
Finally, equation for policy instrument has to be augmented to account for reaction to
shocks zt: This is achieved by replacing the top left square submatrix of new 	21 with R:
As before, the solution can be found by solving the augmented system (D.7) with Schur
decomposition.
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Appendix E
Commitment: application of the
Laséen-Svensson (2011) approach
Consider the standard LQ RE model. The policy objective is quadratic
Lt =
1
2
1X
s=t
s tg0sQgs =
1
2
1X
s=t
s t (y0sQys + 2y0sPus + u0sRus) : (E.1)
subject to the system of linear constraints
xt+1
Xt+1

=

A11 A12
A21 A22
 
xt
Xt

+

B1
B2

[ut] +

C
0

[t+1] ; or (E.2)
yt+1 = Ayt +But + t+1; and x0 given, (E.3)
where yt = [x0t; X
0
t]
0 : We assume A22 is invertible. We consider standard discretionary
policy.
Set up the Lagrangian,
L0 = minfutg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t

(y0tQyt + 2y0tPut + u0tRut) + 20t+1(Ayt +But + t+1   yt+1)

The rst order conditions for ut are
 B0Ett+1 = P 0yt +Rut (E.4)
The rst order conditions for yt are
A0Ett+1 = t   Qyt   Put (E.5)
142
which can be written in the matrix form24 I 0 00 0 A0
0 0  B0
3524 yt+1ut+1
Ett+1
35 =
24 A B 0 Q  P I
P 0 R 0
3524 ytut
t
35+
24 t+10
0
35 (E.6)
Partition (E.6) as

~G11 ~G12 ~G13 ~G14 ~G15

266664
xt+1
Xt+1
ut+1
Et1t+1
Et2t+1
377775
=

~D11 ~D12 ~D13 ~D14 ~D15

266664
xt
Xt
ut
Et1t
Et2t
377775+
266664
Ct+1
0
0
0
0
377775
and reshu­ e so xt and 2t come rst (since we have initial values for these)

~G11 ~G15 ~G12 ~G13 ~G14

266664
xt+1
Et2t+1
Xt+1
ut+1
Et1t+1
377775
=

~D11 ~D15 ~D12 ~D13 ~D14

266664
xt
Et2t
Xt
ut
Et1t
377775+
266664
Ct+1
0
0
0
0
377775
let
kt =

xt
Et2t

and t =
24 Xtut
Et1t
35
Then
GEt

kt+1
t+1

= D

kt
t

We dene the auxiliary variables 
t
t

= ZH

kt
t

where we will associate the stable roots with , and the unstable with .
Use the generalized Schur decomposition G = QSZH and D = QTZH , premultiply
with the non-singular matrix QH from the generalized Schur decomposition to get
QHQSZHEt

kt+1
t+1

= QHQTZH

kt
t

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then we get
SEt

t+1
t+1

= T

t
t

where S and T are both upper triangular, then
S S
0 S

Et

t+1
t+1

=

T T
0 T
 
t
t

The lower right block contains the unstable roots, so a stable solution requires that t = 0
for all t. The remaining equations are then SEtt+1 = Tt , which we solve
Ett+1 = S 1 Tt
since S is invertible. The reason is that det(S) equals the product of the diagonal ele-
ments since S is triangular, and that all diagonal elements are non-zero since jTii=Siij < 1
are sorted rst so there cannot be any zeros in the diagonal of S; det(S) is therefore
non-zero and S is invertible.
E.1 Matrix Singularity
Instead of (E.2) and (E.3), let the dynamic equations be

xt+1
HEtXt+1

=

A11 A12
A21 A22
 
xt
Xt

+

B1
B2

ut +

C
0

t+1; or (E.7)
~Hyt+1 = Ayt +But + t+1; and x0 given, where ~H =

I 0
0 H

where H can be singular (if not, premultiply by H 1 to get the system on standard form).
The rst order conditions for yt, corresponding to (E.5), are then
A0Ett+1 = ~H 0t   Qyt   Put (E.8)
so we can write (E.7), (E.8), and (E.4) as , corresponding to (E.6), as24 ~H 0 00 0 A0
0 0  B0
3524 yt+1ut+1
Ett+1
35 =
24 A B 0 Q  P ~H 0
P 0 R 0
3524 ytut
t
35+
24 t+10
0
35
We can then apply the same solution algorithm as for to this system.
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Appendix F
Parameterisation
U (ct; nt) =
C1 t
1     
n1+ t
1 +  
Uc (ct; nt) = C
 
t
Uc (c

t ; n

t ) = C
 
t
Un (ct; nt) =  n t
Un (c

t ; n

t ) =  n t
F (ezt ; kt; nt) = Ae
ztktn
1 
t = Yt
Fk(e
zt ; kt; nt) = Ae
ztk 1t n
1 
t = 
Yt
kt
Fn(e
zt ; kt; nt) = (1  )Aeztktn t = (1  )
Yt
nt
Yt = Ze
ztktN
1 
t
Rt = 1 + it(1   t)
Y t = Ze
zt kt N
1 
t
Rt = 1 + i

t (1   t )
St =
PFt
PHt
:
Pt
PHt
=
 
(1  ) + S1 t
 1
1 
Pt
PFt
=
 
(1  )S 1t + 
 1
1 
P t
P Ht
=
 
(1  )S1 t + 
 1
1 
P t
P Ft
=
 
(1  ) + S 1t
 1
1 
pFt(z) = Etp

Ft(z), pHt(z) = Etp

Ht(z)
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 
(1  ) + S1 t
 1
1  = t 
(1  )S1 t + 
 1
1  = t =  tSt 
1   + S 1t 
 1
1  =  t
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Appendix G
Normalisation
We introduce the following notations
wt =
Wt
Pt
=
Wt
PHt
Xt =
Pmt
PHt
dt =
Dt
PHt
at =
At
PHt
bt =
Bt
P Ft
pSt =
PSt
PHt
st+1 = st = 1
wt =
W t
P t
=
W t
P Ft
Xt =
P mt
P Ft
dt =
Dt
P Ft
bt =
Bt
P Ft
at =
At
PHt
pSt =
P St
P Ft
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